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This study examines the complex situation of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in post-
Suharto Indonesia, focusing on Chinese in two of the largest Indonesian cities, Medan 
and Surabaya.  The fall of Suharto in May 1998 led to the opening up of a democratic and 
liberal space to include a diversity of political actors and ideals in the political process. 
However, due to the absence of an effective, genuinely reformist party or political 
coalition, predatory politico-business interests nurtured under the New Order managed to 
capture the new political and economic regimes. As a result, corruption and internal 
mismanagement continue to plague the bureaucracy in the country. The indigenous 
Indonesian population generally still perceives the Chinese minority as an alien minority 
who are wealthy, selfish, exclusive and opportunistic; this is partially due to the role 
some Chinese have played in perpetuating corrupt business practices. As targets of 
extortion and corruption by bureaucratic officials and youth/crime organisations, the 
Chinese are not merely passive bystanders of the democratisation process in Indonesia 
nor powerless victims of corrupt practices. By focusing on the important interconnected 
aspects of the role Chinese play in post-Suharto Indonesia, via business, politics and civil 
society, I argue, through a combination of Anthony Giddens‘s structure-agency theory as 
well as Pierre Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus and field, that although the Chinese are 
constrained by various conditions, they also have played an active role in shaping these 
conditions. They have thus played an active role in shaping the democratisation process 
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Contemplating the Role of the Ethnic Chinese: Ethnic Politics, 




In 2010 Sofyan Tan (陈金扬), a Chinese Indonesian social activist, who was 
previously a physician, made history in the city of Medan by being the first ethnic 
Chinese to run for mayor. Not a stranger to politics (having lost in the race for a seat in 
the North Sumatra regional representatives council [DPD- Dewan Perwakilan Daerah] in 
2004), Tan was initially chosen as the candidate for deputy mayor by the incumbent 
mayor. Later when the incumbent decided to choose someone else to be his running mate, 
Tan was nominated by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P- Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, a powerful party in Indonesia) and the Prosperous 
Peace Party (PDS- Partai Damai Sejahtera, a party led by Christians). He was paired 
with a Muslim woman, in the hopes that this cross-ethnic, cross-religious pairing would 
attract many voters. The race was an interesting one for what it shows us about the 
politics of ethnicity, money, criminality and civil society associations as they effect the 
Chinese in post-Suharto Indonesia. Tan insisted that he would run an honest government 
if he was elected, making no promises of political favours to anyone who backed him. 
One of the main Chinese Indonesian civil society organisations, the Chinese Indonesian 
Social Association (PSMTI- Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia), backed Tan, 
but the other, the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI- Perhimpunan Indonesia 
Tionghoa), possibly due to his refusing to promise business contracts for their support, 
turned away from him. In fact in the first round of the election, INTI openly supported 
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one of the candidates (not the incumbent) who used to be the regional leader of an 
influential youth/crime organisation in North Sumatra and had many criminal ties, 
important for business in Medan city. Tan and his running mate unexpectedly defeated 
eight other candidate pairs in the first round by gaining the second highest votes and thus 
ran against the incumbent in the second round. Afraid of Tan‘s popularity with the poor, 
to whom he had given much support, the incumbent conducted a major smear campaign 
against him. Rumours were spread that Tan would turn Medan into a ‗Chinatown‘ and 
build many Chinese temples instead of mosques. In addition, many Chinese voters were 
intimidated by rumours and mobile phone text messages that warned if Tan won the 
election, there would be riots against the Chinese. Consequently it appeared that voters 
were scared off and Tan and his running mate lost in the second round of the race. 
Tan‘s story implies a paradox of Indonesia‘s new democracy as well as of the 
position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians since the collapse of Suharto‘s authoritarian 
regime. Although in Indonesia‘s new democracy, there has been an opening up of a more 
democratic and liberal political space, which has led to the emergence of competitive 
electoral politics in Indonesia, at the same time this democratic space has been marred by 
money politics and smear campaigns during elections. In this democratic space the 
Chinese are free to participate in electoral politics and run for public office, but very few 
of them have been elected because the Chinese are still perceived as an alien minority by 
the pribumis (indigenous Indonesians). It is ironic that although Tan has made significant 
contributions to helping the indigenous population, he is still regarded as a Chinese by 
the indigenous majority. This reflects the ambivalent feelings the pribumis have towards 
the Chinese in Indonesia. But it is even more ironic that some businesspeople in INTI, 
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who shared the same ethnicity with Tan, and who themselves are often deemed a target of 
bureaucratic extortion, preferred not to support Tan, who was relatively clean and was 
committed to end all sorts of corruption and bureaucratic abuse. Instead, they channelled 
their support to another candidate who could promise them business favours. In so doing 
these Chinese continued perpetuating their ambivalent position in Indonesian society, and 
to a certain extent contributed to shaping the predatory characteristics of Indonesia‘s new 
democracy. 
This study looks at how the new political, business and socio-cultural 
environment in post-Suharto Indonesia influences the actions of the Chinese minority, 
while at the same time examining how the Chinese display active agency in reacting to 
and shaping this political, business and socio-cultural environment that constrains and 
facilitates their actions. In this way the Chinese contribute to the shaping of their 
continuing ambivalent position. In business, Chinese businesspeople often resort to semi-
legal and illegal means to safeguard their business and personal interests. Very few 
Chinese businesspeople refuse to become targets of extortion by the power-holders and 
gangsters or choose to get themselves organised and protest against the extortion. From a 
socio-cultural perspective, Chinese Indonesians established several ethnic-based 
voluntary associations that focus on promoting Chinese culture and socialisation 
activities among the Chinese. These organisations have assisted the local governments to 
establish cultural and business connections with China, as well as promoting philanthropy. 
These organisations, although involved in many positive activities, contribute to the view 
that the Chinese are very insular and exclusive. There are Chinese community leaders and 
social activists who reach out to the wider society by establishing non-ethnic-based socio-
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cultural organisations that focus on promoting cross-ethnic understanding and solidarity, 
however, such leaders and activists are rare. In electoral politics, some Chinese 
Indonesians have run for public office with the aim of bringing positive changes for the 
people but some participated in electoral politics in order to safeguard their business and 
personal interests. In addition, some Chinese businesspeople supported reform-minded 
electoral candidates without expecting any benefits in return, but some sponsored 
politicians associated with predatory forces in order to get political favours for their 
businesses. Therefore there are Chinese Indonesians who have acted as both agents of 
change and reform, while others have been involved in maintaining the status quo 
inherited from Suharto‘s New Order regime. It is not surprising that the ambivalence of 
their position in post-New Order Indonesia has increased.  
This study further argues that under a democratic society, where there is a lack of 
good governance which promotes the rule of law, accountability and transparency, the 
economically privileged ethnic minority that is deemed as ‗outsiders‘ as well as targets of 
extortion, and has not been fully accepted by the majority indigenous population, tends to 
actively resort to illegal and semi-legal means as well as opportunistic tactics to gain 
business and personal interests, and make use of intra-ethnic linkages to safeguard their 
ethnic identity and culture. 
This study adopts a combination of Anthony Giddens‘s structure-agency theory as 
well as Pierre Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus and field as a framework for examining 
strategies and tactics that Chinese Indonesians adopt to safeguard their business and 
personal interests as well as ethnic and cultural identities in the post-Suharto era. Both 
Guddens and Bourdieu perceive social actors as agents that actively respond to and shape 
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their social structures. Giddens (1984) argues that our social reality is shaped by both 
social forces and active human agency. All people are knowledgeable about the 
conditions and consequences of their actions in their daily lives. Although people are not 
entirely free to choose their own actions, they have agency. Therefore, Giddens sees 
social structures as both the medium and the outcome of the actors‘ actions.  
 
As human beings, we do make choices, and we do not simply respond 
passively to events around us. The way forward in bridging the gap 
between ‗structural‘ and ‗action‘ approaches is to recognize that we 
actively make and remake social structure during the course of our 
everyday activities. 
(Giddens, 1989, p. 705, emphasis in the original)  
 
  
Habitus, according to Bourdieu (1990a, p. 131), is a system of acquired 
dispositions through which people deal with the social world. Bourdieu (1990b) also 
notes that ―[a]s an acquired system of generative schemes, the habitus makes possible the 
free production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the condition of 
production‖ (p. 55). In other words, habitus is an orientation to individual action. The 
concept of field complements the idea of habitus. A field is a relatively autonomous arena 
within which people act strategically, depending on their habitus, to enhance their capital. 
Examples of fields include politics, religion, and philosophy (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 72-74). 
Bourdieu considers the habitus the union of structures and agency: ―…habitus operates as 
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a structuring structure able to selectively perceive and to transform the objective structure 
[field] according to its own structure while, at the same time, being re-structured, 
transformed in its makeup by the pressure of the objective structure‖ (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 
46-47). In other words, habitus shapes the objective structure (field) but at the same time 
it is also shaped by the objective structure. This concept is parallel to Giddens‘s structure-
agency theory. One of the significant strengths of Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus lies in its 
consideration of actors‘ social positions in the study of habitus and this is never discussed 
in Giddens‘s theory. Bourdieu (1984, p. 114; 1998, pp. 6-8) argues that a person‘s habitus 
is structured by his or her position within a social space, which is determined by his or 
her sociological characteristics in the form of volume and kinds of economic capital, 
cultural capital and social capital possessed. Economic capital refers to material resources 
that can be turned into money or property rights. Cultural capital refers to non-material 
goods such as types of knowledge, skills and expertise, educational credentials, and 
aesthetic preferences acquired through upbringing and education that can be converted in 
to economic capital. Social capital refers to networks of contacts that can be used to 
maintain or advance one‘s social position (Bourdieu, 1986). 
According to Bourdieu (1993, p. 73), actors who are well endowed with capital 
and therefore enjoy privileged positions in a particular field tend to defend the status quo 
of the field in order to safeguard their capital, whereas those least endowed with capital 
and therefore occupy the less advantaged positions within the field are inclined to 
challenge the status quo of the field via subversion strategies in order to enhance their 
capital and improve their social positions. This argument offers a valid explanation of 
why some Chinese businesspeople in the opening story of this thesis chose to support the 
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mayoral candidate who could promise them business favours should he get elected and 
not Tan who was committed to end all sorts of corruption and bureaucratic abuse. 
However, Bourdieu‘s argument cannot explain why on the other hand, there are also 
some actors who possess a lot of capital within a field choose to challenge the status quo 
through certain subversion strategies. For instance, in the 2010 mayoral election in 
Medan, there were also some wealthy Chinese businesspeople who decided to support 
Tan, even though he made no promises of political favours to anyone who supported him 
(I will elaborate more on this in Chapter Six). I argue that Giddens‘s emphasis on actors‘ 
free will within the constraints imposed by social structures is useful in explaining such 
actions: 
 
…[A]lthough…[social structures] might constrain what we do, they do not 
determine what we do. I could choose to live without using money, should 
I be firmly resolved to do so, even if it might prove very difficult to eke 
out an existence from day to day…[T]he fact that I use the monetary 
system contributes in a minor, yet necessary, way to the very existence of 
that system. If everyone, or even the majority of people, at some point 
decided to avoid using money, the monetary system would dissolve. 
(Giddens, 1989, p. 705) 
 
Although the example used in Giddens‘s quotes is extreme and unimaginable in 
the present day, it clearly shows that Giddens sees social structures as being both 
constraining and enabling to human actions. Social structures might constrain human 
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actions but at the same time they also enable social actors to challenge the status quo. In 
other words, social actors have a choice to defend or challenge the status quo.  
Hence, this is the theoretical framework for this study: Social structures constrain 
and enable the actors‘ actions. The actors‘ actions are always oriented by their habitus, 
which is dependent on the volume and kinds of capital possessed. Those who are well 
endowed with capital in a social structure tend to defend the status quo of the structure in 
order to safeguard their capital and positions, whereas those least endowed with capital 
within the structure are inclined to challenge it via subversion strategies. However, the 
actors‘ actions are also dependent on their free will within the constraints imposed by the 
social structure. They have a choice to defend or challenge the status quo of the social 
structure.  
The Chinese Indonesians are an ethnic minority, who play a crucial role in the 
Indonesian economy, but at the same time are still perceived by the indigenous majority 
as ‗outsiders‘. While the anti-Chinese sentiments among non-Chinese and the corrupt 
bureaucracy in the post-New Order era have constrained the Chinese from enjoying full 
civil rights and equality, these factors do not determine the Chinese people‘s reactions. 
Chinese Indonesians have reacted to such circumstances in different ways. In the opening 
story of this chapter, for instance, Sofyan Tan chose to initiate and engage in endeavours 
that sought to alter the indigenous Indonesians‘ perceptions of the Chinese. He also ran 
for mayorship and was committed to eliminating corruption and bureaucratic abuse. On 
the other hand, many wealthy Chinese businesspeople in Medan decided to support 
another candidate who could promise them business favours should he get elected. I 
argue that the position of Chinese Indonesians as a whole is increasingly ambivalent and 
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more complex in the post-New Order era because Chinese Indonesians like Sofyan Tan 
who have been relentlessly working to rectify the racial stereotypes of Chinese among 
pribumis are fewer than those who continue to reinforce such stereotypes.  It can be said 
that Chinese Indonesians like Tan are ‗a minority within a minority‘. Thus following 
Giddens‘s structure-agency theory and Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus and field, this study 
considers Chinese Indonesians as social actors who by taking actions within the 
constraints imposed by social structures, on the one hand perpetuate their ambivalent 
position, but on the other hand may attempt to rectify it. 
 
1.1 Rethinking the Position of Ethnic Chinese Indonesians 
In comparison with ethnic Chinese in other Southeast Asian countries such as 
Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia, the social and political positions of ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia are relatively vulnerable. Due to the same religious beliefs shared 
by the Chinese minorities and the majority of indigenous populations in Thailand and the 
Philippines, as well as the policies of colonial authorities in the pre-independence 
Philippines and the kings in Thailand that encouraged the assimilation and intermarriage 
of the Chinese into indigenous societies, the Chinese in both countries have generally 
been well assimilated into indigenous populations and play an essential role in not only 
the economic development of their countries, but also in politics (Sidel, 2008, p. 131; 
Skinner, 1957; 1996; Akira, 2008; Wickberg, 1965; Carino, 2004).
2
 There have been 
politicians with some Chinese ancestry who became members of parliament, or prime 
ministers in Thailand or presidents in the Philippines (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p. 
                                                 
2
 Most of the Chinese in Thailand and the Philippines are respectively Buddhists and Roman Catholics.   
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4; Suryadinata, 1993a, pp. 298-300; Hau, 2014). Conversely, the colonial authorities in 
British colonial Malaya and Dutch East Indies discouraged the intermarriage and 
assimilation of the Chinese into indigenous societies (Sidel, 2008, pp. 130-131). 
Moreover, from the colonial period until the present day, very few Chinese in Malaysia 
and Indonesia believe in Islam, which is the religious belief of most indigenous people in 
both countries (Tan, 2000; Ong, 2008). These two factors have strengthened the 
segregation between Chinese and indigenous populations in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Like their counterparts in Indonesia, the Chinese in Malaysia are generally perceived as 
an alien minority group by the indigenous majority and have been encountering various 
barriers in entry into the civil service and public universities as well as in business 
activities, especially after the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), an 
affirmative action programme in favour of the indigenous majority, in 1970 (Thock, 2005; 
Lee & Heng, 2000, pp. 208-209).
3
 However, the proportion of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia 
has always been much larger than their counterparts in Indonesia.
4
 Moreover, massive 
anti-Chinese violence has been fairly minimal in Malaysia and the post-independence 
governments have never implemented assimilation policies to curtail Chinese culture, 
like what happened during the New Order regime in Indonesia.
5
 Therefore, most Chinese 
in Malaysia still maintain Chinese languages and many Chinese customs. In addition, the 
                                                 
3
 The NEP was formulated after the broke out of inter-ethnic riots between Chinese and Malays (the largest 
indigenous ethnic group in Malaysia) on May 13, 1969. For the background and factors behind the riots, 
see Kua (2007) and Comber (2009a). 
4
 When Malaya (present-day Peninsular Malaysia) first achieved independence in 1957, the Chinese 
constituted 37.17 per cent of the total population (Phang, 2000, p. 96, Table 4.1). In 1970 (seven years after 
the formation of Malaysia that comprised Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak), their share of the total population 
declined to 35.51 per cent (Phang, 2000, p. 96, Table 4.1). Due to the slow-down in the population growth 
rate of the Chinese, their proportion further declined to 24.6 per cent in 2010 (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2010). In Indonesia, the Chinese constituted about 2.03 per cent of the total population in 1930 
and their proportion declined to 1.2 per cent in both 2000 and 2010 (Ananta, Arifin & Bakhtiar, 2008, pp. 
20, 23, Table 2.1; Ananta, Arifin, Hasbullah, Handayani & Pramono, 2013, p. 14, Table 2). 
5
 The inter-ethnic riots between Chinese and Malays on May 13, 1969 is the only massive violence against 
the Chinese in Malaysia since independence.  
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Chinese in Malaysia have always been actively involved in politics. Since independence, 
there have been several Chinese members of parliament and a few cabinet ministers, 
deputy ministers as well as state chief ministers (ketua menteri negeri) in Malaysia 
(Suryadinata, 1993a, pp. 300-303; Lee & Heng, 2000; Cao, 2005).
6
 
It is therefore not surprising that research on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia over the 
last few decades has generally been sympathetic; academics tend to focus on their 
marginalised position, their experiences of being discriminated against as a minority and 
their experiences as victims of ethnic violence. However I suggest that leading scholarly 
works in this field of study portray Chinese Indonesians as passive and powerless actors, 
while being victims of prejudice and discrimination, and unable to take independent 
actions. The long history of anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia and the long standing 
discriminatory policies of Suharto‘s authoritarian regime against the Chinese are key 
reasons for this tendency in the field of study. For examples, Leo Suryadinata‘s (1992) 
and Charles A. Coppel‘s (1983) studies focus on how the discriminatory policies of the 
pre-New Order and the New Order regimes marginalised the Chinese minority politically, 
socially and economically. They attribute the reasons behind such policies to the jealousy 
of pribumis against the Chinese, who play a dominant role in the Indonesian economy, 
and the perceptions that the Indonesian nation includes only indigenous Indonesian 
people. The Chinese minority was perceived as an alien minority; other minorities 
considered external to the Indonesian nation, such as Arabs and Indians, do not encounter 
as much suspicion or hostility from indigenous Indonesians because their numbers are 
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relatively small compared to the Chinese.
7
 Hence, they are considered too few to cause 
political and social instability. In addition, unlike the Arabs who are almost exclusively 
Muslim, very few Chinese are Muslim.
8
 Therefore, the Chinese do not tend to be 
associated with Islam and this tends to give them a double minority status in the world‘s 
largest Muslim majority nation.
9
  
Mona Lohanda (2002), in her study of the Chinese in colonial Java, argues that 
despite having lived in Java for generations, the Chinese minority was still perceived as 
outsiders who had ties with an external power, that is the land of their ancestors. They 
were consequently marginalised politically by the Dutch colonial rulers and were 
excluded by indigenous Indonesian nationalists from the Indonesian nationalist 
movement. A recent study by Nobuto Yamamoto (2011) points out that although 
peranakan Chinese journalists of Sino-Malay newspapers had played a pivotal role in the 
development of the Indonesian nationalist movement during the 1920s and 1930s, they 
were excluded from indigenous formal politics. No Indonesian political parties (with the 
exception of the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) accepted ethnic Chinese as members. 
                                                 
7
 In 2000, it was estimated that Chinese Indonesians constituted about 1.2 per cent of the total Indonesian 
population (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 23, Table 2.1). At the same time, the Arabs and Indians formed 0.043 
per cent and 0.017 per cent of the total Indonesian population (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 29). The figures, 
which are the latest data on the percentage of ethnic Chinese, Arabs and Indians in total Indonesian 
population, were calculated directly from the raw data of the 2000 Population Census as the Census only 
includes quantitative information on these ethnic minorities in some provinces. See also Ananta et al. 
(2008, p. 21). 
8
 In 2000, 98.27 per cent of Arab Indonesians were Muslims. Conversely, only 5.41 per cent of Chinese 
Indonesians were Muslims (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 30, Table 2.3). 
9
 In 2000, Muslims constituted 88.22 per cent of the population in Indonesia, while Christians and 
Buddhists were 8.92 percent and 0.84 per cent respectively (Suryadinata, Arifin & Ananta, 2003, p. 104, 
Table 4.1.1). 35.09 per cent of Chinese were Christians and 53.82 per cent Buddhists (Ananta et al., 2008, 
p. 30, Table 2.3). In 2010, the percentage of Muslims and Buddhists had slightly decreased to 87.54 and 
0.71 respectively, while Christians had increased to 9.87 per cent. 42.80 per cent of Chinese were 
Christians and 49.06 per cent Buddhists (Ananta et al., 2013, p. 21, Table 3). The figures for 2010 are the 
latest official figures on the religious composition of Indonesia and Chinese Indonesians. However, to date, 
the official figures on Arab and Indian Indonesian population as well as the religious composition of both 
ethnic groups in 2010 are not available. 
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Consequently, peranakan Chinese journalists were left out from accounts of Indonesian 
national history. In a similar way Helen Pausacker (2005) examines the historical and 
contemporary involvement of the peranakan Chinese in Javanese wayang (shadow 
puppetry). The contributions of the Chinese politically and culturally, according to both 
authors, have been lost from the collective memory due to political factors and racism. 
J. A. C. Mackie (1976) and Jemma Purdey (2005; 2006) look into events of 
violence against the ethnic Chinese and argue that the Chinese are always made 
scapegoats during economic crisis and political turbulence because of anti-Chinese 
sentiments among pribumis. In his study on the identity of ethnic Chinese in post-Suharto 
Jakarta, Hoon Chang-Yau (2008) points out that although the relatively open and liberal 
environment after the overthrow of the New Order regime allowed the Chinese to openly 
express their identity and organise themselves, they continue to occupy a vulnerable 
position in Indonesian society as anti-Chinese sentiments are still alive among the 
pribumis. The Chinese have yet to be fully accepted by their pribumi counterparts since 
many pribumis still have stereotypes of the Chinese based on essentialist assumptions of 
race, origin and class. Chinese Indonesians are perceived as foreign descendants because 
they still practise Chinese culture that is different from indigenous cultures in the country. 
Moreover, they are still perceived by many pribumis as economically strong but 
exclusive and selfish (pp. 125-145). Thung Ju Lan (2009) in her article on the direct 
participation of Chinese Indonesians in electoral politics makes a similar argument that 
not many Chinese electoral candidates were elected into local, regional or national 
parliaments because indigenous Indonesians have generally not yet been willing to accept 
Chinese Indonesians‘ role in formal politics. 
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The connection between violence and the unacceptability of the Chinese in formal 
politics is made explicit in Hui Yew-Foong‘s (2011) ethno-historical study of the Chinese 
communities in West Kalimantan and their plight as political orphans. Hui reveals that 
the Chinese were seen as ―signifiers of wealth‖ (p. 277) by the indigenous population and 
experienced harassment and extortion from local indigenous gangsters from time to time 
(pp. 275-276). During the anti-Madurese violence perpetrated by the Malays and Dayaks, 
the indigenous communities of West Kalimantan, in Sambas District in 1999, although 
the Chinese were not targeted, they nevertheless closed their shops and some of them 
placed foods, drinks and other supplies outside their doors for the Malays and Dayaks in 
order to safeguard their property from being looted (pp. 274-277).  
According to Hui, the position of the Chinese in the province remains ambivalent 
even after the opening up of political space in the post-New Order era, as the political 
freedom and political achievement of the Chinese in post-New Order West Kalimantan 
were met with a backlash from local indigenous communities. In November 2007, a 
Chinese, Christiandy Sanjaya (黄汉山), paired with a Dayak, was elected as the deputy 
governor of West Kalimantan during the gubernatorial election in November 2007. The 
Malays, another major indigenous group in West Kalimantan, were upset as ―they had 
been denied representation in the highest offices of the province‖ (p. 299). In early 
December 2007, a dispute between a Chinese and a Malay over a purported accident in 
Pontianak turned violent, in which rioters attacked and vandalised properties owned by 
ethnic Chinese. Hui suggests that the riots could be traced back to the gubernatorial 
election that saw the victory of the Chinese candidate. Some Malays ―are willing to resort 
to violence to express their displeasure with the Chinese for gaining political ascendance 
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at their expense‖ (Hui, 2011, p. 303). Later, nine Chinese community leaders in 
Pontianak issue a public apology in the press to the Malay community. Hui saw the 
issuance of the public apology as an act to ―appease the injured Malay community‖ (p. 
302) that had experienced electoral defeat.  
Although these works have documented important events and attitudes towards 
the Chinese in Indonesian history, they still ascribe a largely passive and powerless role 
to Chinese Indonesians. They scarcely touch on the active human agency on the part of 
Chinese Indonesians in creating, deploying or shaping their position in Indonesian society. 
Mary F. Somers‘s Ph.D. thesis (1965) on Peranakan Chinese politics in the 1950s and 
Leo Suryadinata‘s work (1981) on Peranakan Chinese politics from the 1910s to the 
early 1940s are two of the few scholarly works that focus on the active role of Chinese 
Indonesians in shaping their political fortunes. To my knowledge, Marleen Dieleman and 
colleagues‘ edited volume (2011) is the first scholarly work that claims to adopt 
Giddens‘s structure-agency theory in examining how Chinese Indonesians demonstrated 
active agency in shaping their destinies and crucial social trends in the country during 
periods of crisis and regime change. The work covers the role of Chinese Indonesians in 
dealing with issues of assimilation, identity as well as civil rights. The contributors have 
made a compelling case that Chinese Indonesians were not merely passive and powerless 
bystanders and victims in Indonesian history, but were also active agents of change 
during periods of crises. One of the papers by Patricia Tjiook Liem, for example, 
examines the experience of a simple Chinese shopkeeper, Loe Joe Djin, in early twentieth 
century Batavia (present-day Jakarta), who was found guilty of being an accessory to 
theft. During the Dutch colonial era, the Europeans versus the indigenous people and 
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other Asians in the Indies were subjected to two different legal systems, and the 
sentences inflicted on Asians were often arbitrary and harsher than those imposed upon 
Europeans; at the same time appeal was impossible. Insisting he was innocent and that 
the sentence was unjust, upon his release, Loe complained by telegram to the Chinese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Beijing and to the Chinese ambassador in The Hague. His 
appeal to China prompted the Chinese government to pressure the Dutch government to 
treat the Chinese equally to the Europeans in the criminal administration of justice under 
Dutch law. Subsequently the system was changed, and in minor criminal cases, 
Europeans and Asians were equated without distinction.
10
 Tjiook-Liem‘s work 
demonstrates how Loe was not a passive and powerless victim of injustice. He displayed 
active agency in fighting against the unjust legal system and his action triggered a legal 
reform in the Indies. 
There are some political economists who portray the wealthy Chinese big 
businesspeople as active agents of capitalism in New Order Indonesia. Richard Robison 
(1986; 1992) and Jamie Mackie (2003) depict how the highly patrimonial New Order 
regime co-opted a few ethnic Chinese capitalists into the networks of patronage, in which 
the pribumi politico-bureaucrats had dominant power. Although the Chinese capitalists 
were economically powerful, their marginalised ethnicity made them politically impotent 
and rendered them what Christian Chua (2008, following Riggs 1964, pp.189-193; 1966, 
pp 249-254) refers to as a ―pariah business class‖. The concept of ―pariah 
entrepreneurship‖ Riggs created to refer to Chinese businesspeople in his research in 
Thailand; these businesspeople were politically vulnerable and had to depend on politico-
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 However, for serious criminal cases, the Europeans and the indigenous people as well as other Asians 




bureaucrat protectors and patrons for patronage and privileged access to facilities. In 
return, the businesspeople contributed unofficial funds to the personal income of their 
protectors and patrons. Chua suggested that in Suharto‘s New Order the Chinese played a 
similar game; in order to gain patronage and privileged access to licenses, contracts and 
state bank credit, they established patron-client relations with politico-bureaucrats. This 
shows that the Chinese capitalists played a significant role in forming the political-
business oligarchy in New Order Indonesia. 
In his work, Chua explored in detail the active role played by Chinese Indonesian 
big business in shaping their position and reinforcing the stereotypes about the Chinese in 
the post-New Order era. His works (2005; 2008; 2009) examine the impact of political 
democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia on Chinese Indonesian conglomerates and 
how the conglomerates managed to resist, influence and even mould political reforms. 
All his works point out that although the collapse of the New Order regime put an end to 
the highly centralised, predatory patronage networks that secured the dominance of 
Chinese conglomerates in the private sector, Chinese conglomerates were able to react 
and adapt to the post-authoritarian environment in the country via six ways. Firstly, in the 
process of bank restructuring carried out by the new government, Chinese tycoons tried 
to buy back their assets on sale through third parties or their offshore companies. They 
did not encounter much competition since external investors were not enthusiastic to take 
over the assets, due to the inscrutability of the actual composition of the companies and to 
the generally muddy business environment in Indonesia. Secondly, some Chinese 
business elites tried to infiltrate the new regulatory institutions by bringing in and 
supporting close or bribeable people in order to influence the composition, orientation 
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and arbitration of the institutions. Thirdly, Chinese tycoons established political 
connections with new power-holders and potential power-holders such as opposition 
leaders by contributing money to their political activities. Fourthly, Chinese 
conglomerates also resorted to financial coercion to keep the media favourable to them. 
Their tactics included bribes, lawsuits, intimidation of journalists, threats to withdraw 
advertising, and take-over of media that were critical to Chinese big business. Fifthly, 
Chinese tycoons bribed the new politico-bureaucrats to expedite the facilitation of 
business opportunities. Sixthly, some Chinese big businesspeople hired thugs in the 
provinces outside Jakarta to intimidate local populations and local politicians and 
subordinated them to private interests. Chua‘s works show that Chinese conglomerates 
were able to survive in democratised Indonesia by resorting to various extra-legal tactics 
because the political democratisation in post-Suharto era has yet to lead to the emergence 
of good governance that emphasises transparency and the rule of law, although there is an 
increasing effort to enforce the rule of law. By actively adopting these corrupt tactics, 
Chinese tycoons played a crucial role in shaping and perpetuating the new corrupt, 
predatory political-business system. At the same time, the ongoing wealth accumulation, 
exploitation and corruption by Chinese tycoons has reinforced the stereotypes of the 
Chinese as corrupt and opportunistic. As Jemma Purdey (2009) in her review of Chua‘s 
work (2008) rightly puts it, 
 
Chua‘s Chinese conglomerates play a very large and largely detrimental 
part (as they did during the New Order) in rendering futile any efforts to 
19 
 
remove [the boundaries between ethnic Chinese and pribumi Indonesians] 
and alter the nation‘s perceptions of the ―ethnic Chinese‖. 
(p. 113) 
 
Yen-Ling Tsai‘s work (2008; 2011) on Chinese exclusivity and the asymmetrical 
relationship between ethnic Chinese and pribumis is another body of scholarly work that 
focuses on the active role of Chinese Indonesians in reproducing and perpetuating their 
ambivalent position in post-Suharto Indonesia. Based on her field research in Medan and 
Jakarta, Tsai notes that after the anti-Chinese violence in May 1998, many Chinese 
thought that they could no longer depend on the state‘s security apparatus. Thus, they 
chose to live in gated communities, which were significantly more expensive than non-
gated communities.
11
 Security guards, who are mostly pribumis, are employed to ensure 
the safety of the communities. Tsai points out that the more the Chinese choose to protect 
themselves by living in gated communities, the more they reinforce the pribumis‘ 
perception of the Chinese as an exclusive ethnic minority. In addition, the more the 
Chinese rely on pribumi security guards for safety and protection, the more they 
reproduce the stereotypes of Chinese as wealthy and as the perfect target of extortion. 
Scholarly works on ethnic Chinese Indonesians show that the historical 
development of ethnic relations and various policies of the different governments in 
Indonesia have constrained what Chinese have been able to do, but at the same time it is 
possible to see that the Chinese themselves have contributed to creating and reproducing 
their ambivalent position. This will be further explored in the chapters to come. At the 
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 It should be noted that gated communities are not entirely new - they already existed before May 1998; 
but class-based residential patterns certainly have intensified after the May 1998 riots. 
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same time the changing political climate has both opened up possibilities, and made the 
situation more complex for the ethnic Chinese. As will be explored further in the next 
chapters, I suggest that the Indonesian case can contribute to more general understanding 
of the relationship between democratisation and ethnic minorities. 
 
1.2 Scope of Research 
What is the relationship between democratisation and ethnic minorities? It is 
hoped that this study will open up further questions about what the democratisation 
process means to minority populations, and particularly when those minorities have the 
ambivalent position of being marginalised, at the same time as having economic power, 
what, as was stated above is seen as a ―pariah class‖. This study therefore looks into the 
increasingly ambivalent position of Chinese Indonesians in post-Suharto Medan and 
Surabaya by looking at the interconnectedness of business, electoral politics and the 
revitalisation of the socio-cultural life of the Chinese in the post-Suharto era. Medan and 
Surabaya were selected as field sites for this study since both cities are economically and 
politically significant, but also have some interesting contrasts in regard to their Chinese 
populations. These cities are the capitals of North Sumatra and East Java respectively, 
which have been ―the sites of vibrant urban and industrial centers‖ (Hadiz, 2004, p. 623). 
Medan is a historically important town of plantation, manufacturing and trade, while 
Surabaya is a vital port city which functions as a gateway to Eastern Indonesia (Buiskool, 
2004, p 1; Hadiz, 2004, p. 623). According to City Population, an online atlas, Medan 
and Surabaya were the fifth and the second largest cities in the country respectively in 
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2010 (City Population, 2012).
12
Both cities have a significant Chinese Indonesian 
population; according to the Indonesian Population Census of 2000, the concentration of 
the Chinese Indonesian population was 10.65 per cent in Medan and 4.37 per cent in 
Surabaya, which are much higher than the percentage of Chinese Indonesians in the total 
population of Indonesia (1.2 per cent, Ananta et al., 2008, p. 27, Table 2.2).    
Medan and Surabaya are also, however, quite different in terms of their ethnic 
Chinese communities. It is widely observed that ethnic Chinese in Medan are less 
indigenised (at least in terms of their daily language use) or in other words, they are more 
totok, compared to their counterparts in Java, where Surabaya is situated (Mabbett & 
Mabbett, 1972, p. 9). The term ‗totok‘ originally meant pure-blood Chinese who migrated 
to Indonesia more recently than the peranakans, i.e. acculturated Chinese who have little 
or no command of Chinese languages or dialects and practise culture and customs that are 
neither purely Chinese or purely indigenous Indonesian. Some peranakan Chinese are 
descendants of intermarriage between Chinese male immigrants and local indigenous 
women before mass Chinese immigration to Indonesia occurred in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The totok-peranakan distinction began to emerge after mass Chinese 
immigration to Indonesia took place at the second half of the nineteenth century. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the term ‗totok‘ is used to refer to Chinese Indonesians who have a 
China-oriented upbringing and who have command of some Chinese languages or 
dialects (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 2; Hoon, 2008, pp. 4-5, 190-191).
13
 Edward Aspinall and 
colleagues (2011) highlight that the Chinese population in Medan ―is recognized as 
having a distinctive culture that largely survived the ban on public expressions of Chinese 
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 The data in City Population is based on the Indonesian Population Census of 2010, which is the latest 
census of Indonesia. 
13
 I will elaborate more on the origins of totok and peranakan in Chapter Two. 
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language and culture under the New Order government‖ (p. 32). They also point out that 
most Chinese Indonesians in the city are Buddhists and they speak Hokkien, a Chinese 
dialect originating from the southern part of Fujian province in southern China, in their 
daily life (Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 2011, p. 32). According to surveys conducted 
by M. Rajab Lubis and Peter D. Weldon on languages usually spoken at home by ethnic 
Chinese in Medan and Surabaya respectively, 73 per cent of ethnic Chinese respondents 
in Medan spoke a Chinese language at home, but only 22 per cent of their counterparts in 
Surabaya use a Chinese language at home (Lubis, 1995, p. 76; Weldon, 1978, p. 270, 
Table 11). According to another survey conducted by RM. H. Subanindyo Hadiluwih on 
languages usually spoken by Chinese Indonesians in Medan, 51.92 per cent of Chinese 
Indonesians in the city spoke a Chinese dialect (read: Hokkien) in their workplace, 57.69 
per cent of them spoke a Chinese dialect with friends, and up to 90.38 per cent of them 
spoke Hokkien or another Chinese language at home (Hadiluwih, 1994, pp. 97-98). 
 
 
During my fieldwork in Medan, I also observed that most Chinese in Medan, 
including those who are very young, spoke Hokkien. There are also some Chinese who 
can speak Mandarin as well. This marks a sharp contrast to their Chinese counterparts in 
several places in Java such as Jakarta and Surabaya. I visited the Chinatowns in Jakarta 
(Glodok) and Surabaya (Kembang Jepun) and the common language of communication 
in both places was Indonesian instead of Mandarin or any other Chinese language. The 
cultural differences between Chinese in Medan and Surabaya are probably due to two 
factors. The first factor has much to do with the inter-ethnic relationships between 
Chinese and indigenous Indonesians in these two cities. According to Judith Nagata 
(2003, p. 275), Medan has a long history of tensions between local Chinese and local 
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indigenous groups. The use of Chinese languages among Chinese in Medan causes a gulf 
between them and the indigenous Indonesians. The Chinese are also considered wealthier 
and often encounter opposition and antagonism from indigenous Indonesians, as in the 
words of an ethnic Chinese stuffed toy distributor in Medan: 
 
Many pribumis still think that ethnic Chinese are rich because they have 
stolen much wealth from pribumis. Some pribumi children even throw 
stones at any Chinese who pass in front of their houses because they are 
taught by their parents that the Chinese are bad. Many local Muslim 
pribumis often target ethnic Chinese as their scapegoat. If all Chinese have 
disappeared, I believe those Muslims would target local Batak Christians 
because of their different religious background. […] I believe the 
stereotype of ethnic Chinese among pribumis will only disappear 




in Mandarin, August 4, 2010) 
 
In fact, Medan was the site of the first violence against Chinese in May 1998 
(Purdey, 2006, p. 114). The situation is quite different in Surabaya; according to an 
article in Gatra magazine (Trihusodo & Herawati, 1998) and also mentioned in an 
interview with Dédé Oetomo (温忠孝) (Interview in English, December 24, 2010), an 
ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya, the Chinese in Surabaya generally maintain 
good relationships with indigenous Indonesians and did not encounter massive riots in 
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May 1998. It was also alleged that the local ethnic Chinese business community in 
Surabaya was able to guarantee relative peace in the city by paying generously for local 
military protection, in contrast to many other major cities in Java such as Jakarta and Solo, 
where all troops mysteriously disappeared when the anti-Chinese riots broke out (Dick, 
2003, p. 475). According to one informant in Surabaya, although initially violence 
against the Chinese did occur in the far north of the city, where Chinatown is situated, it 
was immediately suppressed by the local armed forces and did not spread to other parts 
of the city (Interview with Susana, in Mandarin, January 14, 2011).
14
  
The second factor is that Medan is very near to Malaysia (particularly Penang and 
Kedah) and Singapore, two neighbouring countries with ethnic Chinese communities that 
still maintain Chinese languages and many Chinese customs. Many Chinese in Medan 
have relatives or close friends in Malaysia and Singapore. The interaction between 
Chinese in Medan and those of Malaysia and Singapore exposed the former to cultural 
influence from the latter. As Cao Yunhua (2010) notes,  
 
Medan is near to Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur. It is only 
separated by the Straits of Melaka from these cities. It only takes 40 to 50 
minutes to travel from Medan to these cities by flight. Such convenience 
in transportation enabled the Chinese in Medan to have frequent 
interaction and to establish close relationships with the Chinese in 
Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur. […] In recent years, the Chinese in 
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Medan like to send their children to these three cities to study. After 
graduation, many of them stay and work in these cities.  
(p. 77, my translation from Chinese original) 
 
1.3 Methods of Research 
The original objective of my research was to analyse the political economy of 
ethnic Chinese businesses in Medan and Surabaya since the advent of democratisation 
and decentralisation in Indonesia. I intended to explore how ethnic Chinese 
businesspeople had adapted to the democratic environment that had emerged since 
1998.  Specifically, I intended to discover the issues involved in interactions between 
businesspeople and local government and political parties, and how these might have 
evolved in the decade since the implementation of decentralisation as part of the 
democratisation process. I found this specific focus to be difficult for several reasons. 
The first reason was due to problems in obtaining data that were essential for that 
specific research. The information on patrimonial relationships between Chinese 
businesspeople and power-holders was very essential data, however, during my fieldwork 
in Indonesia, most of the businesspeople I interviewed were reluctant to talk about these 
relationships. Additionally, some Chinese businesspeople who were close to power-
holders were unwilling to be interviewed and such information was generally not covered 
in the media. Therefore, I had to rely on other informants who knew those businesspeople 
or had some knowledge of patrimonial relationships involving Chinese businesspeople to 
get such information. In addition, I could not get more concrete information on local 
regulations concerning business activities, which was also essential to my research, due 
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to problems of accessing the local bureaucracy. The local regulations are also not entirely 
available on the internet. Therefore, I needed to rely on the media and individual 
interviews to get more information on local regulations. Thus the data on patrimonial 
relationships involving Chinese businesspeople and local regulations concerning business 
activities that I received from individual interviews and the media were not sufficient in 
and of themselves for a thesis. 
 On the other hand, there has been a lack of in-depth research on Chinese 
Indonesian civil society groups and the participation of Chinese Indonesians in electoral 
politics in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya. According to my review of literature on 
ethnic Chinese Indonesians, there was (and still is) no scholarly work that has discussed 
the role of Chinese Indonesians in both of these aspects in detail. However, I believe that 
it is essential to understand the role of Chinese Indonesians with regard to politics and 
civil society in order to get a better picture of their position in the post-Suharto era. As it 
turns out, my informants in Medan and Surabaya were willing to share more information 
on these issues with me during my fieldwork, than they were about my original research 
topic. In addition, as I have mentioned earlier, most scholarly works on Chinese 
Indonesians have ascribed a largely passive and powerless role to this minority in 
Indonesian history. These works do not give due credit to the active agency of Chinese 
Indonesians in creating, deploying or shaping their position in Indonesian society. 
Therefore, I decided to focus on the active agency of Chinese Indonesians in responding 
to democratisation and shaping the democratisation process as well as their position in 
Indonesian society since the end of the Suharto regime, and to focus on the aspects of 
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business, civil society and politics since they are clearly interconnected in terms of the 
role Chinese Indonesians have been playing in the post-Suharto era.   
The methods used in this research are library research, in-depth, semi-structured 
individual interviews, as well as participant observation. The fieldwork was conducted in 
Jakarta (June 2010 and May 2011), Medan (July 2010 to December 2010) and Surabaya 
(December 2010 to May 2011). Library research was conducted by consulting both 
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include statistical reports published 
by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS- Badan Pusat Statistik), news magazines published 
in Indonesia, and newspapers, both at national and local levels. The secondary sources 
include books, journals and academic writings regarding the background of Chinese 
Indonesian communities in Medan and Surabaya, the changing political landscape in 
post-Suharto Indonesia, the decentralisation policies, the associational life and the 
participation of Chinese Indonesians in formal politics in post-Suharto Medan and 
Surabaya, the Chinese-language presses established in Medan and Surabaya since the end 
of the New Order, and local Chinese business in Medan and Surabaya since the advent of 
democratisation and regional decentralisation. I also interviewed Chinese Indonesian 
businesspeople, leaders of local major ethnic Chinese organisations, persons in charge or 
staff of local Chinese-language press, journalists, politicians, academics and NGO 
activists in both cities (see Appendix One for a complete list of informants). The 
interviews were conducted in Mandarin, Hokkien, Indonesian or English. All names of 
informants used in this study, except for public figures, are pseudonyms. In addition, I 
conducted participant observation to look into the ―Chineseness‖ of ethnic Chinese in 
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Medan and Surabaya during my interactions with Chinese families in Medan and 
Surabaya.  
 
1.4 Outline for the Thesis 
I have divided the thesis into two parts. In the first part I examine the construction 
of the Chinese minority in Indonesia as a type of ―pariah class‖ and query what effect 
democratisation has had on this construction. I do this through two chapters: Chapter 
Two which explores the origins of the ambivalent position of ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia, and Chapter Three which looks at the marginalised position of ethnic minority 
―pariah classes‖ and their role in democratisation processes. In this part I suggest that the 
ambivalent position of the Chinese was not only due to the policies of colonial and post-
colonial regimes and the prejudice among indigenous Indonesians, but also the actions of 
the Chinese themselves. At the same time I question the concepts of democracy, the 
democratisation process in post-Suharto Indonesia, its impact on the state and society, as 
well as the role of Chinese Indonesians in the democratisation process. 
The second part, which consists of Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six, 
showcases how the ambivalence of democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia and the 
response of Chinese Indonesians to such ambivalence have created an even more 
paradoxical position for the Chinese.  
The freedom for cultural expression opened up in the reformasi era has led to the 
emergence of two different Chinese ethnic and cultural identities. One emphasises the 
revival of Chinese culture and the bolstering of Chinese ethnic identity, another focuses 
on the integration of Chinese Indonesians into the wider Indonesian society. In Chapter 
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Four I look into the sociological factors behind the emergence of these two different 
Chinese ethnic and cultural identities, and examine how these two different identities are 
manifested in two different approaches towards opening up the Chinese socio-cultural 
sphere in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya. Chinese Indonesians who strongly support 
Chinese ethnic and cultural identities have made used of the more liberal environment to 
establish Chinese-based organisations and Chinese-language presses. In general these 
organisations and presses make use of intra-ethnic linkages to safeguard Chinese ethnic 
and cultural identities, thus contribute to multiculturalism in post-Suharto Indonesia. The 
rise of China as an economic power also prompted leaders of some Chinese organisations 
to utilise their intra-ethnic linkages and social networks in China to assist local 
governments to establish cultural and business connections with China. Many indigenous 
Indonesians, however, perceive that the active role of Chinese organisations in promoting 
Chinese culture indicates an insistence upon separateness and this is one thing that has 
made the Chinese targets of dislike. At the same time, there are Chinese Indonesians who 
favour the integration of the Chinese into the wider Indonesian society and who have 
established non-ethnic-based socio-cultural organisations to promote cross-ethnic 
understanding and solidarity. On the whole, however the socio-cultural activities and 
endeavours of Chinese organisations and Chinese-language presses have reproduced and 
perpetuated the stereotypes of the Chinese as insular, exclusive, opportunistic and 
oriented toward China instead of Indonesia.  
The corrupt and muddy business environment in the post-New Order era 
influenced the ways Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan and Surabaya gain and 
safeguard their business interests, as well as deal with illegal practices by government 
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officials, police and premans (gangsters/thugs). In Chapter Five I examine, against the 
background of these structural conditions, how Chinese Indonesian businesspeople tend 
to resort to various illegal or semi-legal means, such as giving in to the illegal requests of 
government officials, police and premans, establishing collusion with local power-
holders, heads of security forces and youth/crime organisations, as well as financial 
coercion against critical media to gain and protect their business and personal interests. 
These business practices in turn perpetuate and reproduce the corrupt and muddy 
business environment, as well as the predatory political-business system. The business 
practices also reproduce and reinforce the stereotypes of the Chinese as wealthy, corrupt, 
opportunistic and as the perfect target of extortion. Although there are also Chinese 
businesspeople who refuse to be victims of extortion and choose to fight against the 
illegal practices, such businesspeople are rare.  
Chapter Six focuses on the involvement of Chinese Indonesians in electoral 
politics in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya and how this intersects with their 
stereotypical position as businesspeople. On the one hand, the opening up of a democratic 
environment in post-Suharto Indonesia has prompted many Chinese Indonesians to get 
involved in electoral politics. Some of them become electoral candidates in order to push 
for reform and positive changes in Indonesia and reject approaches of support for their 
campaigns in return for political and business favours. On the other hand, there are those 
who become actively involved in politics with the aim of gaining political protection for 
their business instead of fighting for the interests of the general public. Ironically, they 
often have a higher chance of getting elected, because of the increase in costs for election 
campaigning in the direct elections, introduced during the democratisation process. Their 
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own wealth, or the willingness to accept support from corrupt businesspeople, often 
Chinese, ensures enough funds to get party support and bribe voters. In this way, Chinese 
businesspeople continue to establish corrupt and patrimonial relationships with aspiring 
politicians in exchange for political favours for their business. In addition, some Chinese 
who strongly support the re-emergence of cultural expression and Chinese ethnic identity 
are reluctant to support some reform-minded Chinese politicians whom they deem as not 
‗Chinese‘ enough and not close to the Chinese community. This has led to the 
marginalisation of genuine reform-minded politicians such as Sofyan Tan. It has also 
perpetuated the predatory characteristics of Indonesia‘s new democracy and reinforced 
the stereotypes of the Chinese as corrupt and opportunistic.   
The seventh chapter provides an analysis and summary of the active role of ethnic 
Chinese in reproducing and perpetuating their ambivalent position as well as in shaping 
Indonesia‘s political, business and socio-cultural environment in the post-Suharto era. I 
also suggest that studying the Chinese in Indonesia may direct us to rethinking the effect 
of democratisation on ethnic minorities, and the role that those minorities may have in 
how transformative democratisation can be both for their situation and the betterment of 











“Pariah” Ethnic Minorities and Democratisation 
 
Part One deals with the construction of the Chinese minority in Indonesia as a ―pariah 
class‖ and what effect democratisation has had on this construction. The ambivalent 
position of the Chinese minority has been shaped by historical, and structural factors, but 
also it is necessary to recognise the agency of the Chinese themselves. Historically, the 
Chinese have their ancestral roots in China and do not have particular regions in 
Indonesia to identify with. During the Dutch colonial period, the colonial regime‘s divide 
and rule policy, the granting of economic privileges to the Chinese, and subsequently the 
emergence of nationalist sentiments oriented toward China in early twentieth-century 
Dutch East Indies effectively prevented the Chinese from integrating into the wider 
indigenous population. The Chinese therefore began to be perceived as an alien minority 
associated with various negative attributes and occupying an ambivalent position in 
Indonesian society. During the New Order, the Chinese were excluded from politics and 
were only given opportunities to get involved in economic activities. Some Chinese 
business elites, who were politically vulnerable, established patron-client relations with 
politico-bureaucrats to gain patronage and privileged access to facilities. Thus, the New 








   





The ethnic Chinese have always been a small minority in Indonesia. In 1930 they 
represented an estimated 2.03 per cent of the total population (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 20). 
It was estimated that Chinese Indonesians formed about 1.2 per cent of the total 
Indonesian population in both 2000 and 2010 (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 23, Table 2.1; 
Ananta et al., 2013, p. 14, Table 2).
16
 Despite their small proportion in the country, it has 
been widely acknowledged that ethnic Chinese Indonesians have played an important and 
vital role in the economic development of Indonesia. The economically privileged 
position of Chinese Indonesians is largely due to historical factors. The Chinese were 
already residents in Java and coastal communities of the Maluku Islands, Sulawesi, 
Sumatra and Kalimantan before the arrival of the Dutch. The Chinese settled in the 
Indonesian archipelago for trading purposes (Reid, 1993; Sidel, 2006, p. 19). Many local 
regents appointed Chinese merchants as intermediary traders between themselves, the 
indigenous population, and external markets. These local regents preferred the Chinese to 
the indigenous population to fill this occupational niche in order to prevent the rise of an 
indigenous merchant class that might challenge their position (Reid, 1992, p. 497). In 
pre-colonial times, the Chinese in Java and other parts of Southeast Asia could assimilate 
into the indigenous population, because increasingly numbers of those who traveled to 
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 The names of informants in this chapter are pseudonyms except for the following public figure: Anton 
Prijatno. 
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 This figure was calculated directly from the raw data of the 2000 and 2010 population censuses. The 
figure, which is significantly smaller than that in 1930, is based on self-identification. Only those who 
identified themselves as Chinese were recorded as ethnic Chinese.  
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Southeast Asia for trade were themselves Muslim (Wertheim, 1965, pp. 46-47; Chua, 
2008, p. 31; Skinner, 1996, p. 55; Anderson, 1998, p. 321; Lembong, 2008, p. 48). 
Under Dutch colonial rule, which began in the seventeenth century, the Chinese 
could no longer be completely assimilated into the indigenous society. According to 
Mona Lohanda (1996, p. 1), in the days of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the people in the Indonesian archipelago were 
classified into Christians and non-Christians and on a racial basis, westerners (Europeans) 
and non-westerners (non-Europeans). Each non-western ethnic group was ruled by local 
headmen appointed by the VOC. All Chinese from different speech groups (e.g. Hokkien, 
Hakka and Hainan) were classified as Chinese. The headman of the Chinese community 
in each locality was known as ‗Kapitan Cina‘ (Chinese captain) (Lohanda, 1996). Like 
the local regents before them, the VOC used the Chinese as middlemen between the 
Dutch and the indigenous population (Suryadinata, 1988, p. 262; Chua, 2008, p. 31; 
Hoadley, 1988). After the collapse of the VOC in 1800, its territories were taken over by 
the Dutch colonial government. In 1854, the colonial government divided the population 
of the Dutch East Indies into three groups (Govaars, 2005, p. 20). The first group was 
European who formed the upper level. The middle level was Foreign Orientals, which 
included the Chinese, Arabs, Indians and Japanese who were born in the Dutch East 
Indies or had resided there for 10 years or above. The bottom level was the indigenous 
population (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 83; Shiraishi & Shiraishi, 1993, p. 8). According to 
The Siauw Giap (1967, p. 91), it was this stratification which made Islam less attractive 
to the Chinese, because Muslims were considered indigenous people with a status inferior 
to that of the Chinese. 
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Under Dutch rule, Chinese businesspeople became indispensable to the colonial 
economy. The colonial government granted Chinese licenses to engage in ―the selling of 
opium, the operation of gambling establishments, ferries, pawnshops, and abattoirs, and 
the gathering of birds‘ nests for export to the gourmets of China‖ (Williams, 1960, p. 24). 
Such a monopoly concession system was known as revenue or tax farming and the 
license holder was known as a revenue farmer (Govaars, 2005, p. 27; Williams, 1960, p. 
25). Among all monopoly concessions the opium concession was the most lucrative 
(Govaars, 2005, p. 28).
17
 The monopoly concession system produced many wealthy 
Chinese revenue farmers. 
In order to prevent the Chinese and the indigenous people from combining forces 
to challenge them, the Dutch introduced zoning and pass systems in 1835 and 1863, 
respectively, that required the Chinese to reside in restricted areas and prevented them 
from travelling out of these areas unless they had passes (Suryadinata, 1993b, pp. 81-82). 
These systems effectively prevented the Chinese from living among the indigenous 
population and restricted interaction between the Chinese and other ethnic groups. 
Moreover, according to Leo Suryadinata, the zoning system ―had a far-reaching impact 
on the ‗separateness‘ of the Chinese‖ (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 82). The Chinese therefore 
began to occupy an ambivalent position in Indonesian society during Dutch rule. On the 
one hand, they played a crucial role in the colony‘s economic development. On the other 
hand, the Chinese began to be perceived as the ―Other‖ because of this and were 
increasingly regarded with suspicion and prejudice by the indigenous majority.  
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In the 1890‘s Dutch humanitarians pressured the Dutch colonial government to 
abolish the revenue farming system, since they saw it as detrimental to the welfare of the 
indigenous population (Williams, 1960, pp. 25-27). This move broke part of the Chinese 
economic power. The Chinese in Indonesia were also further angered when, in 1899, 
after the defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Dutch 
government acceded to the Japanese government request to classify the Japanese in the 
Dutch East Indies as Europeans (Fasseur, 1994, p. 37). Although the Chinese also 
demanded equal status with Europeans, the Dutch rejected this demand as the colonial 
government was concerned that the concession would exert a considerable impact on the 
growing nationalist forces among indigenous Indonesians.
18
 As Mona Lohanda (1996) 
notes: 
 
Considering the turbulent political circumstances of the colony, 
particularly from the first decade of the twentieth century, the Dutch were 
very cautious in their handling of Chinese affairs. Yielding to the Chinese 
request for equal status would provoke anti-Chinese feeling among the 
Indonesians, which in turn might endanger the Dutch themselves. 
(p. 151) 
 
At the same time, political events in China stimulated the nationalist sentiments of 
the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. China had been invaded by foreign powers in the 
nineteenth century, losing in the Opium War (1840-1842) to the British and suffering an 
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immense defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). After the Boxer Uprising in 
1900, Beijing was invaded and plundered by the allied armies, an alliance of the armies 
of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the United States (US) (Govaars, 2005, p. 49).
19
 As Ming Govaars (2005) remarks, 
―The division of China into foreign concessions and spheres of influence threatened to 
make it ‗a kind of international colony‘‖ (p. 49). Two prominent Chinese political 
leaders, K‘ang Yu-wei (康有为) and Sun Yat-sen (孙逸仙/孙中山), sought to rescue 
China ―while living in exile among the overseas Chinese‖ (Govaars, 2005, p. 49). K‘ang 
was a reformist while Sun was a revolutionary. The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, 
who had suffered great loss of prestige, could identify with the difficulties of China and 
offered financial support to both K‘ang and Sun with the hope to ―contribute to the future 
greatness of their ancient homeland‖ (Govaars, 2005, p. 49). In addition, the lifting of the 
prohibition of Chinese emigration by the Manchu government (Qing Dynasty) in 1894 
and the issuance of the Chinese law of nationality in 1909 which was based on jus 
sanguinis and claimed that every legal or extra-legal child of Chinese father or mother 
would be considered a Chinese citizen, regardless of birthplace further strengthened the 
nationalist sentiments of the Chinese in the Indonesian archipelago (Govaars, 2005, p. 50; 
Willmott, 1961, p. 14).
20
  
These various factors contributed to the Pan-Chinese Movement in the Dutch East 
Indies, which revolted against the restrictions placed on the Chinese, particularly the 
zoning and pass systems. ‗Pan-Chinese Movement‘ is a term used by scholars such as 
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 The Boxer Uprising was an anti-foreigner movement that took place in China in 1900. For the origins 
and background of the uprising, see Esherick (1987). 
20
 Previously, the Manchu government prohibited the emigration of Chinese and those returning to China 
from abroad were subjected to death penalty. For more details on this policy, see Lim (1967, p. 63) and 
Chong (1983/84, p. 3). 
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Lea E. Williams (1960), Leo Suryadinata (1981) and Ming Govaars (2005) to refer to the 
emergence of nationalist sentiments oriented toward China and the revival of Chinese 
culture among the peranakan Chinese in early twentieth century Dutch East Indies. The 
peranakan Chinese tried to preserve their Chinese identity and safeguard their business as 
well as political interests by forming various Chinese organisations. These included the 
Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (THHK), a Chinese organisation which promoted Chinese 
nationalism based on the teachings of Confucius through the Chinese-medium schools set 
up by the organisation in the Indies; the Siang Hwee (Chinese Chamber of Commerce) 
that championed the interests of Chinese business and community; and the Soe Po Sia 
(Chinese reading club) which disseminated modern political ideas through the 
distribution of reading materials (Williams, 1961, pp. 54-113; Kwee, 1969, pp. 1-21; 
Govaars, 2005, pp. 58-61; Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 5-6). The peranakan Chinese also 
established newspapers in Bahasa Melajoe Tionghoa (Sino-Malay language) such as Li 
Po, Chabar Perniagaan/Perniagaan, Pewarta Soerabaia, Djawa Tengah and Sin Po to 
promote Chinese nationalism and Chinese culture (Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 5-6, 21).
21
 In 
order to curb Chinese nationalism, and placate the Pan-Chinese movement, the colonial 
government passed a nationality law in 1910 based on jus soli which declared that all 
persons born in the Indies of parents residing there were Dutch subjects even if not Dutch 
citizens (Willmott, 1961, p. 15). Thus, the Indies-born Chinese were both Chinese 
citizens and Dutch subjects.
22
 Later in 1917 and 1918, the Dutch abolished the hated 
zoning and pass systems (Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 10-11).  
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 Sin Po later published its Chinese-language edition, known as Xin Bao, in 1921 (Suryadinata, 1997, p. 
254). 
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Takashi Shiraishi (1997, pp. 187-207), however, argues that these systems 
restricting Chinese movement and residence were abolished because the Dutch saw that 
anti-Sinicism was already firmly in place among indigenous Indonesians in the early 
1910s as a result of the rise of new nationalist politics that emphasised racial distinctions. 
Hence, it was no longer necessary to require Chinese and indigenous people to reside in 
different quarters. In fact, the abolishment of both systems in the late 1910s did not bring 
significant improvement in interactions and relations between the Chinese and the 
indigenous population. Many pribumis (indigenous people) perceived the Chinese as 
foreigners who were culturally different from the indigenous population.
23
 They also 
believed that the Chinese were economically strong but exclusive and selfish 
(Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 78; Coppel, 1983, p. 5). The loyalty of the Chinese to the Indies 
was also doubted by many pribumis. Before independence, the Chinese were often 
suspected of allying with the Dutch and China (Dawis, 2009, p. 2). Such stereotypes and 
prejudice manifested in anti-Chinese violence that broke out in Tangerang, Jakarta, 
Bandung, Pontianak, Palembang, Bagan Siapi-Api and Medan during the early phase of 
the Revolution (1945-1946) (Somers, 1965, pp. 110-119; Heidhues, 1974, pp. 101-102, 
109; Cribb, 1991, pp. 53; 111). Many Chinese traders were attacked because they were 
deemed as rivals of indigenous small businesses. Some Chinese were caught in the riots 
because they were suspected of being in league with the Dutch (Heidhues, 1974, p. 109; 
Hoon, 2008, 33). The violence prompted the Chinese in some areas of the Dutch East 
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 It should be noted that the indigenous population also differed in terms of ethnicity and religious 
backgrounds. Apart from Javanese, the largest indigenous ethnic group in Indonesia, there are other 
indigenous ethnic groups such as Sundanese, Madurese, Bugis, etc. Although the majority of the 
indigenous population are Muslims, there are also indigenous Indonesians who are non-Muslims. For 
instance, most of the indigenous people in North Sulawesi are Protestant Christians. In Bali, the indigenous 
people are predominantly Hindus.  
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Indies to form self-defense corps, known as Pao An Tui (or Poh An Tui), to protect the 
Chinese and their properties from attacks by Indonesian army irregulars (Setiono, 2003, 
pp. 624-625; Coppel, 1983, pp. 25-26; Tsai, 2011, p. 145). The Dutch sanctioned the 
formation of the Pao An Tui and armed the corps (Purcell, 1965, p. 479; Setiono, 2003, 
pp. 625-626). As Benny G. Setiono (2003, p. 627) notes, the formation of the corps in 
East Java and North Sumatra turned out to be a disaster as it had led to several violent 
conflicts between ethnic Chinese residents and pro-independence troops in both 
provinces.
24
 Abdul Baqir Zein (2000, p. 10) also points out that the Pau An Tui of Medan, 
North Sumatra, was involved in the invasion of Bagan Siapi-Api and the terrorisation of 
the residents.
25
 This gave the impression to many pro-independence Indonesians that the 
Pao An Tui was formed to support the Dutch in fighting against the pro-independence 
revolutionaries (Coppel, 1983, p. 26). The Pau An Tui was disbanded at the end of the 
revolution in 1949 (Zein, 2000, p. 11).  
After independence, some indigenous leaders assumed that the Chinese were 
oriented to China instead of Indonesia (Dawis, 2009, p. 2). Many Chinese in Indonesia, 
especially those who were recent immigrants, had a strong sense of pride in China 
(Coppel, 1983, p. 26). The victory of the communists in China in 1949 triggered Chinese 
nationalism among Chinese Indonesians and prompted some Chinese Indonesians to 
return to China to receive further Chinese-language education and to build their ancestral 
land (Godley, 1989; Hui, 2011, pp. 98-99). In the eyes of some indigenous Indonesian 
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 There were also Chinese militias that fought for the Republic. In Pemalang, Central Java, the Chinese 
formed their own struggle group known as the Chinese Youth Irregulars (LPT- Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa) 
in 1945 to fight for the independence of Indonesia. The LPT played a prominent role in overthrowing the 
Japanese administration in Pemalang and exhorting (often violently) the Chinese community to fly the 
Indonesian flag after Japan‘s surrender (Lucas, 1991, pp. 86-87). 
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 Zein however does not explain why the Pau An Tui of Medan invaded Bagan Siapi-Api. 
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leaders, the Chinese minority was oriented toward China. They therefore perceived the 
Chinese minority as a potential ‗fifth column‘ for China (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 167).26 
They were therefore uncomfortable with the dual citizenship of the Chinese that emerged 
again out of the relatively liberal the Citizenship Act of 1946 and the Round Table 
Agreement on Citizenship in 1949 between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Under these 
provisions, those Chinese who had been Dutch subjects and did not reject Indonesian 
citizenship were considered as citizens of both Indonesia and China (Hoon, 2008, p. 33). 
For many indigenous nationalists, as Hoon Chang-Yau (2008) puts it, ―dual nationality 
meant that the political loyalty of the Chinese must be divided between Indonesia and 
China‖ (p. 34). Moreover, during the 1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference, China 
abandoned its traditional claim that all ethnic Chinese were Chinese citizens 
(Suryadinata, 1992, p. 171). Both President Sukarno and the Chinese prime minister, 
Zhou Enlai (周恩来), agreed that ethnic Chinese should choose only one citizenship (Liu, 
2011, pp. 177-179). Hence, in 1958, a new and less liberal citizenship act known as ―Act 
No. 62 of the year 1958 Concerning Republic of Indonesia Citizenship‖ was passed 
(Willmott, 1961, p. 118). Under the new act, Chinese in Indonesia would lose their 
citizenship if they did not submit an official statement abjuring Chinese citizenship 
(Willmott, 1961, p. 120; Hoon, 2008, p. 34). However, the act was only fully 
implemented in 1960, thus leaving the citizenship of most Chinese in an ambiguous state 
between 1958 and 1960 (Hoon, 2008, p. 35). In November 1959, as part of the steps 
towards reducing the economic role of ethnic Chinese, the government issued the 
Presidential Decree No. 10 that banned ―alien‖ (i.e. Chinese) retail trade in rural areas 
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 According to Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.), the expression ‗fifth column‘ refers to a ―clandestine 




and required all the aliens to transfer their business to Indonesian citizens by January 1, 
1960 (Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina – BAKIN, 1979, pp. 301-305). Although the 
decree was officially only directed at Chinese without Indonesian citizenship, in reality, 
those with Indonesian citizenship encountered similar distress as the distinction between 
citizens and aliens was still unclear (Hoon, 2008, p. 35). In West Java alone, 9,927 
Chinese were forced to move from rural areas to urban places (Huang, 2000, p. 19). 
There were also Chinese who were sent back to China. According to Thee Kian Wie 
(2006, p. 88), around 119,000 Chinese citizens were repatriated to China during 1960-
1961.
 
Some chose to leave for China because they thought that the Presidential Decree 
had threatened their livelihood (Mackie, 1976, p. 95). 
Under Dutch rule and during the Sukarno years (1949-1965), ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia were allowed to form ethnic-based organisations (ranging from cultural 
associations to clan groups to business chambers), establish Chinese-language presses, 
open Chinese-medium schools, and be involved in politics (Heidhues, 2006, pp. 77-83; 
1974, pp. 74-86; Huang, 2000, pp. 75-100, 158-172, 101-157; Pandiangan, 2003, pp. 
409-413; Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 74-86; 1992, pp. 154-153; 1993, pp. 80-81, 86-88; 1997, 
pp. 253-259).
 
In fact, in the new parliament elected in the 1955 election, which was the 
first national election held in Indonesia after independence, nine appointed seats were 
reserved for ethnic Chinese (Heidhues, 1974, p. 77).
 
During the Sukarno era (both the 
parliamentary democracy [1950-1957] and guided democracy [1957-1965] periods), 
there were even a few cabinet ministers who were of Chinese origin (Suryadinata, 1992, 
pp. 12, n10, 12, n11; 1993b, p. 88). 
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It is important to note that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are by no means 
culturally homogenous. Conventionally, scholars have divided them into peranakan and 
totok. The peranakans were local-born and acculturated Chinese. Some of them were 
products of intermarriage between Chinese male immigrants and local indigenous women. 
They had been residing in Indonesia for centuries. Although the peranakans still 
identified themselves as Chinese, they had adopted many elements of the majority 
Indonesian indigenous culture and some of them could not speak Chinese (Skinner, 1958, 
p. 2; Somers, 1964, p. 4; Hoon, 2008, pp. 4-5). The totoks, on the other hand, were pure-
blood Chinese who were born in China and migrated to the Indies. They spoke Chinese 
and maintained most Chinese customs and cultural traditions. In addition, they were 
generally more politically oriented to China. According to Leo Suryadinata (1992, p. 90), 
the peranakans also used the Hokkien term ‗singkeh‘, meaning ‗new guests‘, to refer to 
the totoks. Mass Chinese immigration to the Indies took place in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The mass immigration was a result of the Taiping Rebellion, a civil 
war against the Manchu imperial government which began in Guangxi in 1850 and later 
spread to other provinces.
27
 The immigrants included a significant number of women and 
it became possible for Chinese men to marry China-born women rather than indigenous 
or peranakan women.
28
 Many more Chinese women immigrated to Indonesia after 1900 
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 For the origins and background of the Taping Rebellion, see Jen (1973). 
28
 Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, there was no female emigration from China to 
Southeast Asia. This was due to a few factors. First, although the Manchu imperial government officially 
prohibited the emigration of Chinese, in reality, the regulation was often strictly enforced over the women 
but not the men. This was because the officials knew that the male emigrants often returned with their 
savings or had to send money to their families in China, thus allowing the officials to extort money from 
them. Second, women were accorded very low social status in the traditional Chinese society. The main 
duty of women was to remain at home to look after their children and parents-in-law. Therefore, they were 
forced to remain in China. In fact, this special role of Chinese women was manifested in the custom of 
foot-binding, which forced women to stay indoors. Third, most of the male emigrants were too poor to 
bring their families overseas (Lim, 1967, pp. 63-64; Chong, 1983/84, pp. 3-4). Chinese female immigration 
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as a result of the Boxer Uprising in 1900 mentioned earlier in this chapter. Descendants 
of these new immigrants usually remained culturally totok Chinese and formed the 
distinct and separate totok community (Somers, 1964, p. 4; Hoon, 2008, p. 5). 
In post-colonial Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese peranakan 
community was divided into two competing streams. The ‗integrationist‘ group led by the 
Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship (BAPERKI- Badan Permusjawaratan 
Kewarganegaraan Indonesia) fought for citizenship rights for ethnic Chinese and 
advocated for recognition of a separate Chinese ethnic identity yet one remaining part of 
the Indonesian nation. This group believed Chinese Indonesians did not need to give up 
their cultural heritage to fully participate in national politics (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 33; 
Aizawa, 2011, pp. 49-50; Hoon, 2008, p. 35). BAPERKI was founded in March 1954 
with the aim to promote the understanding of Indonesian citizenship and the elimination 
of discrimination against ethnic Chinese who were Indonesian citizens (Coppel, 1976, pp. 
45-46; Somers, 1964, p. 11; Hoon, 2008, p. 35). On the other hand, the ‗assimilationists‘ 
group formed by a number of Chinese peranakans, who were Christians or right wing 
elements associated with the military, advocated the complete assimilation of the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Southeast Asia began only from the latter half of the nineteenth century as some of the hindrances that 
had earlier prevented them from leaving the country were removed. The immediate factor that prompted 
Chinese female emigration was the economic and political upheavals in China brought about by the 
Taiping Rebellion. The chaotic situation in China forced many Chinese women to migrate overseas. 
Besides that, the contact the Chinese had with the West, as a consequence of the Opium and Arrow Wars in 
nineteenth century China, played an essential role in eliminating the traditional prejudice the Chinese had 
against female emigration (For the origins and background of the Opium and Arrow Wars, see Elleman 
[2001, pp. 3-56]). The opening of the ―treaty-ports‖ in Guangdong and Fujian brought to the increase in the 
interaction of the Chinese in these two provinces with Europeans. This interaction had resulted in the 
establishment of several girls‘ schools by European Christian missionaries. Both Christian and non-
Christian female students attended these schools. Apart from their educational work, the Christian 
missionaries also joined certain Chinese women to fight against the foot-binding custom that discriminated 
against women. Such efforts had contributed to educational and social advancement of Chinese women, 
thus removing the traditional prejudice among Chinese against female emigration. Furthermore, in 1860, 
the Manchu government officially allowed Chinese women to emigrate as wives and dependents of the 
male emigrants. These factors prompted female emigration from China in the second half of the nineteenth 
century (Lim, 1967, pp. 72-75; Chong, 1983/84, pp. 5-6).  
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into the indigenous Indonesian population (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 70; Hoon, 2008, pp. 35-
36). According to Suryadinata (1992, pp. 70-72), these assimilationists Chinese 
peranakans included Junus Jahja a.k.a. Lauw Chuan Tho (刘全道), an economist; Ong 
Hok Ham a.k.a. Onghokham (王福涵), a university student; and K. Sindhunatha (王宗海
), a navy captain. The assimilationists were of the opinion that the Chinese needed to 
―abandon their cultural background and exclusionary lifestyle – that is, living separately 
from other Indonesian ethnic groups‖ in order to eliminate discrimination against them 
(Aizawa, 2011, p. 49). Junus Jahja, one of the assimilationists, later converted to Islam in 
1979 and advocated Chinese conversion to Islam as a means for the Chinese to be fully 
assimilated into the indigenous population because the majority of the indigenous 
population were Muslims (Suryadinata, 1997, pp. 190-191; Setyautama, 2008, p. 159). 
His open advocation for the assimilation of the Chinese had upset some Chinese 
Indonesians, especially those with a strong ethnic identity. As interviewed by Kompas, 
Jahja revealed that he had been outrightly accused as a ―betrayer‖ (pengkhianat) by other 
Chinese Indonesians for abandoning his cultural roots (Setianingsih, 2009, p. 16, my 
translation from Indonesian original). 
The anti-Communist violence instigated by the Suharto-led military after the 
military takeover on October 1, 1965 took a strong anti-Chinese turn at times from 1965 
to 1968 (Mackie, 1976; Davidson, 2009b, pp. 47-84; Hui, 2011, pp. 115-146; Tsai & 
Kammen, 2012).
29
 Many Chinese in Indonesia were accused of being Communist 
sympathisers and at least two thousand of them were killed from 1965 to 1966 (Coppel, 
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 For a comprehensive discussion on the background of the military takeover and the subsequent mass 
violence against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI- Partai Komunis Indonesia) and the Left, see 
Kammen and McGregor (2012). 
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1983, p. 58). The last and worst major anti-Chinese violence broke out at late 1967 and 
early 1968 in West Kalimantan. The military provoked Dayaks to murder Chinese who 
were accused of supporting the communist party (Mackie, 1976, pp. 126-128; Davidson, 
2009b, pp. 47-84; Hui, 2011, pp. 115-146). About two to five thousand Chinese were 
killed and nearly 100,000 Chinese were relocated to coastal cities and towns such as 
Pontianak and Singkawang (Davidson, 2009b, pp. 68, 74-77).
30
  
Later, Suharto‘s government began to enforce assimilation policies to curtail 
Chinese culture and control the ethnic Chinese. Public displays of Chinese characters 
were forbidden. Ethnic Chinese were not allowed to openly celebrate Chinese holidays or 
festivals. Ethnic Chinese organisations were banned except those dealing with health, 
religion, burial services, sports and recreation.
31
 Schools that offered all instruction in 
Chinese were closed down. Chinese-language newspapers were prohibited, except for 
one produced by the government. Furthermore, ethnic Chinese were urged to adopt 
indigenous-sounding names (Coppel, 1983, p. 165; 2002, pp. 22-23; Suryadinata, 1992, 
pp. 153-164; Chua, 2008, pp. 39-40).  
It is worth noting that although many Chinese in Indonesia became more 
Peranakanised, if not ‗Indonesianised‘, under Suharto‘s policy of forced assimilation, in 
some places like Medan, Pontianak, Singkawang, Bangka and Belitung, the local Chinese 
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 It should be noted that the anti-Communist violence was never anti-Chinese massacres in general, 
although the massacres that broke out in West Kalimantan in 1967 and 1968 was targeted exclusively at 
Chinese (see Davidson [2009b, pp. 47-84] for more details on massacres of Chinese in West Kalimantan). 
There were about half a million people killed in 1965-1966 and the victims were mostly indigenous 
Indonesians who were members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Relatively few 
Chinese were murdered in this period (Cribb & Coppel, 2009, pp. 447-465; Tsai & Kammen, 2012, pp. 
131-155). Prior to its collapse in 1965, the PKI was relatively tolerant of the Chinese minority due to the 
―anti-racist character of Marxist ideology‖ (McVey, 1968, p. 359). The party leaders often stood out against 
racial attacks on the Chinese minority (Mackie, 1976, p. 79). 
31
 Some Chinese organisations therefore converted to charitable foundations (yayasan) that focused on 
health, religion, burial services, sports or recreation in order to continue to operate. 
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generally can still speak Mandarin and certain Chinese dialects. Many older Chinese can 
read and write Chinese as they had studied in pre-New Order Chinese-medium schools. 
The younger generation generally cannot read and write Chinese but they can still speak 
Mandarin and certain Chinese dialects. Moreover, many Chinese in those places also still 
practise most Chinese customs as well as cultural traditions.
32
  
During the New Order period, Suharto‘s regime also issued regulations and 
decrees that marginalised and stigmatised the Chinese. For instance, a particular code was 
attached to the national identity cards and passports of Indonesians of Chinese origin 
(Tan, 1991, p. 123; Aizawa, 2011, pp. 60-61). This coding system stigmatised the 
Chinese and ―constantly exposed them to discrimination and exploitation by the 
bureaucracy, police and military‖ (Hoon, 2008, p. 39). Chinese Indonesians also had to 
produce a Citizenship Letter (SBKRI- Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik 
Indonesia) to obtain documents such as birth certificates, passports or marriage 
certificates (Aizawa, 2011, p. 61).
 
In addition, unwritten barriers restricted the Chinese 
from politics, public service, military and entrance to public universities. During the New 
Order era, there were very few ethnic Chinese members of parliament.
33
 These were 
Chinese peranakans from the ‗assimilationists‘ group.34 As Benedict R. O‘G. Anderson 
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 In fact, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia once told me that many people in Jakarta deemed 
Chinese Indonesians from ‗PBBM‘ (Pontianak, Bangka, Belitung and Medan) as less assimilated and 
exclusive (Personal communication with Timothy, in Indonesian, January 31, 2011). 
33
 A few months before the collapse of the New Order regime, Suharto appointed Bob Hasan a.k.a. The 
Kian Seng (郑建盛), his long-time crony and golf partner of Chinese descent minister of trade and industry 
(Setyautama, 2008, p. 410). But Hasan was adopted by an indigenous Muslim military officer since he was 
little and had been highly assimilated into indigenous society. Hence, as Li Zhuo Hui (李卓辉) (2007, p. 
153), chief editor of Indonesian Chinese-language press Guo Ji Ri Bao (《国际日报》) points out, the 
Chinese community did not perceive Hasan as an ―ethnic Chinese businessperson‖ and did not think he 
represented the Chinese community. 
34
 They included Sofyan Wanandi a.k.a. Liem Bian Khoen (林绵坤) (representing the university student 
group), Jusuf Wanandi a.k.a. Liem Bien Kie (林绵基) (Golkar), L. B. G. Surjadinata a.k.a. Lie Beng Giok 
(Indonesian Protestant Party), Lo S. H. Ginting (Catholic Party), Harry Tjan Silalahi a.k.a. Tjan Tjoen Hok 
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(1990) notes, ―In another sort of regime, men of their [i.e. the very few ethnic Chinese 
members of parliament in New Order Indonesia] abilities would probably long since have 
achieved cabinet rank‖ (p. 115, n52). In general, the Chinese were only given the right to 
participate in economic activities (Chua, 2008, p. 42). As a result, as Hoon Chang-Yau 
(2006b) notes, ―This continuous and intentional official discrimination against the 
Chinese placed them in a vulnerable position of ethnic and class hostility‖ (p. 153). 
So why did Suharto‘s New Order issue regulations and decrees that contradicted 
the assimilation policies? In his study of the background of the assimilation policies, 
Nobuhiro Aizawa (2011) suggests a possible reason. According to Aizawa (2011, p. 60), 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (DEPDAGRI- Departemen Dalam Negeri) which drafted 
and issued the assimilation policies, considered assimilation as a way ―to prevent possible 
sources of political opposition and, thus, pave the way for the president‘s re-election‖. 
Therefore, the Chinese, who continued to be perceived as a potential ‗fifth column‘ of 
China, needed to be de-politicised to ensure that the government took better control of 
any political threat or opposition (Aizawa, 2011, pp. 60-61).
35
 Chua makes a similar 
argument that such contradictions were meant to ensure that the social and political status 
of the Chinese, who were economically significant, remained politically weak. Under 
such circumstances, the Chinese would not be able to challenge the position of the 
power-holders. This would then secure the social and financial base of the politico-
bureaucratic rulers‘ power (Chua, 2008, pp. 37-38, 41-43). In other words, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(曾春福) (Catholic Party), Budi Dipojuwono a.k.a. Lie Po Yoe (李保佑) (Indonesian Nationalist Party), 
Djoko Sudjatmiko a.k.a. Lie Giok Houw (李玉虎 ) (Golkar) and Anton Prijatno (王炳金 ) (Golkar) 
(Suryadinata, 1992, p. 14n12; Suryadinata, 1993, p. 88; Setyautama, 2008, pp. 170, 182, 193, 433, 434; 
interview with Anton Prijatno, in Indonesian, February 24, 2011). 
35
 To further control possible sources of political opposition, Suharto‘s regime even reduced the number of 
political parties to three in 1973, i.e. Golkar that was set up by the Suharto group, United Development 
Parties (PPP- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI- Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia) (Suryadinata, 2002a, pp. 30-31). 
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assimilation policies were aimed to secure the power of Suharto‘s regime and were never 
meant to integrate the Chinese into the general Indonesian population.   
The New Order policy, therefore, deliberately excluded the ethnic Chinese from 
politics, and thus many Chinese, as had been the case over the centuries, chose to get 
involved in economic activities. The New Order also saw the emergence of a substantial 
number of cukongs, Chinese Indonesian capitalists who collaborated with members of the 
Indonesian power elite, usually from the military and the Suharto family, both of these 
being the dominant political force during the Suharto era. These cukongs included Liem 
Sioe Liong a.k.a. Sudono Salim (林绍良), Tjia Kian Liong a.k.a. William Soerjadjaja (谢
建隆 ) and Lie Mo Tie a.k.a. Mochtar Riady (李文正 ). They were all owners of 
conglomerates (big business groups). The Suharto regime provided protection and 
various facilities such as privileged access to licenses, contracts and state bank credit to 
these cukongs. In return, the power elite and their family became the Chinese capitalists‘ 
business partners (Robison, 1986, pp. 271-322; Suryadinata, 1997, pp. 33-34). Many 
cukongs channelled part of their profits to their political patrons‘ foundations (yayasan) 
in the form of ‗donations‘ (Chua, 2008, p. 49). However, as Suryadinata has maintained, 
the number of such cukongs was small and did not represent Chinese Indonesians in 
general (Suryadinata, 2002b, p. 15). Most of the Chinese in Indonesia were, and still are, 
owner-managers of small- and medium-scale enterprises or professionals. Nevertheless, 
the corrupt relationships between a handful of Chinese Indonesian tycoons and power 
elites greatly influenced indigenous Indonesians‘ perception of the Chinese. As a result, 
Chinese Indonesians were (and are) generally perceived to be wealthier than indigenous 
Indonesians, corrupt and opportunistic. I argue that Chinese Indonesian tycoons during 
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the New Order had played a crucial role in reinforcing the negative stereotypes against 
ethnic Chinese.  
It is ironic that some ethnic Chinese Indonesians preferred to cooperate with and 
even be part of Suharto‘s autocratic regime although they were aware that the regime 
systematically discriminated, marginalised and stigmatised the Chinese minority. For 
instance, Jusuf Wanandi, a Chinese peranakan member of parliament affiliated to Golkar 
during the New Order period, notes in his memoir that  
 
We [the Chinese minority] remained discriminated against in many fields, 
from education to employment. We were never really well assimilated. 
 
This, I think was in large part because of the attitude from the top. 
Soeharto, A. H. Nasution and other top brass of the military never 
recognised the contribution of the ethnic Chinese. Soeharto made use of 
us. He used Chinese businessmen like Liem Sioe Liong to get money. He 
asked the cronies to help his family with business. He asked for our 
support on political issues. But he would never recognise us. 
 
If the Chinese were attacked he never said anything […] Never once did 
he give us a decent place within the New Order because he wanted to keep 
things – including the credit for what his government achieved – for 
himself. It was sadly fitting that the New Order should later collapse amid 
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the rubble of anti-Chinese riots. We were treated as minor wives, enjoyed 
but not recognised. 
(Wanandi, 2012, pp. 126-127) 
 
The text implies that Wanandi was well aware that Suharto only used Chinese capitalists 
for his own benefits. But it is ironic that Wanandi still chose to stay in Golkar and 
continued to be part of the New Order regime. I therefore argue that in the process of 
safeguarding their political interests, ethnic Chinese politicians such as Wanandi and the 
like also contributed to perpetuating the Chinese minority‘s marginalised and vulnerable 
position in New Order Indonesia. 
By confining the Chinese to the economic sector and forming an alliance with a 
handful of well-connected Chinese tycoons, the New Order regime managed to fortify the 
perception of the Chinese as economically powerful and responsible for social and 
economic inequalities in the country. The Chinese had no means to rectify this 
impression since they were socially and politically weak. Christian Chua (2008) has 
noted that  
 
[the Chinese] were at the regime‘s mercy and had to put up with these 
kinds of stigmatisation that were meant to instrumentalise them as 
scapegoats in several ways. […] [T]hey were blamed for the misery of the 
pribumi. The discontent of the powerless masses and the anger about their 






Consequently, the Chinese were exposed to periodic anti-Chinese riots during economic 
crises (e.g. in 1997-1998) and workers‘ strikes (e.g. the workers‘ strike in Medan that 
took place in 1994) (Purdey, 2006, pp. 77-141; Yang, 2006, 2007; Chua, 2008, p. 44).
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Even minor incidents such as traffic accidents, street fights and employer-worker disputes 
involving Chinese and pribumis could turn into anti-Chinese riots (Dahana, 2004, pp. 48-
49). In addition, as John T. Sidel (2006) observes, the anxiety of Muslims about the 
ambiguous political position of Islam in New Order Indonesia also led to attacks on the 
Chinese. The ambiguous political position of Islam had its origins in the colonial period, 
whereby the Dutch colonial government prioritised Indonesian Christians graduated from 
missionary schools in the recruitment of civil servants, teachers and army officers, as 
well as granted economic privileges to the Chinese minority. As a result, Muslims 
became subordinate in Indonesia. These conditions persisted even after independence. 
Although Muslims were the majority in Indonesia, they were unable to hold a dominant 
position in the political arena. Sidel points out that in post-colonial Indonesia, key posts 
in the bureaucracy and the military were held by those educated in secular and Christian 
schools, and not those with Islamic educational backgrounds. Moreover, there was no 
organisation that could be considered to represent the voice of all Muslims in the country. 
Muslim organisations like All-Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI- 
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia), which was founded by Suharto‘s close 
associate B. J. Habibie in the early 1990s, only spoke for middle-class Muslim 
professionals, while Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was an organisation that represented only 
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 For the background of the workers‘ strike in Medan, see Yang (2006, pp. 241-242). 
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rural Muslims. Moreover, while the New Order era saw the rise of Chinese 
conglomerates, local indigenous small business communities were at the same time 
undermined and marginalised due to the lack of access to capital and technology, as well 
as the lack in established connections with the state. The anxiety and feelings of 
inferiority among Muslims prompted them to spread violence against the mostly non-
Muslim Chinese, across the country.
37
 As Jemma Purdey (2005) puts it, ―Incidents of 




In summary it can be said that the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies and in the 
Republic of Indonesia after independence were treated as a ―pariah class‖ (Riggs, 1964, 
1966; Chua, 2008), powerful in business, but hated for their wealth. They came to be 
perceived as the ―Other‖ by the indigenous Indonesians. To borrow Fredrik Barth‘s term 
(1969, p. 15), the Chinese and the pribumis came to be separated by an ethnic boundary, 
that is a social boundary that emerges if an ethnic group maintains its identity when its 
members interact with outsiders (Barth, 1969, p. 15). Even though the cultural 
characteristics within an ethnic group may change and transform, as long as the 
dichotomisation between members and outsiders persists, the ethnic group will continue 
to exist (Barth, 1969, p. 14). It can be said that although the Chinese and the pribumis 
generally became culturally more similar under Suharto‘s forced assimilation, the 
boundary that separated them was strengthened at the same time. As a result, the Chinese 
continued to occupy an ambiguous, outsider position in Indonesian society. As Hui Yew-
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 It should be noted that these attacks were fundamentally religious and not ethnic in nature. 
38
 However, it should be pointed out that during the New Order period, the real upswing of anti-Chinese 
violence only took place between 1995 and 1998. Violence against the Chinese was fairly minimal prior to 
that. For an account of violence against the Chinese during the New Order era, see Coppel (1983); Mackie 
(1976, pp. 111-138); Purdey (2006); Yang (2006; 2007). 
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Foong (2011) explains, ―[T]he Chinese are strangers in Indonesian society‖ (p. 15). 
According to Simmel (1950), the ―stranger‖ is a person ―who comes today and stays 
tomorrow‖ (p. 402). He or she is not an ‗owner of soil‘ since he or she is deemed as a 


























Democratisation and Ethnic Minorities: A Look at Indonesia’s 
Democratisation and the Ethnic Chinese
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In this chapter I will examine the marginalised position of the ethnic minority and 
their role in democratisation processes. This discussion will allow me to question the 
concepts of democracy, and the democratisation process in post-Suharto Indonesia. This 
chapter first discusses the major theoretical approaches to democratisation and how this 
relates to ethnic minorities. It questions the democratisation process in post-Suharto 
Indonesia and its impact on the state and society. This chapter also discusses specifically 
what has been the role of Chinese Indonesians in the democratisation process in 
Indonesia.  
 
3.1 Democratisation and Ethnic Minorities  
Conceptualising democracy is not easy and scholars have yet to reach a consensus 
on its definition. In general, there are two broad theoretical approaches to democracy. 
Some scholars adopt a minimalist, one-dimensional procedural conception that focuses 
on elections, where democracy is: ―[an] institutional arrangement in which all adult 
individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their 
chief executive and national legislature‖ (Lipset & Lakin, 2004, p. 19). A further 
elaboration of this adds the element of uncertainty; a regime is considered democratic 
―[o]nly if the opposition is allowed to compete, win, and assume office […]‖ (Przeworski, 
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Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi, 1996, p. 50). Other scholars such as Larry Diamond (1999) 
and Jeffrey Haynes (2001) see this as merely as a limited type of democracy, an 
―electoral democracy‖, whereas ―liberal‖ (Diamond 1999) or ―full‖ (Haynes 2001) 
democracy extends the idea of democracy beyond electoral procedures to include 
substantial individual freedoms and citizens‘ rights to participate in the political process. 
According to Diamond (1999, pp. 10-12) and Haynes (2001, p. 10), in addition to the 
core elements of electoral democracy, liberal or full democracies have the following 
components: 
- The armed forces are subordinated to civilian rule. 
- Executive power is constrained by the rule of law and independent government 
institutions, thereby guaranteeing horizontal accountability of public officials. 
- Beyond periodic elections, citizens have multiple channels to express their interests via 
elected political representatives as well as independent organisations and movements.    
- Traditionally marginalised groups such as ethnic minorities and the poor have the 
opportunity to participate in the political process. 
 
In thinking about democracy in this thesis, it is important to explore the role that 
ethnic minorities play in the democratisation process, and what democracy means for 
them. Many authors have reservations about considering democracy as a political system 
that will necessarily guarantee minority rights. A volume on ethnicity and 
democratisation in Europe edited by Karl Cordell (1999) argues that the interests of 
minority groups in new democracies are safeguarded only if governments have the 
political will, political capital or economic capital to implement minority rights 
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legislation. Nalini Rajan (2002) maintains that democracy tends to promote majoritarian 
rule that is inimical to minority rights. She argues that minority rights can flourish only in 
a democratised state which promotes equal consideration of individual autonomy and 
―opt[s] for consensus rather than simple majority decision-making‖ (p. 68). Daniel A. 
Bell (2004) points out that democratisation in East and Southeast Asia tends to emerge 
with nation-building projects that centred on the culture of the majority ethnic group. 
Therefore, he asserts that democratisation in these regions may marginalise or even 
eliminate expressions of minority culture as well as languages and consequently worsen 
the situation of vulnerable ethno-cultural minority groups.  
In her works on democratisation and market-dominant minorities, i.e. 
economically privileged minorities, in newly democratised countries, Amy Chua (2003a; 
2003b) argues that democratisation tends to bring a backlash against the minorities. 
Citing cases such as the genocides of economically dominant minorities in former 
Yugoslavia (the Croats) and Rwanda (the Tutsis), as well as the nationalisation of 
industrial assets formerly owned by ethnic Chinese capitalists in post-Suharto Indonesia, 
Chua argues that the simultaneous introduction of democratisation and free markets in 
developing countries with a deeply resented market-dominant minority often results in 
backlash against the minority through expulsion, atrocities, or economic restrictions. She 
explains such outcomes by suggesting that with democratisation ―politicians will have 
powerful incentives to scapegoat the resented economically dominant minority and 
foment ethnic hatred to their advantage‖ (Chua, 2003a, p. 154). As a result, the aroused 
ethnic majority may demand policies that will end the resented market-dominant 
minority‘s economic dominance. To resolve ethnic tensions and conflict, Chua proposes 
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that multi-ethnic developing countries should be ruled by authoritarian regimes until 
equality in wealth distribution among all ethnic groups is achieved. She also recommends 
the introduction of economic policies that positively discriminate against ethnic 
minorities and benefit the poor indigenous majorities.  
Chua‘s controversial argument has been criticised by a several scholars. For 
instance, Tom Ginsburg (2004) points out that Chua‘s conception of democracy is too 
narrow because she defines democracy as rule by majority, including any violence 
perpetuated by a majority group against a minority group. Due to such a narrow 
conception of democracy, Chua attributes many things to democracy that may not 
actually have much to do with it. For instance, she attests that the massive genocide of the 
Tutsis perpetuated by the Hutus in Rwanda in 1994 was a result of political liberalisation 
in the early 1990s. The Tutsis were the ethnic minority who played a dominant role in 
Rwanda‘s economy while the Hutus were the ethnic majority in the country. Ginsburg 
(2004) rightly refutes such a view by arguing that ―[t]he fact that a majority of a 
population commits an atrocity, or is complicit with it, hardly renders that action a result 
of democracy‖ (pp. 13-14).  
Edmund Terence Gomez (2008) and Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh (2008) also criticise 
Chua for homogenising communities of the economically privileged minorities and over-
emphasising the obscenely wealthy tycoons from the minority groups. Yeoh argues that 
the structure of the economically privileged minorities is actually more complicated than 
Chua‘s readers are led to understand from her works. He points out that in Southeast 
Asian countries, apart from a few wealthy business tycoons, there are also large labouring 
masses within Chua‘s ―market-dominant minorities‖. I agree with their views since 
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throughout Chua‘s works there is little mention of those who do not belong to the 
wealthy trading class (such as Chinese Indonesians like Sofyan Tan) within the so-called 
economically privileged minorities.  
Gomez (2008) also argues that the affirmative action proposed by Chua to target 
disadvantaged groups along ethnic lines could reinforce racial identities and in the long 
term, hinder ethnic cohesion. He maintains that under truly democratic rule, ethnic 
harmony is promoted and discrimination against minorities will be curbed. To resolve 
ethnic conflict due to economic inequality, Gomez (2008, p. 13) strongly recommends 
the introduction of ―[a]n electoral system that encourages moderation as well as 
accommodates difference, a government led by a coalition of parties representing 
different interest groups that promotes dialogue and encourages politicians to seek 
compromises that eventually help benefit all communities‖.  
In my view, these authors (including those who criticise Chua‘s perspective) have 
made significant contributions in opening up discussions and debates on the relationship 
between democratisation and minority rights. But I also wish to point out that they have 
largely ascribed a passive and powerless role to the minorities. The locus of power is 
assumed to be within the ruling classes and the minorities are perceived as passive and 
powerless outsiders. This literature does not touch on the active and dynamic role of the 
minorities in shaping their destinies as well as that of their countries, and in dealing with 






3.2 Democratisation in Post-New Order Indonesia 
Suharto‘s authoritarian rule ended in 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis 
(Suryadinata, 2001, p. 506). Social unrest in Indonesia, aggravated by the financial crisis, 
escalated and peaked in mid-May in Jakarta and other parts of the country. Chinese shops 
and properties were looted and burned down, and it was alleged that many Chinese 
women were brutally tortured, raped and murdered (Mackie, 1999, p. 189).
40
 According 
to the Joint Fact-Finding Team (Joint Team) appointed by the Habibie government to 
investigate the riots, the violence was probably instigated by someone ―at the country‘s 
‗highest levels‘ of decision-making‖ to create a critical upheaval so that martial law could 
be imposed (The Joint Fact-Finding Team [TGPF], n.d.). Leo Suryadinata (2001, p. 507) 
suggests another possible scenario that the violence was an outcome of the internal 
conflict within the military.
41
 It has also been argued that the violence was instigated by 
the military to deflect public anger from the Suharto regime and towards the Chinese 
minority (Heryanto, 1999. p. 327). However, to date there is still no concrete evidence 
available and therefore it is difficult to prove such involvement conclusively.   
The fall of Suharto in May 1998 has led to a process of democratisation in 
Indonesia, with the implementation of a few significant institutional reforms. During the 
New Order, political activities were highly restricted. The populace was thought of as a 
―floating mass‖, which had no role to play in politics, except during the period of the 
national elections every five years. These elections, referred to as ―festivals of 
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 However, as Hoon (2008) stated in his published dissertation, the rapes are still ―a contested issue as 
there has been no consensus on the number of rape victims‖ and ―there is still a general denial of the rapes 
in Indonesia‘s official discourse‖ (p. 46). 
41
 Suryadinata (2001, p. 507) points to the power struggle between General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto‘s 
son-in-law, and General Wiranto, Suharto appointee. According to this analysis, Prabowo instigated the 
violence to discredit Wiranto, who was the then Commander of the Armed forces, so that he could seize 
power from the latter. 
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democracy‖, allowed the country to look like it was a functioning ―democracy‖ even 
though the outcomes of the elections were fixed through various means (Shiraishi, 1994, 
p. 75-99; Clear, 2005, p. 142). The number of political parties had been confined to three, 
i.e. Golkar (Golongan Karya, controlled by President Suharto), the Development Unity 
Party (PPP- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI- 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), and had to be approved by the government (Lindsay, 2007, 
p. 58; Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 74).
42
 Anyone involved in PPP and PDI would find 
themselves potentially ostracised from the patronage links of power that ran through 
Golkar (Vickers, 2005, p. 175). 
After being appointed president on May 21, 1998, B. J. Habibie attempted to 
distance himself from the previous highly centralised authoritarian regime and to gain 
legitimacy for his reformasi government. On January 28, 1999, the Habibie government 
passed the new law on political parties (Law No. 2/1999) which permitted the formation 
of parties based on any principle and aspiration that did not conflict with the Pancasila, 
the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state
 
(King, 2000, p. 90; 
Abdulbaki, 2008, p. 158).
43
 However, communist parties and separatist parties were and 
are still prohibited. The new law removed restrictions on forming political parties, thus 
allowing people to organise themselves and form political parties. The first free and open 
elections since 1955 were held in June 1999 (Suryadinata, 2002a, p. vii; Hadiz & 
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 Golkar was originally founded as ‗Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups‘ (Sekber Golkar- Sekretariat 
Bersama Golongan Karya) by the Indonesian military leaders in 1964. The objective of the organisation 
was to counterbalance the increasing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). After Suharto 
came into power, he turned the organisation into ―the electoral vehicle of the New Order regime‖ (Tomsa, 
2008, p. 36). 
43
 Pancasila comprises five principles: ―Belief in the one and only God‖, ―Just and civilized humanity‖, 
―The unity of Indonesia‖, ―Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives‖ and ―Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia‖ 
(Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia, Washington D.C., 2008).  
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Robison, 2005, p. 231; Wessel, 2005, p. 12). Indonesians were also given the first 
opportunity to directly elect the president and vice-president in 2004 (Suryadinata, 2005). 
There have been four rounds of parliamentary elections and numerous local direct 
elections since the end of Suharto‘s autocracy. In general, there are many different 
political parties competing in these elections which have been on the whole carried out 
democratically and peacefully.
44
 Post-New Order elections saw the rise of a few new 
major political parties. These included the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-
P- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan)
45
 led by Sukarno‘s daughter, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri; the National Awakening Party (PKB- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) led by 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest mass-based 
Muslim organisation in Indonesia; the National Mandate Party (PAN- Partai Amanat 
Nasional) led by Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah, the second largest mass-
based Muslim organisation in Indonesia; the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS- Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera), an Islamic Party which adopts Islam as its ideological basis; and the 
Democratic Party (PD- Partai Demokrat), the political vehicle of retired General Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (Suryadinata, 2002a; Ananta, Arifin & Suryadinata, 2005; Tomsa, 
2010). The 2009 election also saw the emergence of two new parties founded and led by 
controversial retired generals, i.e. the Great Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra- 
                                                 
44
 However, it should be noted that small-scale violence had occurred during direct elections for local 
government heads in some locations. These incidents of violence included ―destroying political parties‘ 
campaign materials, […] persecution, destructive demonstrations and clashes between supporters of rival 
candidates‖ (―Local elections are a violent business‖, 2013). Large-scale violence that resulted in deaths 
broke out in conflict areas such as Aceh and Papua. In the face of these incidents of violence, Home 
Minister Gamawan Fauzi stated that he would recommend the government to switch back to the former 
indirect election system whereby local government heads were elected by local assembly members if 
violence continued to break out during local direct elections (―Local elections are a violent business‖, 
2013). 
45
 The PDI-P is a splinter party from the old PDI. It was formed by Megawati‘s faction in early 1999 
(Suryadinata, 2002a, pp. 79, 84; Sherlock, 2004, pp. 25-26). 
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Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya) founded and led by Prabowo Subianto, and the People‘s 
Conscience Party (Hanura- Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat) founded and led by Wiranto 
(Tomsa, 2010). However, it should be noted that Golkar, an integral part of the New 
Order, has remained a major player in post-Suharto political landscape. This shows how 
New Order power relations, practices and institutions have not been totally ‗reformed‘ 
through ‗Reformasi‘, but have persisted even with the supposed end of the New Order 
regime. I will elaborate more on the background and ideology of these political parties in 
Chapter Six. 
In order to accommodate growing regional and local demands for greater 
autonomy in the access to local resources and the control of local political machineries, 
the post-Suharto government also introduced regional decentralisation and local 
autonomy policies under two umbrella laws, Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999. 
Under the decentralisation laws and regulations, significant administrative powers in 
industry, trade, investments, agriculture, public works, transport, cooperatives, labour, 
land, health care, education and culture, and environmental issues, have transferred from 
the central government to regional and local governments (Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005, p. 
261; Hadiz & Robison, 2005, p. 233). According to scholar-bureaucrat Ryaas Rasyid 
(2003), who was appointed by President Habibie to form a group known as the Team of 
Ten (Tim Sepuluh) to formulate the decentralisation laws and regulations, ―The 
[decentralisation] policy was intended to provide more scope for local creativity and 
initiative in making policy and promoting public participation‖ (p. 64). Therefore, it can 
be said that in the context of Indonesia, one of the objectives of the regional 
decentralisation is to promote democratisation at the local level. This policy direction was 
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also strengthened by the introduction of direct elections for local government heads in 
2005 (referred to as ―pilkada‖ – ―pemilihan kepala daerah”. See Erb and Sulistilyanto 
[2009]). There have been numerous local direct elections since 2005.  
One of the surprises of the decentralisation process, as pointed out by Schulte-
Nordholt and van Klinken (2007), was the fragmentation of territories. In the space of 10 
years, the number of provinces increased from 26 to 33 while the number of districts 
from 293 (1999) to 491 (2009) (Putri & Kusuma, 2012). This fragmentation of 
administrative regions into smaller units is known as ‗pemekaran‘, which literally means 
‗blossoming‘. According to Schulte-Nordholt and van Klinken (2007), the real objective 
of such administrative fragmentation was ―to increase bureaucratic jobs‖ (p. 19). 
Interestingly aspiring regional bureaucratic and political elites often mobilised ethnic 
sentiments in campaigns to establish new provinces or districts (Schulte-Nordholt & van 
Klinken, 2007, p. 2; Aspinall, 2011, p. 306).  
Although Indonesia went through a huge transition after the fall of Suharto, there 
are many who query whether this transition is a fully democratic one. As stated above, 
scholars such as Diamond (1999, pp. 8-16) and Haynes (2001, pp. 6-10) would classify 
post-New Order Indonesia as an ―electoral democracy‖, instead of a façade or pseudo-
democracy, as was the case under the reign of Suharto, when elections were heavily 
controlled by the ruling party and legal alternative parties were denied a fair and 
authentic opportunity to compete for power.
46
 However there are other factors as 
mentioned above, which are crucial to the emergence of a ―full democracy‖ by their 
definitions, and there are many reasons for questioning Indonesia's transition to a ―full 
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 Diamond (1999, p. 15) regards such regimes as pseudo-democracies instead of non-democracies, since 
pseudo-democracies tolerate formally legal alternative parties and organisational pluralism to a certain 
extent. Such tolerance is absent in non-democracies. 
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democracy‖. Although many scholars have shown optimism about Indonesia‘s 
democratisation process, because of electoral reforms, decentralisation, and the decline of 
the armed forces‘ role in politics (Abdulbaki 2008, Crouch 2010), there are also those 
who have pointed to serious flaws in Indonesia‘s democratisation process. For example 
some scholars offer critical analyses of democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia by 
highlighting the decay of state institutions, rampant corruption in the bureaucracy, and 
the capture of the new political parties and institutions by old as well as some new 
predatory interests in post-Suharto Indonesia. For examples, both Marcus Mietzner (2008, 
pp. 244-248) and Jamie S. Davidson (2009a, p. 294) point out that corruption and internal 
mismanagement continue to characterise the bureaucracy in the country. Amy Freedman 
and Robert Tiburzi (2012) opine that while Indonesia has made significant progress in the 
democratisation process, it is at the same time undermined by various hurdles such as 
rampant corruption and the poor enforcement of the rule of law. Howard Dick and 
Jeremy Mulholland (2011) coined the term ‗political marketplace‘ for the post-New 
Order Indonesian state as the state was marked by money politics. Since membership 
dues and state subsidies for political parties are minimal, political parties and factions 
need slush funds to function. They obtain slush funds from ministries, agencies and state 
enterprises competing for influence in the drafting and passage of laws as well as in the 
facilitating of favourable committee hearings though bribing parliamentarians. With 
regard to money politics within political parties, Dick and Mulholland point out that 
―positions and parliamentary seats are allocated by internal auction, moderated by 
patronage and influence‖ (p. 76).  
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In addition, Vedi R. Hadiz (2003; 2010) argues that due to the absence of an 
effective, genuinely reformist party or political coalition, the predatory politico-business 
interests nurtured under the New Order managed to reconstitute and reorganise 
themselves successfully within the new political and economic regimes. Most of these 
predatory interests were previously entrenched at the lower layers of the New Order‘s 
vast and lucrative patronage network. This network extended from Jakarta all the way 
down to the provinces, cities, kabupatens and villages.
 
Although such a centralised 
system of patronage no longer exists after the fall of Suharto, its elements managed to 
reinvent and consolidate themselves in the new political parties and institutions. Such 
newly decentralised and competing predatory interests include ambitious political fixers, 
entrepreneurs and enforcers, state bureaucrats, newly ascendant business groups, as well 
as a wide range of political gangsters, hooligans and thugs. They contest to gain 
ascendancy at the local level of politics as regional decentralisation has created new rent-
seeking opportunities for individuals in local governments. In other words, corruption, or 
what Indonesians generally call KKN (the Indonesian-language acronym for corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism), has devolved from the central to the local level governments. 
Such uneven democratisation has constrained what the ethnic Chinese have been able to 
do, particularly in business, and made their situation more complex. This will be further 
explored in the chapters to come. 
According to Vedi R. Hadiz and Richard Robison (2005),
47
 the absence of an 
effective, genuinely reformist party or political coalition in post-Suharto Indonesia is an 
important legacy of the New Order rule, which successfully disorganised civil society.
 
During the New Order, mass-based social and political movements were systematically 
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 See also Hadiz (2000, p. 15; 2005b, p. 125). 
67 
 
destroyed and paralysed in the name of eliminating the political Left, which was deemed 
to be a supporter and ally of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). As a result, the 
working class continued to be poorly organised and lacked political coherence. The 
emerging urban middle class and bourgeoisie, which largely basked in their position of 
privilege during the high economic growth period, grew increasingly conservative.
 
This 
has led to the extreme difficulty for reformist elements within civil society to organise 
coherently and effectively.
 
Therefore, it is no surprise that when the structures of 
authoritarian rule finally came to an end, it was the predatory politico-business interests 
that included the ethnic Chinese cukongs and conglomerates nurtured by the New Order 
that were ―in the best position to take advantage of the opening up of political space‖ 
(Hadiz & Robison, 2005, p. 232). Maxwell Lane (2013) makes a similar argument that 
the extreme political repression during the New Order era had eliminated ―all political 
traditions that may have provided an ideological basis for opposition — such as 
liberalism, liberal democracy, social democracy, socialism, and communism‖ (p. 2). This 
resulted in the inability of the reformasi movement to develop a solid structure to 
compete with various political forces formerly nurtured under the New Order.  
In fact, with regards to the relationship between democracy and civil society, 
Robert D. Putnam (1993; 1995) maintains that a strong and vibrant civil society is a 
precondition to the consolidation of democracy. According to Putnam (1993), the strong 
bonds among civil society groups will generate social capital, i.e. ―features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks‖ (p. 167). The social capital helps to 
facilitate coordinated actions among members of a community for mutual benefit and 
subsequently strengthens the state and the economy. This will bolster effective 
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democratic governance. In order to foster wider cooperation, Putnam argues that 
networks of civil society groups should cut across salient social cleavages and be 
autonomous from politics. But Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards (1996) criticise 
Putnam for focusing solely on the role of horizontally structured apolitical organisations 
and downplaying the ability of social-movement groups in advancing democracy. They 
also questioned the ability of such apolitical organisations in shaping political 
participation and promoting democracy ―without engaging in specifically political issues 
and without representing compelling social interests‖ (Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 41). 
They propose that ―social-movement organizations, grassroots interest groups, and 
grassroots political associations of all sorts‖ (Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 49) are more 
likely to advance citizens‘ interests and promote democracy. The stronger a civil society 
engages in public and political issues as well as represents compelling social interests, the 
more likely it will be able to advance effective democratic governance.  
I agree with Foley and Edwards‘s view because in the Indonesian case, the 
reformasi movement that played a crucial role in bringing down the Suharto regime 
comprised a cross-section of society, that is university students, social activists, middle 
class politicians and intellectuals, all calling for the resignation of Suharto and his regime 
(Aspinall, 2005). However, it should be noted that although the movement succeeded in 
forcing Suharto to resign, the New Order regime did not enter into a thorough unraveling, 
as Hadiz, Robison and Lane suggest. Golkar and most of Suharto‘s cronies remained 
powerful and influential in the political arena. The end of the Suharto regime did not lead 
to the consolidation of political opposition forces since the reformasi movement lacked a 
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clear social base and effective organising vehicles that were crucial in establishing a 
viable alternative political choice to Indonesians.  
J. Danang Widoyoko (2011) argues that the pervasive and systematic corruption 
in Indonesia ―is typical of a highly fragmented polity with a weak civil society‖ (p. 165). 
The end of Suharto‘s highly centralised, autocratic regime led to the fragmentation of 
power and produced new power centres. This created mushrooming corruption 
throughout the entire country. Corruption flourishes in the new democracy because the 
wider society and organised interest groups are too weak to prevent it (Widoyoko, 2011, 
pp. 168-169). Interestingly a recent volume on illegal practices of state institutions in 
Indonesia edited by Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (2011) argues that 
corruption and illegal activities by government officials in various sectors
48
 are not just 
deviations from the normal operation of the state but also part of the state-formation 
process. Therefore, Aspinall and van Klinken emphasise that eradicating illegal practices 
in state institutions requires a new form of state that is embedded in a politically engaged 
citizenry (p. 28). 
Therefore, as Hadiz (2005a, p. 48) argues, the end of the New Order has not been 
followed by greater popular participation in politics. Movements and organisations 
representing the interests of lower-classes such as labour and the urban poor have 
remained excluded from political contests. Hadiz and Robison (2005) further point out 
that political newcomers who genuinely promote reforms and do not associate with 
predatory networks ―often find themselves constrained in what they are able to achieve‖ 
(p. 235). Most of them are academics and activists from various non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). They have little choice but to latch onto existing predatory 
                                                 
48
 Including election campaigns, the judiciary, the education sector and the construction industry. 
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coalitions with more established financial sources and an apparatus of violence for their 
own survival in political contestations.  
Mietzner holds a slightly different view with regard to civil society in post-New 
Order Indonesia. While emphasising that the democratisation process in Indonesia was 
undermined by anti-reformist elites, Mietzner (2012) nevertheless opined that the civil 
society in the country ―has been vital in ensuring that recent elite attempts to overturn 
democratic reforms did not throw Indonesia into a full democratic recession‖ (p. 217). 
For instance, when conservative elites attempted to take over the General Elections 
Commission (KPU- Komisi Pemilihan Umum), civil society organisations and the media 
actively resisted such an attempt and demanded that the KPU be freed from political 
party influence. Later, President Yudhoyono‘s Democratic Party (PD- Partai Demokrat) 
began to oppose the inclusion of political parties into the KPU and subsequently the 
initial proposal of letting political parties take over the Commission has been shelved. 
Thus, Mietzner (2012) asserts that ―the impact of these elite manoeuvres has been 
mitigated by resistance from civil society, making Indonesia more a case of democratic 
stagnation than of full-blown regression‖ (p. 211). He also notes that the civil society in 
post-New Order Indonesia has its own internal problems that are closely related to the 
lack of coordination and cooperation between highly professional NGOs based in Jakarta 
and less developed civil society groups in the regions (Mietzner, 2012, p. 222). This 
implies that civil society as a whole in post-New Order Indonesia is fragmented and 
unable to influence the government.
49
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 Mietzner (2012, p. 222) therefore proposes that in order to protect democratic achievements in Indonesia, 
international donors should strengthen civil society by continuing to offer financial support to NGOs (that 




Edward Aspinall (2010) asserts that the accommodation of predatory political 
forces nurtured by the New Order in Indonesia‘s new democracy forestalled their 
attempts to resist and destroy the democratic system from the outside. Therefore, the low 
quality of democracy is the price of Indonesia‘s steady democratic progress. He makes a 
paradoxical remark that ―[t]he success of Indonesia‘s democracy and its poor quality are 
two sides of the same coin. It was precisely by achieving a low-quality outcome that 
Indonesian democratisation proceeded so smoothly‖ (Aspinall, 2010, p. 32). 
Apart from the corrupt and illegal practices that continue plaguing state 
institutions as well as the capture of the new political and economic regimes by the old 
(and some new) predatory interests, there are other hurdles that undermine the 
democratisation process. For instance, with regard to the military in post-New Order era, 
despite the positive official stances of the government and the military leadership towards 
military reform, the military remains powerful. Although some military officers indicted 
for human rights crimes in East Timor were prosecuted and found guilty, the sentences 
were later overturned (Kammen, 2012, pp. 111-112). Moreover, decentralisation reforms 
have (ironically) opened up more opportunities for local military commanders to have 
more control over local budgets and decision-making processes (Croissant, Chambers & 
Völkel, 2011, p. 198). Harold Crouch (2010, p. 161) points out that the inability of the 
government to provide the military with adequate funding is the greatest hurdle to 
military reform. Since the end of the authoritarian regime, the military budget remains 
very low. In 2000, a major-general was only paid Rp. 1.6 million (about US$200 at that 
time) every month, while the official basic monthly salary of a corporal was only Rp. 
850,000 (about US$100) (Crouch, 2010, p. 167). Therefore, most military (and police) 
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officers relied on private semi-legal and illegal means to earn more funds to finance their 
daily operations. Some of them worked as security guards in commercial enterprises to 
earn extra income. In small towns, ethnic Chinese businesspeople make regular financial 
‗contributions‘ to local commanders to gain guaranteed military protection in the events 
of anti-Chinese violence. Besides that, local military and police units extracted financial 
‗contributions‘ from both legal and illegal businesses such as logging, mining and fishing 
in exchange for their ‗protection‘ on those businesses. Military units are also involved in 
smuggling (Crouch, 2010, p. 166).   
In addition, efforts to end the military controlled businesses have, to date, largely 
failed. The military resisted the transfer of its business holdings to the government by 
selling a certain amount of the holdings‘ stake to private commercial companies. Thereby, 
the assets could no longer be classified as military business enterprises and could not be 
transferred to the government (Crouch, 2010, p. 168, Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
Although the government later formed an inter-ministerial team in 2009 to oversee the 
partial reform of the military controlled businesses, the team does not have clear authority 
over the military and its businesses, and lacks independence because it is dominated by 
the ministry of defense (Human Rights Watch, 2010, pp. 1, 12). It can therefore be said 
that post-New Order governments have been half-hearted in pushing for reforms in the 
military. 
In addition, the end of the New Order did not reduce the influence of preman 
(gangster/thug), paramilitary and militia groups in Indonesia. These groups are closely 
related. The origins of preman go back to the 1945-1949 Revolution and the late 1950s. 
According to Ian Wilson (2010, p. 201), during the Revolution, strongmen and toughs 
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were at the forefront of the struggle for Indonesia‘s independence. Many of them were 
later incorporated into the new national military. In 1954, General Nasution, the head of 
the armed forces, ―deployed networks of gangsters and former militias as part of a 
campaign to pressure Sukarno into suspending parliamentary democracy, eventually 
ushering in the period known as ‗Guided Democracy‘‖ (Wilson, 2010, p. 201).50 The 
Pancasila Youth (PP- Pemuda Pancasila), the largest quasi-official youth/crime 
organisation, was formed out of this alliance. In the mid-1960s, the military mobilised PP 
and local gangsters to confront and crush suspected members of the communist party 
(Ryter, 2000, p. 19; 2001; 2002; Hadiz, 2004, p. 626). Former governor of North Sumatra 
Syamsul Arifin, as interviewed in The Act of Killing, a 2012 documentary film about the 
anti-communist genocide, acknowledged the important role of gangsters in eliminating 
communism in Indonesia, ―Communism will never be accepted here, because we have so 
many gangsters, and that‘s a good thing‖ (Cited in the subtitles of The Act of Killing, 
2012). Under Suharto the institutionalisation of local gangsters was furthered intensified 
(Wilson, 2011, p. 242). Apart from PP, other quasi-official youth/crime organisations 
such as the Army Veterans‘ Youth (PPM- Pemuda Panca Marga) and Armed Forces 
Sons‘ and Daughters‘ Communication Forum (FKPPI- Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri 
Purnawirawan Indonesia) were formed to help maintain political order and stability 
through violence and intimidation (Ryter, 2001; 2005, p. 22; Beittinger-Lee, 2009, p. 
164). These organisations are generally considered as ―fronts for preman activity‖ 
(Hadiz, 2003, pp. 125-126), and were usually backed and protected by the military during 
the New Order period (Ryter, 2000, p. 20). Thus, such organisations are also known as 
‗preman organisations‘ (Wilson, 2010, p. 200). (I will hereafter use the terms 
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‗youth/crime organisations‘ and ‗preman organisations‘ interchangeably.) Therefore, it 
can be said that the distinction between preman, soldier, politician and criminal is often 
blurry.  
These quasi-official youth/crime organisations were particularly influential in 
Jakarta and North Sumatra (Ryter, 2002). Members were mostly indigenous premans 
with criminal backgrounds. There are ethnic Chinese members in these organisations but 
their number is very small compared to that of indigenous members. Two well-known 
examples were Anton Medan a.k.a. Tan Hok Liang (陈福良) and Yorrys Raweyai. 
Medan is a Chinese Muslim and Raweyai is a mixed Chinese-Papuan. Both used to be 
prominent figures in the criminal underworld, especially in Jakarta‘s early 1980s 
gambling scenes. Medan was also allegedly involved in perpetrating the May 1998 
rioting and burning down the house of Liem Sioe Liong, one of Suharto‘s cronies. Both 
Medan and Raweiyai were later racially targeted by their indigenous counterparts (Tsai, 
2011, p. 146, n66; Ryter, 2001, pp. 125, n4, 150, 150, n76; Setyautama, 2008, p. 357).  
Premans also demanded to be given the opportunity to provide informal 
protection service in exchange for money (Beittinger-Lee, 2009, p. 164). Many Chinese 
Indonesians were their clients. As cited by Ryter (2001), a field operative of PP in Jakarta 
admitted that ―PP lives from the Chinese‖ (p. 152).  
After the unravelling of the New Order regime, despite losing their main backer, 
premans are able to survive by taking advantage of the inability of the post-New Order 
regimes to maintain security and the opportunities opened up by competitive electoral 
politics as well as regional decentralisation. Many political parties have established their 
own paramilitary wings or civilian militia known as ‗satgas parpol‘ (satuan tugas partai 
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politik, i.e. political party militias). Members mostly came from youth/crime 
organisations such as PP and ―[mercenaries] of the disenfranchised urban milieu‖ (King, 
2003).
51
 Moreover, premans still dominates the protection racket scene in Indonesia. 
According to Christian Chua (2008, pp. 92-93) and also mentioned in an interview with a 
NGO activist in Medan (Interview with Halim, in Indonesian, July 26, 2010), many well-
established businesspeople (including ethnic Chinese) hired premans to protect their 
business, to break up strikes, or to intimidate business competitors and media that reports 
negatively about them. In the 2009 general assembly of PP, the then Vice President Jusuf 
Kalla even openly defended the premans and emphasised their importance to Indonesia, 
―We need a preman to run the economy, the market. We need adventurous people to 
engage in fair [economic] development‖ (Cited in ―Kalla says ‗thug‘ needed to run 
Indonesia‖, 2009). Therefore, as Phil King (2003) observes, ―[R]eformasi was a 
liberalisation of both party politics and underworld criminal activities‖. Some scholars 
even opined that post-New Order Indonesia is becoming a ‗preman state‘ (Lindsey, 2001; 
Schulte Nordholt, 2002). 
 
3.3 Democratisation, Decentralisation and Ethnic Minorities in 
Indonesia 
 It is evident that the situation of ethnic minorities in Indonesia is varied. The 
Chinese represent a particular type of ethnic minority with quite different experiences 
than those of indigenous minority groups across the country. Edward Aspinall (2011) and 
Jacques Bertrand (2004; 2010) propose perspectives that focus on the agency of minority 
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groups in dealing with democratisation and decentralisation since the end of the New 
Order. Aspinall opined that the opening up of democratic politics since the downfall of 
Suharto and the devolution of political and fiscal authority to local governments provided 
opportunities for regional minorities to mobilise ethnicity in contesting for political 
power in local politics. Regional minority elites have been attempting to resuscitate 
tradition (adat) and traditional ethnic political institutions associated with particular 
ethnic identities.
52
 In doing so, the elites are able to demonstrate that they are fit to rule 
when competing for political power. But Aspinall also notes that as the new democratic 
system has settled into place (after 2001), the political salience of ethnicity has declined. 
Local politics has been marked by bargaining and cooperation between different ethnic 
groups. It can be said that the emergence of democratisation and decentralisation in 
Indonesia has opened up opportunities for regionally-based indigenous minorities (as 
opposed to the ethnic Chinese, Arabs and Indians) to compete for political power through 
inter-ethnic cooperation and this has, in turn, shaped the pluralism in Indonesian politics.  
Bertrand argues that the emergence of democratisation and decentralisation in 
post-New Order Indonesia had opened up opportunities for certain minority groups to 
renegotiate their position in the country. Such renegotiation had manifested in the form of 
violent conflicts involving various indigenous minority groups, particularly from 1999 to 
2002. These included clashes between Muslims and Christians in Maluku (1999) and in 
Poso, Central Sulawesi (1999), Dayak-Madurese (1996-1997) and Dayak and Malay-
Madurese (1999) conflicts in West Kalimantan, Dayak-Madurese conflicts in Central 
Kalimantan (2001), and the intensification of conflicts in East Timor, Aceh and Papua 
(1999). Bertrand (2010) argues that ethnic relations in Indonesia were greatly influenced 
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by the formation of an Indonesian national model ―characterized by the concept of a 
single nation and secular but religious state‖ (p. 97).53 Under the New Order regime, this 
model was reaffirmed, modified and intensified primarily through repression. This 
process involved marginalising and creating tensions for certain minority groups. The 
downfall of the Suharto regime and the subsequent democratisation and decentralisation 
processes created uncertainties about future outcomes and opened up opportunities for 
certain minority groups to renegotiate their inclusion or the terms of inclusion in the 
Indonesian national model. According to Bertrand (2010),   
 
Groups that had been integrated by force during the Suharto regime [i.e. 
East Timorese and Papuans] saw opportunities to remobilized and demand 
secession or significantly greater autonomy. Those that had been 
marginalized, [such as the Dayaks of Kalimantan,] either through 
repression or displacement in the name of development, could demand 
redress. Tensions among Muslims and Christians in some areas also were 
high, since the New Order regime had changed the balance of power 
between the two groups and demands were being made to revisit the status 
of Islam in the polity. These sets of tensions were embedded in the 
institutional structures that the New Order regime had established, as well 
as the way in which it had implemented its vision of Indonesia‘s national 
model. With its fall, the conditions were ripe for reopening terms of 
inclusion, in some cases through violent means. 
(pp. 97-98) 
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In other words, the collapse of the authoritarian regime and the emergence of 
democratisation as well as decentralisation had opened opportunities for marginalised 
groups to seek ―better inclusion and more respect for their needs‖ (Bertrand, 2010, p. 93), 
and for regionally-based minority groups to demand greater autonomy or even 
independence. In this process, the minority groups shaped their destinies as well as the 
process of democratisation. Unlike regionally-based minority groups, the Chinese could 
not mobilise their ethnicity in contesting for local political power because they do not 
have particular regions to identify with. However, they could appeal to their political 
ideals as a means to contest for political power. They also benefitted from the opening up 
of a relatively liberal socio-cultural environment since the end of the New Order because 
they could openly express and celebrate their ethnic and cultural identities. The open and 
active participation of the Chinese in the socio-political arena also contributed to 
multiculturalism and political activism in post-Suharto Indonesia.  
Bertrand also points out that ethnic violence diminished significantly after 
Megawati Sukarnoputri became president in mid-2001. She was able to create a relatively 
stable institutional environment by forming a strong ruling coalition and establishing 
good relations with the armed forces. In addition, peace deals were reached in Maluku 
and Sulawesi. In Aceh and Papua, similar attempts to resolve the crises were made with 
different degrees of success. East Timor was also officially separated from Indonesia in 
1999 and became an independent state in 2002. 
At first glance Amy Chua‘s comments that democratisation brings a backlash to 
deeply resented market dominant minorities, seems to fit the situation of Indonesia in 
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1998, when Suharto stepped down from office and unleashed the forces of reform. The 
Chinese appeared to be a target for some of these forces, as was discussed above, with 
shops being burned, and acts of atrocity were committed on Chinese individuals. 
However as stated above, scholars‘ explanations of this violence have nothing to do with 
the actual process of reform or democratisation itself, but they argue that this violence 
served as an excuse for upheaval, or as camouflage, and was orchestrated by those in 
power and not by the resentful poorer indigenous majority.  
Although the position of the Chinese in Indonesian society may have restrained 
them in some ways, they still played an important role in shaping the reform process, and 
this contributed to their continuing ambivalent position. In fact Mark R. Thompson 
(2011) attributes the weaknesses of the reformasi movement to the lack of support from 
the predominantly ethnic Chinese capitalist class for the movement.
54
 He points out that 
due to its alien, ―pariah‖ status, the ethnic Chinese capitalist class in Indonesia was often 
incapable of, or was reluctant to challenge the state. Hence, in 1998, the Chinese 
Indonesian bourgeoisie did not support the reformasi opposition movement that fought 
for the removal of Suharto from power. Had the capitalist class, including the ethnic 
Chinese, backed the reform movements, Indonesia might have seen a full-scale 
overthrow of the authoritarian regime and the rise of a new regime, like what happened in 
the Philippines and Thailand. In other words, in the case of Indonesia, a weak and alien 
bourgeoisie makes it more likely that one gets half-hearted democracy. In addition, 
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newspaper interview with an ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya, and my interview with another 
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joining non-Chinese social activists and university students in street protests against Suharto and the New 
Order regime. Thus, they also played a role in bringing down the authoritarian regime (―Terlecut Kawan 
Jawa‖, 2009; interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, December 24, 2010). 
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Thompson argues that due to political passivity of the Chinese Indonesian bourgeoisie, 
the democratic system in post-New Order Indonesia has been relatively stable compared 
to the Philippines and Thailand, despite the many weaknesses in the new democracy.
55
 
This argument implies the significance of the agency of Chinese Indonesian capitalist 
class in shaping the predatory nature of the new democracy and the incoherence of civil 
society in the reformasi era. 
John Sidel (2006) and Jacques Bertrand (2004; 2010) point out that the period of 
reform and democratisation after the end of the authoritarian regime was actually marked 
by a considerable decline in anti-Chinese violence after May 1998. But they offer 
different explanations for this change. Sidel focuses on the role of state elites while 
Bertrand looks at the role of both the state and the Chinese minority. Sidel attributes the 
decline of anti-Chinese riots to state-dependent Muslim elites‘ engagement in straight 
religious competition, instead of using anti-Chinese violence to assume more political 
power. Bertrand offers a more comprehensive explanation on the significant decline of 
anti-Chinese violence. He notes that the killings of May 1998, particularly the alleged 
mass rape cases, as well as the alleged involvement of the armed forces in the riots, 
shocked the political elite and Islamic politicians who had been most critical and vocal 
about Suharto‘s collusion with Chinese Indonesian big business groups. They began to 
sympathise with the Chinese minority and acknowledge that the Chinese had not been 
treated justly. Sarah Turner (2003) makes a similar remark, ―Since 1998 there has been 
an increased official and general acknowledgement within Indonesia that the ethnic 
Chinese community received gross injustices during the period of the riots‖ (p. 347).  
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The reversal of attitudes toward the Chinese was also catalysed by capital flight 
and the ‗exodus‘ of Chinese after the events of May 1998. In addition, some Chinese 
Indonesian tycoons had cooperated with post-New Order governments in investigations 
about corruption and this contributed further to the easing of the resentment against the 
Chinese. Bertrand (2004) also notes that the prosecution and subsequent imprisonment of 
Bob Hasan (郑建盛), Suharto‘s long-time crony and golf partner of Chinese descent, 
―particularly pleased many Indonesians‖ (p. 69). In other words, the end of Suharto‘s 
regime had removed Hasan, one of the most significant symbols of hostility against the 
Chinese minority.  
Under the influence of a more sympathetic view from Indonesian political elites, 
Chinese Indonesians have begun to benefit from reforms introduced by subsequent 
governments. Many discriminatory measures against the Chinese were removed. Most 
significantly, Suharto‘s policy of forced assimilation was abandoned. In 2001, President 
Wahid sanctioned the publication of Chinese-language print media through the repealing 
of laws that had prohibited the local publication of Chinese characters in Indonesia since 
1965 and thus Chinese language materials became more freely available. Many schools 
were allowed to conduct Chinese language courses. Besides that, ethnic Chinese were 
allowed to openly celebrate Chinese festivals (Hoon, 2008, p. 104; Giblin, 2003, pp. 347-
348). In fact, in 2002, President Megawati Sukarnoputri announced that the Chinese New 
year would be a state holiday from 2003 (Freedman, 2003, p. 447). In July, 2006, the 
Indonesian Parliament passed a landmark bill on citizenship which took a step toward 
ending discrimination against ethnic Chinese Indonesians. The law did away with the 
distinction between ‗indigenous‘ and ‗non-indigenous‘ Indonesians – long cited by 
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Chinese Indonesians as discrimination– by redefining ‗indigenous Indonesian‘ to include 
all people born in Indonesia and/or to Indonesian parents, and who have never assumed 
foreign citizenship. Under the new law, Chinese Indonesians will no longer need to 
produce proof of their citizenship or undergo the naturalisation process as long as they 
were born to parents who are Indonesian citizens (Asmarani, 2006, p. 1). They are also 
allowed to hold government posts, including the presidency, that were formerly closed to 
them. 
Hence, the fall of Suharto in May 1998 was a turning point for the Chinese in 
Indonesia to openly and actively participate in the socio-political arena. The riots in May 
1998 produced greater ethnic and political consciousness among ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians. They realised that if they wanted to defend themselves, they would have to 
become involved in the political process (Suryadinata, 2001, p. 509).
56
 Thus, a few 
Chinese have also made use of the democratic environment to participate in national as 
well as local politics and establish ethnic Chinese social and cultural organisations. The 
Chinese Indonesian Social Association (PSMTI- Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa 
Indonesia) and the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI- Perhimpunan Indonesia 
Tionghoa) are two major ethnic Chinese organisations formed in Indonesia since the end 
of the New Order (Lembong, 2008, p. 54). Both of them have branches in most provinces 
of the country. There are also Chinese Indonesians who actively participate in formal 
politics and run for public office under different political parties during general elections. 
This reflects the heterogeneous political views of the Chinese. Moreover, since the advent 
of democratisation, several Chinese Indonesians have taken the initiative to actively 
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participate in political activities and social reform movements to fight for equal rights and 
an end to discriminatory practices. Hence, the Chinese minority enjoys a less vulnerable 
political position in the reformasi era.  
But it is necessary to point out that despite the abolishment of several 
discriminatory policies and regulations against the Chinese, the position of the Chinese 
remains ambivalent in Indonesian society. The indigenous Indonesian population 
generally still perceived the Chinese minority as an alien minority because the latter does 
not have particular regions in the country to identify with and is associated with a 
homeland that is external to Indonesia. The stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians as 
wealthy, selfish and exclusive are still common among indigenous Indonesians. Hence, 
although the Chinese enjoy more freedom in formal political participation, not many of 
them were elected in general and local elections. The experience of Sofyan Tan in the 
opening story of this thesis clearly illustrates such an ambivalent position. In addition, the 
negative perceptions of the Chinese sometimes turn into overt hostility whenever there 
are high-profile cases involving illegal and semi-legal business practices committed by 
Chinese Indonesians.  
 For instance, in 2003, there were riots against the Tempo headquarters by a group 
of premans supporting Tomy Winata (郭说锋), a Chinese tycoon who owns the Artha 
Graha Group (GAG).
57
 The riots happened a few days after Tempo magazine published 
an article, indicating that Winata might be behind a fire that struck the huge textile 
market in Tanah Abang, Jakarta. The article revealed that Winata had earlier made a Rp. 
53 billion bid to renovate the market (Taufik, Rurit & Junaedy, 2003a; 2003b). Winata 
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allegedly sent his company‘s gang and the Indonesian Young Bulls (BMI- Banteng Muda 
Indonesia), a paramilitary organisation of PDI-P, to the Tempo headquarters, demanding 
the retraction of the article. Chief editor Bambang Harymurti, editor Karaniya 
Dharamasaputra, journalist Abdul Manan, and the journalist who wrote the article, 
Ahmad Taufik, were attacked and injured. Although several police were present during 
the riots, they did nothing to stop the attacks (Budiman & Manggut, 2003, pp. 14-16; 
―Law of the Concrete Jungle‖, 2003, p. 11; Taufiqurrahman & Simanjuntak, 2003). 
Winata also sued Tempo for defamation and biased reporting. Tempo lost the lawsuit and 
was ordered to pay Winata Rp. 500 million (Hantoro, 2004, pp. 42-43). 
According to Arief Budiman (2005, pp. 95-96), the brutal attack on Tempo 
resulted in public anger toward Winata, but this soon transformed into anger toward all 
Chinese Indonesians. As Budiman (2005) puts it,  
 
People felt that Winata‘s actions were ‗typical Chinese‘ behaviour, 
especially for Chinese businessmen. They felt that the Chinese ‗always‘ 
bribed state officials, particularly the police and the military. A 
considerable amount of commentary about the event was published on the 
Internet, including inflammatory anti-Chinese remarks. 
(pp. 95-96) 
 
Fortunately, political and Muslim leaders such as former president Abdurrahman Wahid 
issued public statements that most Chinese Indonesians were decent and unlike Winata. 
This kept the anger under control (Budiman, 2005, p. 96). 
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The utilisation of premans by Winata to intimidate Tempo not only threatened 
press freedom in the country but also reinforced the negative stereotypes of Chinese 
Indonesians as corrupt, arrogant and heartless. Most importantly, the incident clearly 
shows that the poor establishment of the rule of law in post-Suharto Indonesia allows 
well-established business elites to utilise thuggery and coercion provided by gangs and 
paramilitary groups for their personal gain. 
Hence, I argue that the Chinese on the whole also play a role in shaping and 
perpetuating their continuing ambivalent position. In the following chapters, I will 
examine the strategies and tactics of local Chinese in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya 
in gaining and safeguarding their interests in the aspects of business, socio-cultural 
sphere and electoral politics, and how these strategies and tactics at the same time shape 
and perpetuate the ambivalent position of the Chinese. 
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion: Democracy in Indonesia 
 
Amidst the diversity of views on Indonesia‘s democratisation in post-1998 era, 
scholars generally agree that the post-New Order political system has offered more 
freedom for people to elect political leaders through free and relatively fair elections 
compared to previous regimes. As mentioned according to typologies of Diamond (1999) 
and Haynes (2001), post-1998 Indonesia is considered an ―electoral democracy‖ because 
elections have been conducted under ―meaningful rules and regulations‖ (Haynes 2001, p. 
8). However, due to the rampant corruption and internal mismanagement in state 
institutions, as well as the marginalisation of popular participation in political processes, 
Indonesia is still far from a ―full democracy‖ that promotes individual freedom, public 
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participation in rule-making and accountability of public officials to ordinary people 
(Haynes 2001, p. 10).  
Based on the literature and debates above, it can be concluded that Indonesia has 
undergone significant institutional reforms and political liberalisation since the 
unraveling of Suharto‘s highly centralised, autocratic regime. The opening up of 
democratic politics offered opportunities for the Chinese minority to directly participate 
in electoral politics and run for public office. The reformasi era has seen greater 
competition for state power and resources among political elites. The relatively liberal 
socio-cultural environment in the post-New Order era also allows the Chinese minority to 
openly express and celebrate their ethnic and cultural identities. However, the 
democratisation process has been marred by the poor enforcement of the rule of law, the 
capture of state institutions and political parties by old as well as some new predatory 
interests, and rampant criminal gangs as well as political thuggery. In addition, civil 
society remains incoherent and too weak to function as a counterweight to the state. Due 
to the rampant corruption and internal mismanagement in state institutions, as well as the 
marginalisation of popular participation in political processes, Indonesia is still far from a 
―full democracy‖ that promotes individual freedom, public participation in rule-making 
and accountability of public officials to ordinary people. It can therefore be said that the 
end of the authoritarian regime has led to the emergence of a predatory, fragmented state, 
and a fragmented, weak society. I argue that such a political environment allows some 
Chinese Indonesians to continue gaining wealth and protecting their personal interests 
through illegal or semi-legal means as well as opportunistic tactics. This contributes to 





Civil Society, Business and Politics: The Ambivalent Position 
of the Chinese in Post-Suharto Indonesia 
 
Part Two showcases how the ambivalence of democratisation in post-Suharto 
Indonesia has created an even stronger ambivalent position for Chinese Indonesians.  The 
end of the New Order regime has led to the emergence of democratisation and the 
removal of restrictions on Chinese cultural expression in Indonesia. The Chinese can 
openly and actively participate in the socio-political arena. However, due to the absence 
of an effective, genuinely reformist political force, democratisation in post-New Order 
Indonesia is undermined by various hurdles such as rampant corruption and the poor 
enforcement of the rule of law. In addition, the stereotype of Chinese Indonesians as 
wealthy, selfish and exclusive is still common among indigenous Indonesians. Therefore, 
the Chinese remain the targets of extortion and corruption by power-holders and premans. 
But as I have shown in Part One it is necessary to recognise that the Chinese minority on 
the whole are by no means passive bystanders of Indonesia‘s democratisation process nor 
powerless victims of the problems of democratisation. They also play an active and 
dynamic role in shaping their ambivalent position and the predatory nature of the new 
democracy. Part Two therefore suggests that in a newly democratised society without the 
establishment of good governance, the ―pariah‖ ethnic minorities tend to gain and protect 
their business and personal interests through illegal and semi-legal means as well as 
opportunistic tactics. These in return reinforce the negative stereotypes against them, and 
consequently reproduce their ambivalent position. 
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I show here how the bolstering of Chinese identity is manifested in the 
mushrooming of ethnic Chinese-based organisations and Chinese-language presses. 
Hence, Chinese ethnic and cultural identities have become increasingly visible in the 
post-New Order era. Moreover, the political liberalisation that emerged since the 
unraveling of Suharto‘s highly centralised, autocratic regime allows the Chinese to get 
involved in politics and run for public office. However, on the other hand, in the face of 
the corrupt and muddy business environment in post-Suharto Indonesia, instead of 
backing genuine reform-minded electoral candidates during elections, some Chinese 
businesspeople support candidates who can promise them political favours and aide them 
in more corruption. Some Chinese businesspeople have become involved in politics to 
fight for the interests of their own business and not of the general public. They have 
resorted to money politics during their electoral campaigns. Therefore, the increasing 
visibility of the Chinese in socio-cultural and political arenas has upset some indigenous 
Indonesians and has sometimes brought various threats and backlash against the Chinese. 
For instance, in the land seizures that involved three ethnic Chinese developers in North 
Sumatra that took place since November 2011, Harian Orbit, a local Indonesian-
language newspaper in North Sumatra, referred to the three developers as ―slanted-eye 
businesspeople‖ (pengusaha mata cipit), clearly indicating their Chinese ethnicity. 
Furthermore, banners with provocative anti-Chinese words were displayed during the 
demonstrations against the land seizures.
58
 Some Chinese community leaders are afraid 
of such possible threats and backlash if the Chinese are too visible. They therefore have 
urged the Chinese to keep a low profile and stay invisible. 
                                                 
58
 I will elaborate more on the land seizures in Chapter Five. 
89 
 
At the same time, there are also Chinese Indonesians who chose to initiate and 
engage in cross-ethnic endeavours that seek to alter the indigenous Indonesians‘ 
perceptions of the Chinese. However, these endeavours are not well-accepted by the 
majority of Chinese Indonesians. Therefore, the position of Chinese Indonesians as a 






















Opening up the Chinese Socio-Cultural Sphere: The 




The mayoral election of 2010 in Medan not only featured Sofyan Tan (陈金扬) as 
a mayoral candidate, as mentioned in the opening story in chapter one, but it also 
showcased Indra Wahidin (黄印华), another interesting Chinese Indonesian public figure. 
He is a well-known Chinese community leader in Medan, leading the North Sumatra 
branch of the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI- Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa), 
as well as Perhimpunan Keluarga Besar Wijaya Medan, a Chinese clan (surname) 
association. These are two Chinese organisations that have recently focused on promoting 
Chinese culture among Chinese Indonesians. He is also the head of the North Sumatra 
branch of the Indonesian Buddhists Association (Walubi- Perwakilan Umat Buddha 
Indonesia) and the North Sumatra Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry‘s 
China Committee. Wahidin is thus a Chinese with a strong ethnic identity. He studied in 
pre-New Order Chinese-medium schools and is Chinese-literate. Due to his literacy, he is 
also in charge of Medan Zao Bao, a Chinese-language press in Medan. Wahidin is an 
insurance agent by profession, though it is also rumored that he is involved in paint 
distribution. Well-connected to local power-holders in North Sumatra and state officials 
and businesspeople in China, he has been helping the North Sumatra provincial 
government to establish cultural and economic ties with China. He therefore is someone 
who strongly supports not only Chinese cultural identity, but also continuing ties to China. 
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Alim Markus, Lim Ping Tjien and Sofyan Tan. 
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However Wahidin is an interestingly paradoxical figure. Although he appears to 
be in the forefront of the new opportunities the Chinese have in post-Suharto Indonesia, 
to make their cultural and ethnic identities visible, he appears to also be frightened about 
what this visibility might mean to attitudes towards the Chinese. Additionally he is an 
ambivalent figure because he continues to engage with gangster and criminal figures, as a 
way of ensuring the safety of his business, despite knowing that these connections put the 
Chinese in a bad light. As mentioned in the opening story of this thesis, during the 2010 
Medan mayoral election, Wahidin led the North Sumatra branch of INTI to give open 
support to Ajib Shah, a mayoral candidate who used to be the head of the North Sumatra 
branch of the Pancasila Youth (PP), an influential youth/crime organisation in the 
province, important for business in Medan. It was alleged that Wahidin, who was close to 
premans, openly supported Ajib in exchange for political favours for his business. An 
interpretation of one informant that puts this support in a different light, however, was 
that he supported Ajib in order to secure the safety of the local Chinese community. This 
is because Ajib was initially the candidate chosen by the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS), 
but they later revoked their support to Ajib in favour of Sofyan Tan, the only ethnic 
Chinese mayoral candidate in the election. Since Wahidin was afraid that Ajib would 
blame the local Chinese community for this matter, and make trouble for them, he 
decided to openly support and campaign for Ajib.
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Later, when a brutal murder of a Chinese Indonesian couple took place in Medan 
in 2011, Wahidin urged the Chinese to keep a low profile and refrain from showing an 
extravagant lifestyle. This implies that Wahidin believed the murder of the couple could 
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have been triggered by the perception that many local Chinese Indonesians were wealthy. 
This also clearly indicates his concern that the increasingly visible position of the 
Chinese minority might result in threats and backlash. He therefore thought it was better 
for the Chinese to stay invisible and refrain from getting beyond their (traditional) 
position. 
Wahidin‘s imagining of Chinese ethnic and cultural identities is very different 
from that of Sofyan Tan. Wahidin is well aware of the paradoxical environment of the 
reformasi era. The emergence of a democratic and liberal socio-political environment 
was followed by increasing freedom and the opening of space for renewed cultural 
expression. As a result, the ethnic and cultural identities of the Chinese minority that 
were hidden during the New Order period have become increasingly visible. The Chinese 
also become increasingly visible by actively getting involved in politics and running for 
public office. However, some Chinese community leaders such as Wahidin deal with 
such visibility with caution. To them, such visibility also means becoming a potential 
target of backlash and creating more envy as well as hatred. They therefore see the 
visibility of Chinese ethnic and cultural identities in post-Suharto Indonesia as both a 
blessing and a curse, and urge the Chinese to keep a low profile.  
Tan, on the other hand, imagines Chinese ethnic and cultural identities in an 
entirely different way. He also adopts a different approach in dealing with the opening up 
of the socio-political space in post-Suharto Indonesia. Tan is far from a stereotypical 
Chinese. Unlike Wahidin, Tan did not have the opportunity to study in pre-New Order 
Chinese-medium schools because they were already closed down by the time he reached 
school age. His family usually spoke Indonesian at home and had many indigenous 
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Indonesian friends. Upon graduating with a medical degree in 1990, Tan decided not to 
open up his own clinic but to step out from his comfort zone and devote himself to the 
operation of an integrated school that aimed to promote inter-ethnic harmony. For Tan, 
the best way to combat prejudice and discrimination against the Chinese minority is 
through promoting cross-ethnic solidarity and understanding. Therefore, apart from 
establishing an integrated school, he also actively engages in fighting for the interests of 
SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in Indonesia, which in general are dominated by 
pribumis. In addition, he maintains a significant distance from China, and never involves 
himself in assisting local governments to foster cultural and business ties with China, like 
Wahidin and some Chinese organisation leaders. In the eyes of some Chinese 
Indonesians with a strong ethnic identity, Tan is closer to the indigenous population than 
to the Chinese community, they thus perceive him as culturally not ‗Chinese‘ enough. 
This makes him a target of dislike among those Chinese. However, unlike Wahidin and 
some other Chinese Indonesians, Tan is never afraid of potential backlash and threats 
against the Chinese for being too visible in the post-Suharto era. He insists that the 
Chinese have the right to get involved in politics without fearing any repercussion. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, he set an example by running for a seat in the North Sumatra 
regional representatives council (DPD) in 2004 and contesting for the mayorship of 
Medan in 2010. He was committed to eliminating bureaucratic abuse and refrained from 
involvement in corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). Therefore, unlike Wahidin, 
Tan is never close to power-holders and premans.      
The stories of Wahidin and Tan thus represent two different Chinese ethnic and 
cultural identities in post-Suharto Indonesia. The former emphasises the revival of 
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Chinese culture and the bolstering of Chinese ethnic identity. This often contributes to the 
view that the Chinese are very insular and exclusive and therefore may result in a 
backlash from the non-Chinese. The latter focuses on the integration of Chinese 
Indonesians into the wider Indonesian society through initiating and engaging in 
endeavours that seek to alter the indigenous Indonesians‘ perceptions of the Chinese. I 
argue that the emergence of these different Chinese ethnic and cultural identities is due to 
different sociological characteristics of Chinese Indonesians. Wahidin who represents the 
more conservative Chinese ethnic and cultural identities studied in pre-New Order 
Chinese-medium schools and is Chinese-literate, whereas Tan who represents the more 
inclusive Chinese ethnic and cultural identities received his education in Indonesian-
medium schools during the New Order and his family usually spoke Indonesian at home. 
Wahidin is actively engaged in business, whereas Tan is not involved in business 
activities. Wahidin is well-connected to state officials and businesspeople in China, 
whereas Tan is closer to the indigenous Indonesian population, especially those from the 
grassroots community. Following Bourdieu‘s concept of habitus, both Wahidin and Tan 
are endowed with different kinds of cultural and social capital due to their different 
education background and social networks and this results in two different habitus among 
them. These different habitus led to the emergence of two different Chinese ethnic and 
cultural identities in post-Suharto Indonesia. These two different identities are manifested 
in two different approaches of opening up Chinese socio-cultural sphere in post-Suharto 
Indonesia. One focuses on establishing ethnic-based voluntary organisations that promote 
Chinese culture and socialisation activities among the Chinese. These organisations 
rarely engage in cross-ethnic initiatives that promote inter-ethnic solidarity and 
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understanding. Some leaders of these organisations are afraid of potential threats and 
backlash if they go ‗overboard‘ in celebrating their Chinese identity and culture. They 
therefore prefer to keep a low profile. Another approach focuses on reaching out to the 
wider society by establishing non-ethnic-based socio-cultural organisations to promote 
cross-ethnic understanding and solidarity. The leaders of these organisations believe such 
an approach is the best way to eliminate the prejudice against the Chinese. They do not 
express fear of threats or a backlash for actively promoting their endeavours. 
Following Giddens‘s structure-agency theory, this chapter examines how the 
opening up of a liberal socio-cultural environment in the post-Suharto era allows the two 
different approaches towards opening up a Chinese socio-cultural sphere in post-Suharto 
Medan and Surabaya and how these approaches shape the socio-cultural environment in 
post-Suharto Indonesia, as well as contribute to ambivalent attitudes towards Chinese 
Indonesians. After giving a brief overview of the revival of ethnic and cultural identities 
in post-Suharto Indonesia, I will introduce the major Chinese organisations and Chinese-
language presses in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya, and explore their activities that 
focus on promoting Chinese culture, assisting the local governments to establish cultural 
and business connections with China, philanthropy, and cross-ethnic understanding and 
solidarity. Then I will discuss the perceptions of the indigenous Indonesians towards the 
activities and endeavours of Chinese organisations, and explore how the Chinese in 
Medan and Surabaya actively engage with and shape these attitudes through initiating 





4.1 The Revival of Ethnic and Cultural Identities in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia 
 
As detailed in the last chapter, the end of the New Order saw the revival of 
cultural expression and ethnic identity for minority groups across Indonesia. The cultural 
expression and ethnic identity for minority groups was suppressed during the New Order 
period. According to Hoon Chang-Yau (2008), 
 
[T]he [cultural] plurality and pluralism fostered during the 1950s era of 
constitutional democracy were deemed by the New Order to threaten the 
nation‘s development and security, and so were suppressed through the 
introduction of SARA in the 1970s. SARA is an acronym that summarizes 
the sensitive issues of ethnicity (suku), religion (agama), race (ras) and 
interclass (antar golongan) differences. Under the banner of maintaining 
order and stability, all public discussions of issues related to SARA were 
prohibited. During the New Order, Indonesian citizens irrespective of their 
ethnicity, religion, class and gender were all imagined within a constructed 
homogeneous Pancasila national identity. Internally diverse identities 




Jamie S. Davidson (2009) also notes that ―The New Order discouraged public 
manifestation of SARA in any form, including organizations and discourse‖ (p. 230, n60). 
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The opening up of a liberal socio-cultural environment in post-Suharto Indonesia 
led to the revival of cultural expression and ethnic identity for minority groups across the 
country. David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson (2007) have noted that regional minorities 
have ―demanded the right to implement elements of adat or hukum adat (customary law) 
in their home territories‖ (p. 1). As mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, regional 
minorities also mobilise ethnicity in contesting for political power in local politics.  
Although the Chinese minority could not mobilise their ethnicity in contesting for 
political power because they do not have particular regions to identify with, they have 
made use of the liberal socio-cultural environment to openly express and celebrate their 
ethnic and cultural identities. This is manifested in renewed cultural expression such as 
the open celebration of traditional Chinese festivals, the establishment of Chinese 
organisations and Chinese-language presses, and the opening of Mandarin learning 
centres as well as institutions. According to my informants in Medan and Surabaya, after 
the abrogation of the Presidential Instruction no. 14/1967 that prohibited the practice of 
Chinese customs and religion in the public sphere in 2000, many Chinese Indonesians in 
both cities started to openly celebrate Lunar New Year (Interview with Surya, in 
Indonesian, September 1, 2012; interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, December 24, 
2010). The more open and liberal political environment has opened up an ideal breeding 
ground in which ethnic Chinese organisational activities can flourish. At the same time, 
the rise of China as an economic power prompted the resurgence of ethnic identity among 
Chinese Indonesians.
61
 As a result, post-Suharto Indonesia saw the mushrooming of 
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 China has been experiencing significant economic growth since the implementation of its economic 
reform and its opening up to foreign direct investments in the late 1970s, as well as its entry into the World 
Trade Organisation in 2001. China is particularly competitive in labour-intensive industries due to its 
abundant supply of cheap labour (Leong, 2006, p. 218). Some Chinese Indonesians businesspeople had 
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ethnic Chinese-based organisations. Most ethnic Chinese organisations that were 
established or re-emerged in the post-1998 period were Chinese clan organisations and 
alumni associations of pre-1965 Chinese-medium schools in Indonesia. Since the end of 
Suharto‘s rule, many Chinese organisations that were previously closed down re-emerged 
and those that had been converted to foundations dealing with health, religion, burial 
services, sports or recreation began to include again socio-cultural activities that openly 
celebrate and promote Chinese traditions and culture in their routine activities. Two 
major ethnic Chinese mass organisations in post-Suharto Indonesia, i.e. the Indonesian 
Chinese Social Association (PSMTI- Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia, 印
华百家姓协会) and the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI- Perhimpunan Indonesia 
Tionghoa, 印尼华裔总会 ), have branches extended to various parts of Indonesia, 
including Medan and Surabaya. The objectives of both organisations are to fight for the 
interests of Chinese Indonesians, to promote solidarity between ethnic Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesians, to promote social and cultural issues among Chinese Indonesians, 
                                                                                                                                                 
taken advantage of the opportunities opened up by the booming Chinese economy to expand their business 
to China. However, as Leo Suryadinata (2006) and Michael Jacobsen (2007) argue, the rising Mainland 
Chinese economy only offers more opportunities to large firms and conglomerates controlled by ethnic 
Chinese in Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, to expand their business abroad. Large firms 
and conglomerates are in a much better position to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
booming Chinese economy because they have access to huge amounts of capital and production assets, and 
are able to move their capital assets and production lines to China. In contrast, ethnic Chinese small and 
medium businesses do not benefit much from the expanding Mainland Chinese market because they do not 
have sufficient capital assets to penetrate the Chinese market. Most small and medium businesses 
controlled by ethnic Chinese only focus on domestic market and therefore are more dependent on local 
conditions such as the political environment and economic policy, combined with the general perceptions 
of the Chinese in local communities. My fieldwork data corresponds to Suryadinata‘s and Jacobsen‘s 
argument as most of my informants who were owners of small and medium business only focused on the 
domestic market and did not market their products to China. To date, Chinese Indonesian businesspeople 
who have successfully expanded their business to China are mostly prominent business elites such as Liem 
Sioe Liong a.k.a. Sudono Salim (林绍良) (owner of Salim Group), Mochtar Riady (李文正) and his son, 
James Riady (李白) (owners of Lippo Group), and Alim Markus (林文光) (owner of Maspion Group) (Bolt, 
2000, pp. 69-70; Chen, 2010). 
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and to advocate the entry of Chinese Indonesians into electoral politics (Suryadinata, 
2001, pp. 512-514; Giblin, 2003, pp. 357-358; Hoon, 2008, pp. 77-79).
62
  
The existence of Chinese organisations dates back to the Dutch colonial period. 
Many of them were Chinese clan associations organised along surname, lineage or dialect 
lines. The formation of Chinese clan associations is actually the direct result of the mass 
immigration of Chinese to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
as well as the minority status of the Chinese (Lim, 1983, p. 3). Driven by poverty and 
political turmoil in China, many Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia to earn a better 
living and eventually a better life. These Chinese immigrants mostly originated from the 
coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong in southern China. Being in an alien land, 
early Chinese immigrants clustered themselves to form clan associations with the aim to 
provide help and support for the members. Some clan associations even provided 
financial assistance and bursaries for the children of their members. Such associations 
were (and are still) common within ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asian 
countries. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter Two, in the midst of the Pan-Chinese 
Movement in early twentieth century Dutch East Indies, the Chinese in the Indies formed 
organisations that promoted Chinese nationalism. These included the Tiong Hoa Hwe 
Koan (THHK), the Siang Hwee (Chinese Chamber of Commerce) and the Soe Po Sia 
(Chinese reading club). In addition, some Chinese organisations in Indonesia were 
alumni associations of pre-1965 Chinese-medium schools. 
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 INTI is actually a breakaway faction of PSMTI. PSMTI established itself as an exclusively ethnic 
Chinese organisation in which only Chinese Indonesians could become full members. Non-Chinese 
Indonesians could only become honorary members. Some of the original members were uncomfortable 
with such a policy and had subsequently left to form INTI. INTI accepts all Indonesian citizens who agree 
with the objective of the organisation to join as members (Giblin, 2003, pp. 357-358; Suryadinata, 2001, 
pp. 513-514).  
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There were also Chinese triads or secret societies established in the Dutch East 
Indies but their activities were not widespread in the colony like their counterparts in 
British Malaya and Singapore.
63
 According to Mary Somers Heidhues (1993), during the 
colonial period, ethnic Chinese in West Kalimantan, Bangka and parts of Java formed 
triads or secret societies to fight against the Dutch regime. However, they were soon 
crushed by the colonial authorities. Bertil Lintner (2002) also suggests that since the 
number of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies was much smaller than the Chinese in 
British Malaya, ―the East Indies Chinese were perhaps too dependent on Dutch goodwill 
to organise secret societies […] [They] remained by and large faithful to the colonial 
masters who guaranteed their welfare and protected them against possible hostility from 
‗the natives‘‖ (p. 293). 
Apart from Chinese organisations, the Chinese in the Indies also established 
several Chinese-language presses. According to Leo Suryadinata (1997, pp. 253-255), the 
emergence of Chinese-language presses was the direct result of the Pan-Chinese 
Movement in the Indies in the early twentieth century. Early Chinese-language 
newspapers were all weeklies. The newspapers were either associated with the Soe Po Sia 
or the Siang Hwee. The first Chinese-language daily, Xin Bao, appeared in February 1921, 
and it was followed by a few other Chinese-language dailies. When the Japanese invaded 
China in the 1930s, Chinese-language newspapers in the Indies were vocal in their 
opposition to the Japanese. Therefore, all Chinese-language newspapers were closed 
during the Japanese occupation. After the end of the Second World War, some Chinese-
language newspapers were republished. A few new Chinese-language newspapers also 
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 For the origins and background of Chinese triads and secret societies in British Malaya and Singapore, 
see Mak (1981) and Comber (2009b). 
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came into being. Many of them had political orientations towards the People‘s Republic 
of China (PRC) or the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Suryadinata, 1997, pp. 255-257).  
After the military takeover in 1965, the Suharto regime imposed a social stigma 
on the Chinese minority as China- and communist-oriented (Hoon, 2008, p. 37). Their 
culture and their very existence in Indonesia were branded by New Order politicians as 
‗the Chinese problem‘ (Allen, 2003, p. 387). Consequently, the Suharto regime enforced 
assimilation policies to curtail Chinese culture and control the ethnic Chinese. Ethnic 
Chinese organisations were either closed down or converted to charitable foundations 
(yayasan) focusing on health, religion, burial services, sports or recreation (Coppel, 1983, 
p. 165).
64
 Chinese-language newspapers were again prohibited, except for Harian 
Indonesia (《印度尼西亚日报》) produced by the government (Suryadinata, 1997, pp. 
257). 
The opening up of a liberal socio-cultural space since the end of the New Order 
led to the ‗revival‘ of Chinese organisations in Indonesia. There are a few scholarly 
works on Chinese organisations in post-Suharto Indonesia. These include the works by 
Leo Suryadinata (2001), Susan Giblin (2003), Hoon Chang-Yau (2008) and Aimee 
Dawis (2010). Their works introduce major Chinese-based or Chinese-led organisations 
that emerged in Indonesia since the end of the Suharto regime. They also examine in 
detail the activities and endeavours of major Chinese organisations in promoting Chinese 
culture and socialisation activities among Chinese Indonesians, fighting discrimination 
and racism against the Chinese minority, and promoting cross-ethnic understanding and 
solidarity. Two fairly recent endeavours of these organisation, not covered extensively by 
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 A similar mass-suppression of Chinese organisations that were secret societies also took place in 
Singapore in 1958. However, the objective of the suppression was to eradicate criminal activities 
committed by secret societies rather than to eliminate communism like in Indonesia. See Goh (2002). 
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these works, are how Chinese organisations have begun to focus on assisting the local 
governments to establish cultural and business connections with China, and also their 
various philanthropic efforts. I will cover such activities and endeavours for major 
Chinese organisations in Medan and Surabaya in this chapter. 
After the end of the New Order, there were more than 100 Chinese organisations 
established in Medan and Surabaya after the end of the New Order. Apart from the local 
branches of PSMTI and INTI, other major ethnic Chinese organisations in Medan include 
Medan Angsapura Social Foundation (Yasora Medan- Yayasan Sosial Angsapura Medan,
棉兰鹅城慈善基金会), a clan association for ethnic Chinese of Hui Chew origin;65 and 
North Sumatra‘s Chinese Community Social and Education Association (MITSU-PSP- 
Perhimpunan Masyarakat Indonesia Tionghoa Sumatera Utara - Peduli Sosial dan 
Pendidikan, 印尼苏北华社慈善与教育联谊会), a coalition of Chinese organisations and 
Chinese community leaders in North Sumatra.  
In Surabaya, after the May 1998 riots which brought significant losses and 
damage to many Chinese Indonesians and their businesses, a group of Chinese 
Indonesian activists in Surabaya formed the Committee of Social Concern of Surabaya 
(Kalimas- Komite Aliansi Kepedulian Masyarakat Surabaya) with the objective to help 
the victims of the riots and to promote racial harmony through inter-ethnic dialogues. 
According to its founder and chairperson, Hendi Prayogo (吴景贤 ) (Interview in 
Indonesian, March 28, 2011), there were also some non-Chinese university students and 
social activists who joined the group. Kalimas ceased operation in 2000 as no serious 
riots happened in Surabaya since 1998. Several Chinese members of Kalimas later joined 
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 Hui Chew is a city in Guangdong province, China. 
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the local branches of PSMTI or INTI (Interview with Hendi Prayogo, in Indonesian, 
March 28, 2011). 
Other major Chinese organisations in post-Suharto Surabaya include the Surabaya 
Chinese Association (PMTS- Paguyuban Masyarakat Tionghoa Surabaya, 泗水华裔联
谊会), a coalition of several Chinese organisations in the city; local branches of the 
Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Association (PERPIT- Perhimpunan Pungusaha 
Tionghoa Indonesia, 印尼中华总商会 ) and the Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur 
Community (PERMIT- Perhimpunan Masyarakat and Pengusaha Indonesia Tionghoa, 
印尼华商总会), two major ethnic Chinese entrepreneur associations in post-Suharto 
Indonesia, and Hwie Tiauw Ka Chinese Clan Association in Surabaya (PHTKS-  
Perkumpulan Hwie Tiauw Ka Surabaya, 泗水惠潮嘉会馆), a clan association for Hakka-
speaking, Teochew-speaking and Cantonese-speaking Chinese.
66
  
The post-New Order era also saw the unprecedented boom of Mandarin Chinese-
language education, thanks to the strength of the People‘s Republic of China in global 
economy and geopolitics. Many Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians are keen to learn 
the language that was banned by the Suharto regime in the past. In 1999, the Indonesian 
government approved Mandarin Chinese to be taught as an optional foreign language in 
national schools (Chia, 2010, p. 454). Moreover, numerous Mandarin-language learning 
centres were established to fulfill the demand of the people who were keen to learn the 
language. In 2004 alone, there were more than 3,000 Mandarin-language learning centres 
operating across Indonesia (Hoon, 2008, p. 62). In the same year, the ministry of 
education in Indonesia began to cooperate with the Office of Chinese Language Council 
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 See Appendix Two for the list of major Chinese organisations in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya. 
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International (also known as the Confucius Institute Headquarters or Hanban), a public 
institution affiliated with the ministry of education in China, to promote Mandarin-
language education in Indonesia. Hanban and the Ministry of Education in Indonesia 
recruited 76 teachers from China to teach Mandarin Chinese in Indonesia in 2008 (Hoon, 
2008, pp. 62-63; ―Hanban‖, n.d.). 
The removal of restrictions on Chinese cultural expression, and the growing 
interest in the Chinese (Mandarin) language, have led to the emergence of media 
liberalisation and brought about a new beginning for Chinese-language presses in post-
Suharto Indonesia. During Habibie‘s presidency, the House of Representatives passed a 
new Press Law that abolished licensing requirements for the press, and ―revoked the 
government‘s ability to ban publications‖ (Gazali, Hidayat & Menayang, 2009, p. 122). 
When the next president, Abdurrahman Wahid, came into power, he closed down the 
Ministry of Information, which implemented most of the New Order‘s restrictions on 
media (Sen, 2011, p. 7). But soon after Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded 
Wahid in 2001, a new Ministry of Communication and Information was established. 
Nevertheless, Ariel Heryanto and Vedi R. Hadiz point out that compared to the former 
Ministry of Information, the new ministry ―has much less power and carries far fewer 
political responsibilities‖ (Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005, p. 272, n28). It is estimated that after 
the fall of Suharto in 1998, the number of print media jumped from 300 to about 1,000 
(Gazali, Hidayat & Menayang, 2009, p. 122). These included a few Chinese-language 
newspapers. Chinese-language newspapers that are published in Jakarta and are 
circulated across Indonesia include The International Daily or better known as Guo Ji Ri 
Bao (《国际日报》), the largest Chinese-language daily in the country; Indonesia Shang 
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Bao (《印度尼西亚商报》), a business newspaper; and Harian Indonesia (《印尼星洲
日报》), which was formerly the only Chinese-language newspaper produced by the 
Suharto regime but was later taken over by Sin Chew Media Corporation Berhad (星洲媒
体集团) in Malaysia in 2007 (Hoon, 2006a, pp. 100-101, Table 4.1; 2008, pp. 110-113; 
―Harian Indonesia [Sin Chew]‖, n.d.). Guo Ji Ri Bao cooperates with China‘s People‟s 
Daily (《人民日报》), Hong Kong‘s Wen Hui Bao (《文汇报》) and Hong Kong 
Commercial Daily (《香港商报》) in sharing news coverage. Therefore, Guo Ji Ri Bao 
includes these three foreign Chinese-language papers in its publication, making it the 
thickest Chinese-language newspaper in Indonesia. In general, the main reason behind 
the establishment of these newspapers is to revive Chinese language and culture that had 
been suppressed by the New Order regime for 32 years in Chinese Indonesian community.  
In Medan, four Chinese-language presses were established since the end of the 
Suharto regime and all of them are still in-print at the time of writing. In Surabaya, there 
were also four Chinese-language presses established in the post-Suharto era but two of 
them ceased publication after a few years due to various factors.
67
  
Despite the importance of these Chinese-language presses for the freedom of 
ethnic and cultural expression they afford the Chinese, those presses that are still in print 
in both cities are making a loss due to the low readership. The trauma from the closure of 
all Chinese-language presses in 1965 and the anti-Chinese violence in May 1998 led to 
the practice of self-censorship by most Chinese-language presses in the post-Suharto era 
and they often prevent themselves from venturing into political discussion. Most 
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 The closing down of Rela Warta is mainly due to the withdrawal of advertising by its main advertiser. I 
will elaborate more on this point in Chapter Five. The closing down of Harian Naga Surya is due to the 
low readership. For more details on this issue, see Huang (2005). See Appendix Three for the list of 
Chinese-language presses in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya. 
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Chinese-language newspapers in Medan and Surabaya do not publish quality and critical 
editorials and commentaries on political issues. In addition, most of the editors and 
journalists of Chinese-language presses are older generation Chinese aged 60 and above. 
The prohibition of Chinese-language education in New Order Indonesia produced a 
younger generation of Chinese who are mostly Chinese illiterate. Therefore, there is no 
general readership beyond the older generation and this leads to a diminishing market. 
Also younger Chinese are generally not interested in journalism, and hence the editors are 
from the older generation. The older generation editors and journalists are mostly not 
familiar with internet technology. Hence, unlike their Indonesian- and English-language 
counterparts, most of Chinese-language newspapers in Medan and Surabaya do not have 
a well-established website. These problems are an important legacy of the ban on public 
usage of Chinese characters and Chinese-medium schools by the New Order regime. In 
order to survive, therefore, the presses need to rely on the financial support from their 
shareholders and advertising revenue from local Chinese Indonesian businesspeople. 
These businesspeople utilise the presses as an avenue to advertise and to relay important 
news about their businesses. Some businesspeople who also hold important positions in 
local Chinese organisations utilise the presses as a cultural space to publicise activities of 
their organisations. Therefore, many older generation Chinese read Chinese-language 
newspapers to get updates on social and cultural activities of local Chinese organisations, 
and hence these presses are more like ‗society news‘, than actual critical or informative 
news about what is happening in Indonesia. However Chinese-language presses in Medan 
and Surabaya give much coverage of news on China. Hence, Chinese who consider 
China as their cultural motherland rely on Chinese-language newspapers for news on 
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China (Interviews with people in charge and staff of local Chinese-language presses in 
Medan and Surabaya). 
 
4.2 Promoting Chinese Culture: Socialising, Language and Business  
Most Chinese-based organisations in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya actively 
engage in ethnic-based endeavours such as promoting Chinese culture and social 
activities among the Chinese, assisting the local governments to establish cultural and 
business connections with China, reviving the Chinese language and philanthropy. Such 
endeavours usually establish only limited interaction with the non-Chinese.  
In general, local Chinese organisations, particularly Chinese clan associations, in 
Medan and Surabaya function as a social hub for members who are mostly older 
generation Chinese, through organising social and cultural activities such as Chinese 
festival gatherings, dinner functions, choir and dance classes. Informants who are 
committee members of Chinese organisations in Medan and Surabaya relate that most 
Chinese organisations openly celebrated major Chinese festivals such as Lunar New Year, 
Qingming Festival (a traditional Chinese festival in which celebrants remember and 
honour their ancestors) and Moon Cake Festival (Interview with Amin, in Mandarin, 
November 2, 2010; interview with Susana, in Mandarin, January 14, 2011).
68
 The 
vibrancy of such activities is a manifestation of the euphoria of the older generation of 
Chinese in openly celebrating their ethnic and cultural identities that had been prohibited 
for more than 30 years during Suharto‘s rule. In addition, many Chinese Indonesian 
businesspeople also utilised Chinese organisations as a platform to meet people, gain 
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 This is also mentioned by Cao Yunhua (2010) in his work on ethnic Chinese in Medan.  
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access to business information, build business networks and to become better known. In 
fact, leaders of local Chinese organisations in Medan and Surabaya (and Indonesia in 
general) are mostly businesspeople, as Chinese organisations depend on financial support 
from the local Chinese business community in their operation.
69
 It would be easier for an 
organisation to get money if the leaders are engaged in business. This point is emphasised 
in the remark of INTI‘s Surabaya branch‘s chairperson: 
 
Leading a Chinese organisation like INTI is not easy. We have to 
contribute not only our time and energy but also money. Without money, 
it is hard [for an organisation] to run activities. Chinese organisations in 
Indonesia do not receive any funds from the government. So, the funds of 
the organisations come mainly from the leaders. 
(Interview with William Rahardja, in Indonesian, March 4, 2011)  
 
Some Chinese organisations are also keen to revive and promote Chinese 
traditions and culture among the young members, who were born during Suharto‘s rule 
and did not have the opportunity to learn the Chinese languages. For instance, Hwie 
Tiauw Ka Chinese Clan Association in Surabaya (PHTKS), a clan association founded by 
Hakka-, Teochew- and Cantonese-speaking Chinese, started a weekly Hakka-language 
class in 2008 with the aim to revive and promote the Hakka culture among the young 
members, who were mostly children of the elder members (most of the leaders and 
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 See the tables in Appendix Four for the occupational backgrounds of local major Chinese organisations‘ 
leaders in Medan and Surabaya during the period of my fieldwork (2010-2011). All but one leader of those 
organisations were in business, implying the crucial role of Chinese businesspeople in running major 
Chinese organisations.  
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members of the organisation were from the Hakka clan) (Si Shui Hui Chao Jia Hui Guan, 
2010, p. 98). In my interview with Susana, a committee member of the Association, she 
revealed that the instructor was a Hakka-speaking woman from Meizhou, China. She had 
been living in Surabaya for a long time and she could speak Indonesian too. Therefore, 
she conducted her lessons in both Hakka and Indonesian and young students who 
previously had no basic knowledge of the Hakka language could follow her lessons 
(Interview with Susana, in Mandarin, January 14, 2011).
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 Every year the Association 
also arranged a trip for a few young members to visit China and Taiwan in order to 
enhance their understanding of the Hakka culture (Si Shui Hui Chao Jia Hui Guan, 2010, 
p. 45). 
During my fieldwork in Surabaya, the East Java branches of the Chinese 
Indonesian Association (INTI), in collaboration with 13 other ethnic Chinese religious 
and charitable organisations in East Java, jointly organised a talk on the education of 
Chinese tradition. They invited Dr. Zhong Mao Sen (钟茂森) from Pure Land Learning 
College (净宗学院), a college that promotes Pure Land Buddhism in Australia, as the 
speaker. They also invited Master Chin Kung (净空法师), head of the College, who was 
also an eminent monk, to attend the event as a special guest (Deng & Xie, 2011, p. 12; 
Yan, 2011, p. S4). I was invited by INTI to attend the event. There were more than 
1,000 people who attended the talk (Deng & Xie, 2011, p. 12; Yan, 2011, p. S4). Here, I 
will include a detailed record of the event from my field notes: 
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 However, I did not have the opportunity to meet and interview the instructor, and therefore could not find 
out more about her background and the reasons she resided in Indonesia. 
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Before the talk began, a group of primary students in their school 
uniform from Metta School, which was a private school in Surabaya, went 
on the stage and recited the teachings in Di Zi Gui (《弟子规》), an 
ancient book based on the teaching of Confucius that emphasises the basic 
requisites for being a good person and guidelines for living in harmony 
with others. After that, Mr. Wongso, chairperson of the organising 
committee, went on the stage to deliver his speech in Mandarin, saying 
that the residents in Surabaya were very blessed because they had the 
opportunity to listen to Dr. Zhong Mao Sen‘s sharing. Interestingly his 
speech was not translated into Indonesian, indicating it was addressed 
more for the benefit of the speaker than the audience, since most of the 
audience did not understand Mandarin. 
When Dr. Zhong started to deliver his speech, there was an 
interpreter who translated it all into Indonesian. In his view, Chinese 
traditional culture consisted of the concepts of moral and ethics as well as 
karma. He advised that those who were keen to learn Chinese traditional 
culture should start with reading and practicing the teachings of Di Zi Gui, 
which had been recited by the primary school students before the talk 
began. He emphasised that all could live a happy life if they practiced the 
teachings of Di Zi Gui. He concluded with a saying of Mencius, another 
Chinese philosopher, ―Everyone can be a sage‖.   




It was evident that the organisers and attendees perceived the event as a space for 
the Chinese to promote and celebrate their ethnic and cultural identity, promoting both 
what was considered Chinese philosophy of a good life, as well as the Mandarin language. 
However, there was still an evident gap because of the lack of Mandarin literacy among 
the audience. 
  In Medan, local Chinese organisations made a significant contribution to 
promoting Chinese-language education by establishing the Asian International Friendship 
Foreign Language College (STBA-PIA- Sekolah Tinggi Bahasa Asing Persahabatan 
Internasional Asia), a Chinese-language tertiary institution that offers a bachelor degree 
programme in Chinese language. The establishment of such a college was unimaginable 
during the New Order period whereby the public usage of Chinese language was 
forbidden and all Chinese-medium schools were closed down. The institution is located 
at the quiet area of Glugur, which is in the north-west part of Medan. I had the 
opportunity to visit the campus when Ardjan Leo (廖章然 ), vice president of the 
institution, brought me to walk around the campus after my interview with him. 
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 The 
library had many Chinese books that were mostly donated by Chinese community leaders, 
Chinese Indonesian writers, the Office of Chinese Language Council International 
(Hanban) in China and the Chinese Language and Culture Education Foundation of 
China (a foundation established by the Chinese government to promote Chinese-language 
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 The environment of STBA-PIA reminded me of New Era College (NEC) (新纪元学院), a Chinese-
language tertiary institution funded by Chinese community in Kajang, Malaysia. The environments of both 
colleges were very similar as their signboards and notice boards were in both Chinese and 
Indonesian/Malay languages. Classes were conducted in Mandarin and most students were ethnic Chinese. 




education outside China) (North Sumatra‘s Chinese Community Social and Education 
Association, n. d., p. 6). 
STBA-PIA was founded in 2008 by North Sumatra‘s Chinese Community Social 
and Education Association (MITSU-PSP), which was headquartered in Medan. The 
objectives of the institution are to promote Chinese language and Chinese culture, and to 
train local Mandarin Chinese language teachers (Wu, 2009, p. 185). In order to have a 
better understanding of the background and activities of MITSU-PSP, it is essential to 
first look at the background of North Sumatra‘s Chinese Community Relief Committee 
(PTSUPBA- Panitia Tionghoa Sumatera Utara Peduli Bencana Alam, 苏北华社赈灾委
员会 ), which was the predecessor of MITSU-PSP (Interview with Ardjan Leo, in 
Mandarin, November 12, 2010).  
PTSUPBA was an ad hoc relief committee that was formed in December 2004 to 
provide relief aid to tsunami victims from Aceh and Nias, North Sumatra. The victims 
were sheltered in Medan. PTSUPBA consisted of 65 Chinese organisations in North 
Sumatra, including PSMTI, INTI and Yasora Medan. During the relief period, PTSUPBA 
encountered leaders from Sin Chew Media Corporation Berhad, the largest Chinese 
publishing group in Malaysia, who went to Medan to help the tsunami victims. The 
leaders from the publishing group were touched by the efforts of PTSUPBA in providing 
relief aid to the victims. Therefore, the group later donated RM500,000 to the relief funds 
of PTSUPBA. According to Leo, the relief committee also received a donation of 
RMB10 million from the Chinese government (Interview with Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, 
November 12, 2010).   
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Later, a reader of Sin Chew Jit Poh (《星洲日报》), a leading Chinese-language 
daily in Malaysia owned by Sin Chew Media Corporation Berhad, donated RM4.5 
million to the publishing group. The reader requested the group to build an institution in 
the disaster areas such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia or Aceh. The group decided to pass the 
fund to PTSUPBA and requested the leaders to build a college at Aceh. But the relief 
committee eventually set up the institution at Medan instead of Aceh due to some 
unforeseen circumstances as told by Leo, who was the leader of the relief committee at 
that time: 
 
As one of the leaders of PTSUPBA, I went to Banda Aceh to discuss with 
the local Chinese community leaders and the governor of Aceh regarding 
the proposal to set up an institution in their city. Although the governor 
was supportive of the proposal and willing to offer a piece of land in the 
province without any charges, the Chinese community leaders there were 
reluctant to build an institution in their city because they were afraid that it 
would be tough to maintain the operation of such an institution. After all, 
not many students in Aceh were able to pay the tuition fees. After having 
four unfruitful meetings with them, I decided to give up the plan to build 
in Aceh. 
 
Later, I went to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to meet the leaders of Sin Chew 
Media Corporation Berhad. I told them frankly the difficulties of setting 
up an institution in Aceh and proposed to establish the institution in 
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Medan instead. They immediately agreed with my proposal and asked me 
to proceed with the plan. In fact, it only took 15 minutes for me to inform 
the leaders about the difficulties of opening an institution in Aceh and get 
the approval of the publishing group to change the location of the 
proposed institution to Medan. 
(Interview with Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, November 12, 2010) 
 
Leo and other leaders of PTSUPBA decided to form North Sumatra‘s Chinese 
Community Social and Education Association (MITSU-PSP) together with a few Chinese 
community leaders in North Sumatra in order to establish and manage the proposed 
institution. The association decided to build a Chinese-language institution known as the 
Asian International Friendship Foreign Language College (STBA-PIA) at the site of an 
abandoned sugar factory in Glugur, Medan. The site was found and introduced by Tansri 
Chandra (陈明宗 ), one of the founders of MITSU-PSP. The construction of the 
institution started on May 27, 2007 and was completed on August 20, 2008 (North 
Sumatra‘s Chinese Community Social and Education Association, n. d., p. 2). The 
establishment of STBA-PIA cost about US$3.5 million. About one third of the amount 
came from Sin Chew Media Corporation Berhad (RM4.5 million), the largest Chinese 
publishing group in Malaysia, and another two third was donated by several Chinese 
organisations in North Sumatra (Interview with Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, November 12, 
2010).  
The South China Normal University (华南师范大学) in Guangdong, China, 
assisted the college in preparing the syllabus of Chinese language courses and sending 
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over a few lecturers to lecture in the institution. The China Overseas Exchange 
Association (中国海外交流协会) and the Overseas Exchange Association of Guangdong 
Province (广东省海外交流协会 ) assisted in recruiting lecturers in China to teach 
Chinese language in STBA-PIA (North Sumatra‘s Chinese Community Social and 
Education Association, n. d., pp. 6-7).
 
All Chinese lecturers who were sent to teach in the 
institution were paid by the Chinese government (―Ya Zhou Guo Ji You Hao Xue Yuan‖, 
2011, p. M4). Therefore, the Chinese government plays an active role in the operation of 
the institution. The institution also offers a bachelor degree in English language. The 
English language courses were taught by lecturers from State University of Medan 
(UNIMED- Universitas Negeri Medan) (Interview with Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, 
November 12, 2010). Therefore, the founding and operation of the college involved 
international collaboration between Indonesia, Malaysia and China. 
For students who study the Chinese language programme in STBA-PIA, they can 
choose to specialise in teacher-training, business or tourism. They can study the whole 
programme in STBA-PIA campus, or spend the first two years in the campus and proceed 
with their third and fourth years in South China Normal University (North Sumatra‘s 
Chinese Community Social and Education Association, n. d., pp. 7-8). MITSU-PSP 
offers financial aid to students who are interested to study in STBA-PIA and become 
Chinese-language teachers in the future but are unable to pay the tuition fees, regardless 
of their ethnic backgrounds (Interview with Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, November 12, 
2010). 
Leo revealed that founders of the institution also hope the institution will play a 
role in reducing the indigenous Indonesians‘ hostility toward the Chinese. They hope to 
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draw more indigenous Indonesians to study in the institution and believe indigenous 
students would understand the Chinese better and have less prejudices towards the 
Chinese if they study and interact with Chinese students in the institution (Interview with 
Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, November 12, 2010). However, during my fieldwork in Medan, 
I noticed that very few indigenous Indonesians studied in the institution. Less than 10 per 
cent of the student population were indigenous Indonesians. (Interview with Ardjan Leo, 
in Mandarin, November 12, 2010). The institution is generally perceived as a Chinese 
college by indigenous people. In fact, a journalist of Tribun Medan (an Indonesian-
language newspaper in Medan) commented that the campus was like ―the [B]amboo 
[C]urtain country, China‖, when he saw many Chinese characters and Chinese-style 
furniture in the institution (Azmi, 2011, my translation from Indonesian original).
72
 The 
management of the institution might see the Chinese-style decoration and the 
accentuation of Chinese characters in the campus as a revival and public 
acknowledgement of Chinese culture and identity. The comments made by the journalist, 
however, suggest that such representation only reproduces the perception of the Chinese 
as an unchanging alien minority. Therefore, not many indigenous Indonesians study in 
the institution.  
Local Chinese-language presses in Medan and Surabaya play an active role in 
promoting Chinese culture within local Chinese communities. Most Chinese-language 
newspapers in Medan and Surabaya cover Chinese cultural features like Chinese classics, 
literature and calligraphy. In order to promote the learning of Chinese language and 
Chinese culture among young Chinese children, Xun Bao, a Chinese-language newspaper 
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 The ‗Bamboo Curtain‘ is a Cold War euphemism for the political demarcation between the communist 
and non-communist countries. 
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in Medan, produced a children magazine in 2010. As the person in charge of the press 
recounted: 
 
Our press designed and added Xun Bao Youth, a children magazine, to Xun 
Bao since February 4, 2010 to attract more young readers. Xun Bao Youth 
publishes information about learning Chinese and English language, 
general knowledge in science and technology, as well as children comics. 
The contents are designed by our editors hired from China and are suitable 
for primary students. We still keep the same price of the newspaper 
although Xun Bao Youth had been added to it. We also offer discounts for 
schools that subscribed to Xun Bao. 
(Interview with Joe, in Mandarin, November 5, 2010) 
 
Besides that, Chinese-language newspapers in Medan and Surabaya give 
extensive coverage on China in their news reports. According to a journalist of Harian 
Nusantara, a Chinese-language newspaper in Surabaya, the newspaper cooperates with 
Indonesia Focus (《印尼焦点》), a bi-annual Chinese-language news magazine founded 
by Hong Kong Society for Indonesian Studies, as well as China News Agency (中新社) 
and Xinhua News Agency (新华社), two news agencies in China, in sharing news 
coverage (Interview with Musa, in Mandarin, May 19, 2011). Other Chinese-language 
newspapers that do not have any cooperative relations with China News Agency and 
Xinhua News Agency directly download and appropriate news on China from both news 
agencies. The heavy focus on China in Chinese-language newspapers is due to two 
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factors. First, older generation Chinese Indonesians who can read Chinese are generally 
interested in news on China because they consider China as their cultural motherland. 
Second, China‘s economy is booming and there is rising demand of readers for news 
about the Chinese economy.  
Moreover, with the exception of Rela Warta, Chinese-language presses in Medan 
and Surabaya actively support activities of local Chinese organisations. They publish 
news about social and cultural activities as well as philanthropic activities of local 
Chinese organisations. In fact, Vincent, the advisor of Si Shui Chen Bao in Surabaya, told 
me that the newspaper was founded in 2004 with the aim to cover events and activities of 
Chinese organisations in East Java (Interview in Mandarin, April 7, 2011). 
So why did Rela Warta not give extensive coverage of activities organised by 
local Chinese organisations? This had much to do with the political ideology of its 
founder and chief editor. Rela Warta was a Chinese-language press founded in 2001 by a 
group of local ethnic Chinese social activists. Since the founder and chief editor of Rela 
Warta were progressive-minded, left-leaning social activists, the daily stood in sharp 
contrast to other Chinese-language presses in Surabaya (and Medan) in the sense that it 
gave more coverage of political issues and did not cover dinner functions and socio-
cultural activities held by Chinese organisations that solely aimed to provide 
opportunities for attendees to socialise. The founder and chief editor of the newspaper 
considered such events as lack of substance (Interview with Samas H. Widjaja, in 
Mandarin, May 5, 2011). As Rela Warta did not cover many social and cultural activities 
held by local Chinese organisations in the city, it did not get much support from leaders 
of local Chinese organisations. Moreover, the leftist and progressive stand of the 
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newspaper was also in conflict with interests of local Chinese capitalists such as Alim 
Markus (林文光), the owner of Maspion Group, a Surabaya-based conglomerate that 
manufactures household appliances. Therefore, many local well-established Chinese 
businesspeople did not support the newspaper (Interview with Vincent, in Mandarin, 
April 7, 2011). 
 These developments of various institutions specialising in Chinese language and 
culture, point to the increasing business connections Indonesia has opened with China. 
According to Zhao Hong (2013), Indonesia-China relations began to improve 
significantly after 1998 due to ―dramatic changes in Indonesia‘s domestic politics‖ since 
the demise of the New Order regime (p. 3). Post New-Order governments no longer 
perceive China as an ideologically threatening country. Instead, they see China ―as an 
economic powerhouse providing positive spillovers to its cash-strapped neighbours in 
Southeast Asia‖ (p. 4). The Indonesian government is keen to attract more Chinese 
businesses to invest and set up enterprises as well as factories in Indonesia in order to 
accelerate and expand economic development and the building of infrastructure in the 
country. These efforts of the Indonesian government have coincided with China‘s pursuit 
of friendly relations with Southeast Asian countries. A few Chinese organisations in 
Indonesia are in a good position to help the government to establish cultural and 
economic ties with China since the leaders are well-connected to state officials and 
businesspeople in China. They are thus able to utilise their intra-ethnic linkages and 
social networks in China to assist the government to establish cultural and business 
connections with China.  
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In Medan, the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI)‘s North Sumatra branch 
plays an important role in helping local governments to form cooperative relations with 
China. With the help and arrangement of Indra Wahidin, then chairperson of INTI‘s 
North Sumatra branch, and other leaders of the organisation who have strong social 
networks in China, North Sumatra and Guangdong have become sister provinces. There 
are also a few cities and towns in North Sumatra that have become sister cities or towns 
of certain cities or towns in China. Those sister cities or towns are Medan and Chengdu, 
Binjai and Nan‘an, Samosir and Changdao, Deli Serdang and Shanwei, as well as Karo 
and Yunnan (Wu, 2009, pp. 223-224; ―Ji Da Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu Suo‖, 2009, p. B7).  
In Surabaya, the Surabaya Chinese Association (PMTS) and East Java branches 
of both Indonesian Chinese Social Association (PSMTI) and Indonesian Chinese 
Entrepreneur Association (PERPIT) are major Chinese organisations that have been 
active in such initiatives. PMTS and PERPIT‘s East Java branches help the local 
government in developing cooperative relations with China by entertaining officials or 
special guests from China (Interview with Liem Ou Yen, in Mandarin, March 23, 2011; 
interview with William Rahardja, in Indonesian, March 4, 2011). PMTS had offered a 
warm reception to Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), vice president of China at that time, who visited 
Surabaya in July 2000, and Li Peng (李鹏), former president of China, who visited 
Surabaya in April 2002 (Interview with Liem Ou Yen, in Mandarin, March 23, 2011). 
PERPIT‘s East Java branch, on the other hand, often offers a reception to businesspeople 
from China who visit Surabaya to seek for business opportunities in the city. Since its 
foundation, the branch has offered a warm reception to businesspeople from Shantong 
and Yunnan in China who paid a visit to Surabaya (Interview with Liem Ou Yen, in 
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Mandarin, March 23, 2011). During my fieldwork, PMTS took a lead in entertaining the 
representatives of Nan Chang University in Jiangxi, China, who visited Surabaya on 
February 26, 2011. Leaders of PMTS accompanied the representatives to visit the State 
University of Surabaya and invited them for dinner in a restaurant (Zhen, 2011a, p. 4). 
PMTS also helped facilitate the cultural performance tour presented by the 
representatives of Nan Chang University while they were in Surabaya on February 27, 
2011 (Zhen, 2011b, p. 16). 
In addition, with the help and arrangement of Samas H. Widjaja (黄三槐), vice 
chairperson of PSMTI‘s East Java branch, who has good relations with local power-
holders in Surabaya and has strong social networks in China, Surabaya has become a 
sister city of Xiamen and Guangzhou (Interview with Hendi Prayogo, in Indonesian, 
March 28, 2011; interview with Samas H. Widjaja, in Mandarin, May 5, 2011).  
The cultural and business connections between local governments and China 
resulted in some significant investments from China in both East Java and North Sumatra. 
For instance, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), a prominent Chinese 
bank, set up branches in Surabaya (2007) and Medan (2010), creating job opportunities 
for local Indonesians as well as promoting trade and investment in East Java and North 
Sumatra (Zhao, 2007; ―Zhong Guo Gong Shang Yin Hang‖, 2010, pp. 6-7). Chinese 
companies also invested in significant infrastructure projects in North Sumatra and East 
Java. For example, two Chinese companies, China Road and Bridge Corp. and China 
Harbour Engineering Co. Ltd., cooperated with two Indonesian companies, PT. Adhi 
Karya and PT. Waskita Karya to build the Surabaya-Madura Bridge, a cable-stayed 
bridge that connects Surabaya and Madura Island. The project cost Rp. 4.5 trillion and 
122 
 
most of the funding came in the form of a soft loan from China. The construction began 
in 2003 and ended in 2009. The bridge was inaugurated by President Yudhoyono on June 
10, 2009 (―The Suramadu Bridge‖, 2009; Witular, 2009; ―Ekonomi Perdagangan Jadi 
Jembatan Persahabatan Tiongkok-RI‖, 2013). In North Sumatra, two Chinese companies, 
China Harbour Engineering Co. Ltd. and China State Construction Engineering Co. Ltd., 
cooperated with an Indonesian company, PT. Hutama Karya Persero, to jointly construct 
a toll road (with a total length of 17.8km) connecting Medan and Kuala Namu, where the 
new airport that replaced the Polonia International Airport in Medan is located. The 
project cost Rp. 1,507 trillion and was funded by the Indonesian government and the 
Export-Import Bank of China (―Kontrak Tol Medan-Kualanamu Ditandatangani‖, 2011; 
Ridin, 2012). The construction began in 2012 and is estimated to be completed by 2014 
(―Tol Medan-Kuala Namu Siap 2014‖, 2011). These infrastructure projects would 
promote regional economic and social growth in East Java and North Sumatra. In 
addition, China‘s direct investment in East Java increased significantly from Rp. 0.32 
triliun in 2011 to Rp. 1.56 trillion in September 2012
73
 (―Primadona PMA‖, 2013; ―Minat 
Negara Asal PMA s/d Triwulan III – 2012‖, n.d.).74 75 
In short, in the post-Suharto era, leaders of local major Chinese organisations in 
Medan and Surabaya have been making use of their intra-ethnic networks in China to 
assist local governments establish business and cultural connections with China that has 
resulted in the increase of China‘s direct investments in both East Java and North 
Sumatra. China‘s significant investments in some local major infrastructure projects have 
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 This is the latest official data available at the time of writing. Official data for the period before 2011 are 
unavailable.  
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 ―PMA‖ is the acronym of ―penanaman modal asing‖ (foreign investment).  
75
 Official data on China‘s investment in North Sumatra are unavailable. 
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helped promote regional economic and social development in both provinces.
76
 The 
initiative of Chinese organisations leaders in helping to build the bridge between 
Indonesia and China has at the same time strengthened their relationship with the local 
governments in Indonesia.  
 
4.3 Cross-Ethnic Endeavours 
As can be seen above, there are many activities in the post-Suharto era that have 
helped to strengthen Chinese ethnic identity, as well as the Chinese Indonesian links to 
the People‘s Republic of China. Some Indonesian Chinese are aware of how these 
activities appear to separate the Chinese from the pribumi Indonesians, and concertedly 
take steps to temper the appearance that the Chinese in Indonesia are insular and inward-
looking, one of the negative and stereotypical aspects of Chinese identity over the 
centuries. One such way to reach out to pribumi Indonesians is through philanthropic 
efforts, which many of the Chinese organisations are involved in. Another way is the 
establishment of organisations that themselves attempt to cut across ethnic ties. There are 
a few ethnic Chinese community leaders and social activists who are willing to reach out 
to the wider society by establishing socio-cultural organisations that are not ethnic-based 
to promote cross-ethnic understanding and solidarity.  
In general, Chinese organisations in Indonesia (and other Southeast Asian 
countries) actively engage in philanthropy. They do offer financial assistance to members 
of their organisation who are poor and in need, and also provide financial assistance and 
bursaries to the children of their members who excel in their academic performance. 
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Besides that, however, these Chinese organisations often provide financial assistance to 
poor indigenous Indonesians. In Medan and Surabaya, most local Chinese organisations 
contribute food and daily necessities to the local poor and people in need who are mostly 
indigenous Muslims during the Ramadan fasting month every year. Leaders of local 
Chinese organisations hope that helping indigenous Indonesians who are in need will 
reduce the prejudice and hostility toward the Chinese. In other words, the participation in 
philanthropy is a strategy of Chinese organisations in reducing the racial hostility and 
prejudice toward the Chinese among the indigenous population. As told by Lim Ou Yen 
(林武源), the executive chairperson of the Surabaya Chinese Association (PMTS), ―We 
contribute to society by helping those in need. Since most of them are indigenous 
Indonesians, offering assistance to them could also eliminate racial hostility toward the 
Chinese‖ (Interview in Mandarin, March 23, 2011). 
Some Chinese organisations also offer medical assistance to the local population 
who are in need of medical care. For instance, according to the chairperson of INTI‘s 
Surabaya branch, the organisation offers free medical aid for the poor on a regular basis 
at the secretariat office and rural areas (Interview with William Rahardja, in Indonesian, 
March 4, 2011). Similarly, since 1999, INTI‘s North Sumatra branch has been working 
with North Sumatra Local Daily Council 45 (Dewan Harian Daerah 45 Sumatera Utara) 
to provide free medical aid for the poor in Medan before the Independence Day every 
year (Waristo, 2010, p. 12; ―Pengobatan Gratis‖, 2010, p. 6). On the other hand, 
according to an executive committee member of the Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur 
Community (PERMIT)‘s East Java branch, in early 2011, the branch had donated blood 
bags to the Indonesian Red Cross in Surabaya, and mobile medical vehicles to the East 
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Java provincial government to conduct cervical screening tests in local communities 
(Interview with Susana, in Mandarin, January 14, 2011). In April 2011, the Surabaya 
Chinese Association (PMTS) and the Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Association 
(PERPIT)‘s East Java branch had decided to work with the East Java Entrepreneur 
Charitable Foundation and the East Java High Prosecution Office to jointly set up a clinic 
at a village in Jambon, a district which is about 200km away from Surabaya (Yao, 2011, 
p. 16).  
In addition, INTI‘s Surabaya branch offers free legal consultations at the 
secretariat office (Interview with William Rahardja, in Indonesian, March 4, 2011). 
PSMTI‘s East Java branch, on the other hand, participated in the establishment of the 
Kampung Ilmu (Knowledge Village), a business area where petty traders, who are mostly 
indigenous Indonesians, can sell both old and new reading materials, at Jalan Semarang, 
Surabaya. This endeavour offers business opportunities for petty traders and promotes the 
reading habit among residents in Surabaya (Interview with Hendi Prayogo, in Indonesian, 
March 28, 2011). 
Moreover, the major Chinese organisations in both cities often take the initiative 
to offer relief aid to victims of disasters in the country. They usually initiate fundraising 
campaigns through local Chinese-language presses to help the victims. For example, 
MITSU-PSP and PMTS provided relief aid to tsunami victims in Aceh and Nias, North 
Sumatra in December 2004. Some leaders of both organisations even went to the disaster 
areas to provide material aid (Interview with Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, November 12, 
2010; interview with Liem Ou Yen, in Mandarin, March 23, 2011). MITSU-PSP also 
helped shelter several victims in Medan (Jian, 2009, pp. 202-203). In October 2009, a 
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strong earthquake hit Padang, the capital of West Sumatra, destroying scores of buildings 
and leaving many helpless victims. PHTKS launched a fundraising campaign to help the 
victims (Si Shui Hui Chao Jia Hui Guan Cheng Li 190 Zhou Nian Ji Nian Zhuan Ji, 2010, 
p. 96). During my fieldwork in Medan, PSMTI‘s North Sumatra and Medan branches 
launched a fundraising campaign through local Chinese-language presses to help victims 
of flash floods that hit Wasior, West Papua, in October 2010. In less than one month, 
both branches had raised Rp. 110,430,000 for the victims (―Su Bei Ji Mian Lan Yin Hua 
Bai Jia Xing Xie Hui‖, 2010, p. 11). In the same month, the Mentawai Islands in West 
Sumatra was struck by a 7.7-magnitude earthquake and tsunami. The disaster had cost 
more than 400 lives and about 20,000 people had lost their home. MITSU-PSP initiated a 
similar fundraising campaign through local Chinese-language presses to assist the victims 
(You, 2010, p. 1).  
The leaders of most major Chinese organisations are businesspeople and funds 
raised to help those in need are mostly contributed by other local Chinese Indonesian 
businesspeople. Thus, it can be said that Chinese Indonesian businesspeople have played 
a significant role in helping the poor and other people in need. As a Chinese Indonesian 
journalist in Medan remarked, ―Actually, Chinese Indonesian businesspeople have been 
offering a lot of help to those in need all this while. In fact, so far I never heard of any 
non-Chinese businessperson who is actively involved in philanthropy (Interview with 
Andi, in Indonesian, September 10, 2010).    
Apart from these philanthropic endeavours, some Chinese Indonesians have 
attempted to go further, and establish organisations that reach out more directly to the 
pribumi community. Sofyan Tan, the mayoral candidate in the 2010 mayoral election in 
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Medan, already mentioned, was previously a physician and has become a social activist. 
Instead of donating cash or consumer goods to local poor indigenous Indonesians as most 
Chinese Indonesian community leaders have done, he has tried to promote inter-ethnic 
understanding and rectify the negative stereotypes about Chinese Indonesians through 
education. In 1987, when he was still studying medicine in the Methodist University of 
Indonesia, Medan, he founded an integrated school (sekolah pembauran)
77
 known as the 
Sultan Iskandar Muda Educational Foundation (YPSIM- Yayasan Perguruan Sultan 
Iskandar Muda) in Sunggal, Medan. The school promotes integration among students 
from various ethnic-religious background.  
There have been a few works written about the school. Tan (2004) himself 
introduces the objectives and programmes of the school in detail, in a book he wrote 
about building a society that is free from discrimination. The works of Judith Nagata 
(2003), C. W. Watson (2006), J. Anto (a former journalist and media activist in Medan) 
(2009) and an article in the independence day English edition of Tempo in 2004 
(―Schools without Boundaries‖, 2004, p. 67) also cover the background of the school but 
are not as detailed as Tan‘s book. Tan as well as others who write about the school, 
explain the background of the school, by telling Tan‘s own story. 
Being from a poor family of tailors, Tan was far from a stereotypical Chinese. His 
family usually spoke Indonesian at home and had many indigenous Indonesian friends 
When Tan‘s father was still alive, he repeatedly pushed his son to mingle and integrate 
with fellow citizens of other ethnic groups (―Schools without Boundaries‖, 2004, p. 67). 
Therefore, Tan‘s family successfully fostered good relationships with indigenous 
Indonesians. During the episodic ethnic violence between the 1960s and the 1990s in 
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Medan, when many Chinese homes in Tan‘s neighbourhood were attacked and burned, 
Tan‘s family was miraculously free from the attack (Nagata, 2003, p. 375). 
After his father passed away in 1980, Tan had to finance his own medical training 
by giving tutoring lessons to upper secondary school students. As a result, he needed to 
spend a longer duration than usual (12 years) to get a medical degree (Anto, 2009, pp. 63, 
66-73; Nagata, 2003, p. 375; Gunawan, 2004). Upon graduating with a medical degree in 
1990, Tan decided not to open up his own clinic but to devote himself to the operation of 
YPSIM (Gunawan, 2004; ―Schools without Boundaries‖, 2004, p. 67). Tan funded the 
operation of the school by securing a bank loan and borrowing money from a few friends. 
Later, a few international NGOs including Caritas Switzerland and Pan Eco Foundation 
financed the facilities of the school (―Sejarah Singkat YPSIM‖, n.d.; Anto, 2009, pp. 104-
105). Using the Indonesian language as its medium of instruction, the school offered 
education from kindergarten up to upper secondary levels. Apart from Indonesian and 
English, students can also learn Chinese (as an elective subject) (Interview with Sofyan 
Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). In 1988, the school only had 171 students. But the 
number has been increasing from year to year and reached 2,200 in 2013 (―Sejarah 
Singkat YPSIM‖, n.d.).  
In order to encourage cross-ethnic sympathy and inter-ethnic understanding, in 
addition to provide financial aid to students who were smart but poor, Tan had devised a 
programme of fosterage (program anak asuh), whereby every student was financially 
supported by a wealthy patron of a different ethnic and religious group. Chinese patrons 
would sponsor non-Chinese students and vice versa (Tan, 2004, pp. 29-33; Nagata, 2003, 
p. 375; ―Schools without Boundaries‖, 2004, p. 67; Watson, 2006, p. 179). The school 
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would arrange monthly meetings between patrons and protégés. The school also made it 
compulsory for protégés to send greeting cards to their patrons on the latter‘s birthdays 
and during festivals related to the latter‘s religious beliefs (―Program Anak Asuh‖, n.d.). 
Through these arrangements, the programme has produced better inter-ethnic relations 
among patrons and protégés. Since the launch of this programme in 1990, the number of 
protégés has generally been increasing from year to year.
78
  
The programme of fosterage had generated some good and strong relationships 
between patrons and protégés. According to Tan himself (2004, p. 30), for patrons who 
were Chinese businesspeople, they could employ their protégés to work in their 
companies after graduation of their protégés. The protégés could also learn about 
entrepreneurial skills and job ethics from their patrons. For protégés of Chinese descent 
who were sponsored by indigenous Indonesian patrons, their family would be protected 
by their patrons should racial riots break out (Tan, 2004, p. 30). 
The programme of fosterage was followed in 1997 by another project, i.e. the 
building of places of worship in the school. According to J. Anto (2009, p. 199), who 
wrote the biography of Tan, Tan hoped this project would lead to religious solidarity 
among students. The first place of worship that was built was a mosque, but this aroused 
suspicion and opposition among non-Muslim parents, especially those who were Chinese. 
They questioned Tan on why a mosque and not other places of worship, was to be built 
first. Tan replied that it was because Muslims needed to pray every day. Unfortunately 
his reply led to more misunderstanding among non-Muslim parents and they accused Tan 
of attempting to change YPSIM into an Islamic school and convert students to Islam. 
There were also rumours circulating in Sunggal (where the school was situated) that Tan 
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and his family had converted to Islam. This resulted in the withdrawal of a few non-
Muslim students by their parents (Anto, 2009, pp. 201-202; Watson, 2006, p. 180). 
Despite these challenges, Tan persisted and later other places of worship, i.e. a Buddhist 
temple and a Christian church, were built in the school as well (Anto, 2009, pp. 202-205; 
Watson, 2006, p. 180). Tan revealed that the building of a mosque in the school had also 
unexpectedly made the school a ‗safe‘ place during the outbreak of anti-Chinese violence 
in early May 1998. Many local Chinese parked their cars in the school compound 
because they believed that the rioters would not dare to attack the school since it had a 
mosque (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010).  
Every year the school has organised a ‗Unity in Diversity Night‘ (Malam 
Perayaan Bhineka Tunggal Ika), an annual event that combines the celebration of 
festivals related to the five official religions of Indonesia, i.e. Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism). Students present various cultural performances 
such as a Chinese lion dance, an Indian dance, a Malay poetry recitation, a Batak 
gondang musical performance and the like. Students also prepare various ethnic dishes 
and cuisines. Tan (2004, p. 36) asserts that by participating in such activities, students 
have the opportunity to learn about cultural richness and differences in the country. 
The YPSIM has made some headway in altering the negative stereotypes of the 
indigenous Indonesians as extorters who always extort money from the Chinese, and of 
the Chinese as wealthy and exclusive. It has blurred what Barth (1969, p. 15) calls ―the 
ethnic boundary‖ among students of various ethnic groups. This is vividly illustrated in 
the following excerpts from an article on the school taken from the independence day 




―I used to think that all Chinese were rich!‖ said Mona, a grade five 
student in Medan, speaking to TEMPO two weeks ago. Classmate Maggie 
weighs in, ―In the village, my older brother would often be asked for 
money [by indigenous Indonesian gangsters]. I was afraid of them,‖ said 
this small girl with the slanted eyes, reminiscing. 
 
But that‘s all in the past now. Since attending school together at the Sultan 
Iskandar Muda School in the area of Sunggal, Medan, these two girls of 
Batak and Chinese origin, have come to see that their traditional view of 
social relationships regarding the Chinese and other ethnic groups--always 
a thorny point—does not correspond to reality. These days they can play 
together; there is no feeling of awkwardness or fear. ―What‘s more, is that 
here we can tease each other,‖ jokes Maggie. 
(―Schools without Boundaries‖, 2004, p. 67) 
 
Tan himself has claimed that his devotion to promoting inter-ethnic solidarity and 
understanding through education has earned him the respect of many Medanese, 
particularly the indigenous Indonesians from grassroots communities (Interview with 
Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). He has been called ―an integrator between 
the different ethnic groups‖ in Medan (―Schools without Boundaries‖, 2004, p. 67).79 His 
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popularity was also reflected in the result he and his running mate achieved in Medan‘s 
mayoral election in 2010. As I related at the beginning of the thesis, there were 10 pairs 
of candidates and Tan was the only Chinese contestant.    
However as Tan admitted when interviewed by Tempo, students of the school are 
mostly indigenous Indonesians. Many Chinese parents refused to send their children to 
integrated schools such as YPSIM because they considered schools that were dominated 
by ethnic Chinese a better choice. Some did not want their children to enroll in integrated 
schools due to the trauma they experienced in riots that were directed against the Chinese 
(―Schools without Boundaries‖, 2004, p. 67). My observation of the school during my 
visit in 2010 corresponds to Tan‘s information, since I saw very few Chinese students in 
the school. Most of the students were indigenous Indonesians. 
An organisation with a similar goal to YPSIM, to fight against ethnic and racial 
discrimination, was opened in Surabaya by a group of Chinese and indigenous 
Indonesian social activists and university students after the May 1998 riots. This 
organisation is called the Committee of Social Concern of Surabaya (Kalimas- Komite 
Aliansi Kepedulian Masyarakat Surabaya). Hendi Prayogo, the founder of Kalimas, 
shares a similar background with Sofyan Tan. Both of them are Chinese Indonesians who 
did not have the opportunity to study in pre-New Order Chinese-medium schools because 
they were already closed down by the time they reached school age. Both of them usually 
speak Indonesian at home and have many indigenous Indonesian friends. Moreover, 
unlike most Chinese Indonesians, both of them are not involved in business activities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
community (Interview with Farid, in Hokkien, July 15, 2010; interview with The Lie Hok, in Mandarin, 
October 31, 2010). I will elaborate on this point in detail in Chapter Six. 
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Prayogo works as a marketing executive for a private company (―Hendi Prayogo, Ketua 
Komite Tionghoa Indonesia Peduli Pemilu‖, 2009, p. 32).  
In September 1999, Kalimas and a few institutes as well as NGOs such as the 
Institute of Ethnic and Racial Unity Studies in Indonesia (INSPIRASI- Institut Studi 
Persatuan Etnis dan Ras di Indonesia) and the Indonesian Anti-Discrimination 
Movement (GANDI- Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi), jointly organised a 
conference that focused on ending all forms of ethnic and racial discrimination in 
Indonesia. About 100 social activists from various ethnic and religious backgrounds 
attended the event (―Ratusan Produk Hukum di Indonesia Discriminative‖, 1999, p. 14). 
They made several demands to the government. These included making amendments to 
certain articles in the 1945 constitution that discriminated against non-indigenous 
Indonesians, and introducing an anti-ethnic and racial discrimination law (―Stop 
Rasisme‖, 1999; ―Tionghoa serukan DPR buat UU diskriminasi etnis‖, 2000, p. 10).  
Although Kalimas later ceased operation in 2000, the efforts of the organisation, 
its fellow organisers and participants of the anti-racism conference resulted in some 
positive outcomes: the government later removed the term ‗pribumi‘ (indigenous 
Indonesians) from Article 6 in the constitution pertaining to the eligibility of candidates 
running for president and vice-president. This implies that all Indonesian citizens, 
regardless of whether they are indigenous or non-indigenous Indonesians, are eligible to 
run for president and vice president (Indrayana, 2008, p. 434). Moreover, in 2008, the 
House of Representatives passed a bill that criminalised ethnic and racial discrimination. 
According to a news report in The Jakarta Post, ―Under the new law, leaders of public 
institutions found guilty of adopting discriminatory policies would face jail terms one-
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third more severe than those stipulated in the Criminal Code‖ (―Bill against racial 
discrimination passed‖, 2008). The passing of the anti-discrimination law is a 
breakthrough in dealing with racial discrimination at the bureaucratic level, although it is 
by no means able to end the prejudice and discrimination against the Chinese at the 
grassroots level.   
Following Bourdieu‘s concept of habitus, I argue that the orientation of the 
activities and endeavours of local major Chinese organisations and Chinese-led cross-
ethnic organisations in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya has much to do with the 
backgrounds of their leaders. Leaders of local major Chinese organisations are mostly 
engaged in business and are well-connected with local power holders in Indonesia as well 
as state officials and businesspeople in China. Some of them studied in pre-New Order 
Chinese-medium schools and therefore have a strong ethnic Chinese identity. Hence, 
their organisations focus on the interests and needs of ethnic Chinese (including Chinese 
businesspeople) as well as support continuing ties to China, but rarely engage in cross-
ethnic initiatives that promote inter-ethnic solidarity and understanding. Conversely, 
Chinese Indonesians who founded and lead cross-ethnic organisations received their 
education in Indonesian-medium schools during the New Order and have many 
indigenous Indonesian friends. Hence, they have more inclusive ethnic and cultural 
identities, and favour the integration of Chinese Indonesians into the wider Indonesian 
society. They believe that reaching out directly to the indigenous Indonesian community 
is the most effective way to promote inter-ethnic understanding and rectify the negative 
stereotypes about Chinese Indonesians. Moreover, these leaders are not involved in 
business activities. Therefore, unlike most major Chinese organisations, their 
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organisations do not serve as a platform for Chinese businesspeople to establish business 
networks but instead focus on promoting cross-ethnic understanding and solidarity. 
 
4.4 The Perceptions of Indigenous Indonesians 
Despite the efforts of Chinese through various activities discussed above, to gain 
favour with indigenous Indonesians, through philanthropic efforts of Chinese-based 
organisations or the creation of various cross-ethnic organisations, perceptions of many 
indigenous Indonesians toward the Chinese often remain rather negative. For example, a 
university lecturer, who is also an executive committee member of a few ethnic Chinese 
organisations in Surabaya, pointed out that most events, particularly Chinese festival 
dinners and anniversary dinners of Chinese organisations, are often too extravagant and 
reinforce the negative perceptions of the Chinese among indigenous Indonesians: 
 
Many Chinese organisations often hold Chinese festival dinners and other 
events at high-class hotels and upscale [Chinese] restaurants. Seriously, I 
think this is too extravagant. Waiters and waitresses serving at these hotels 
and restaurants are mostly indigenous Indonesians. Don‘t they know how 
to calculate how much has been spent each time a Chinese organisation 
holds a dinner? They will certainly see the Chinese as wealthy, 
extravagant and loving to show off their wealth. After all, the Chinese are 
generally economically better off compared to the indigenous population.  




My informant‘s concern was not without basis. Although to date there is no 
official data on the financial condition of Chinese Indonesians, they are generally 
perceived as economically dominant compared to indigenous Indonesians. As long as the 
uneven distribution of wealth, which is perceived along racial lines, remains unresolved, 
in addition to the negative perceptions of Chinese businesspeople that still exist among 
indigenous people, the more extravagant the events of Chinese organisations, the more 
they reproduce the negative stereotypes of the Chinese.      
In addition, an indigenous NGO activist in Medan commented that the charity 
activities carried out by major Chinese organisations was not sufficient to reduce the 
racial prejudice among indigenous population toward the Chinese. He argued that 
Chinese organisations should also tackle racism by promoting political education about 
ethnic and cultural diversity among indigenous Indonesians: 
    
[The Chinese community] could promote the political awareness [about 
ethnic and cultural diversity] among indigenous Indonesians by facilitating 
training workshops on political awareness [about ethnic and cultural 
diversity for the indigenous population]. They should do that. They [the 
Chinese community] also have several social organisations but these 
organisations are mostly caritative. They only donate groceries [to the 
poor] but never promote political awareness [about ethnic and cultural 
diversity among the non-Chinese]. The poor just accept whatever is given 
[by Chinese organisations] but they still have the mindset of ‗Chinese 
versus non-Chinese‘. […] So their charity endeavours should be followed 
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by contributions that are more concrete in raising the awareness of the 
non-Chinese about the contributions of the Chinese.  
(Interview with Usman, in Indonesian, July 30, 2010) 
 
A reader of Guo Ji Ro Bao made a similar remark on the limitation of 
philanthropic activities in eliminating anti-Chinese sentiments that are deeply-rooted 
among the non-Chinese: 
 
Although the Chinese often offer relief aid to victims of disasters, provide 
free medical aid and distribute food for the needy, it only scratches the 
surface of the anti-Chinese problem and can hardly solve the root causes. 
The only way is through cultural and educational initiatives as well as 
introducing the historical background of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 
(Peng, 2010, p. B3)  
 
The above comments imply that the reader was not confident that the 
philanthropic activities and endeavours of Chinese organisations could reduce the 
prejudice of the indigenous Indonesians against the Chinese. He believed the indigenous 
Indonesians‘ perceptions toward Chinese Indonesians would only change if they 
understand the historical background of Chinese Indonesians. This could only be 
accomplished through cultural and educational initiatives.  
The displeasure of some indigenous Indonesians with the resurgence of ethnic 
Chinese organisational activities in the reformasi era was manifested in a letter from a 
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reader published in Koran Tempo, a mainstream Indonesian-language newspaper on May 
15, 2012. The reader called for all ethnic Chinese organisations in Indonesia to be 
disbanded. According to the letter, the reader was not comfortable with the official visit 
of the chief and a few officers of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in Beijing to 
Indonesia, and their meeting with several Chinese Indonesian community leaders in 




            Disband Ethnic Chinese Organisations 
Recently, on April 20, the delegation of the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office in Beijing visited Jakarta and met with the Indonesian Chinese 
Entrepreneur Association. The chief of the Office remarked that the ethnic 
Chinese from around the world have built good ―foreign relations‖ with China. 
This is an advantage that other ethnic groups do not have. At present, China has 
become the second largest economy in the world, thanks to the great contribution 
of the Chinese/Chinese overseas.  
He also said that the objective of the visit was to offer assistance to solve 
the problems of learning Chinese language among young Chinese/Chinese 
overseas. Learning Chinese language and understanding Chinese culture are 
important for strengthening the unity of the ethnic Chinese. Therefore, he hoped 
young Chinese overseas would master Chinese language, strengthen their 




                                                 
80
 See Appendix Six for the original text of the letter. 
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 This incident also reveals the insensitivity on the part of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in Beijing. 
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This kind of visit was also made in other cities outside Jakarta. In order to 
safeguard the interest of our nation, the Indonesian nation, especially in the 
aspects of nation and character building, as well as to prevent the utilisation of 
―Chinese organisations‖ as a fifth column for China, we should disband and 
prohibit organisations that are exclusively ―Chinese‖. The public and social 
organisations play a crucial role in this matter because without pressure from the 
public, the government will certainly not take any action! Do not let foreign 
interests manipulate our reformation. 
 
Sastrawinata 
Jalan Benda, Cilandak Timur 
Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan 
 
 
This letter highlights the displeasure of some indigenous Indonesians with the 
resurgence of ethnic Chinese organisational activities in the reformasi era, as well as their 
deep concerns about the close ties between Chinese organisations and China. The letter 
also implies that the close ties between Chinese organisations and China has aroused 
suspicion of Chinese Indonesians‘ loyalty to Indonesia among some indigenous 
Indonesians. They are worried that the Chinese government will utilise Chinese 
organisations in Indonesia as a communist ‗fifth column‘ to interfere in domestic affairs 
of Indonesia, although there is no evidence to show that China has such an intention. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, during the late Sukarno era, some Indonesian anti-communist 
leaders perceived the Chinese minority as a potential ‗fifth column‘ of China, considering 
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the local Chinese to be oriented toward China and loyal to the Chinese government 
(Suryadinata, 1992, p. 167); this attitude became even stronger during the Suharto era. It 
is interesting that this fear has resurfaced in the post-Suharto era precisely because of the 
issues discussed in this chapter, the revival of Chinese language and tradition, and the 
development of closer business ties with China. 
The letter drew the attention of a few Chinese Indonesians. Yu Zu Sheng (余竹
生 ), a commentator on Indonesia‘s Metro TV‘s Chinese-language programme, as 
interviewed by Lian He Zao Bao (Singapore‘s mainstream Chinese-language press), 
opined that Chinese organisations should position themselves as local Indonesian 
organisations and refrain from being too close to China. He pointed out that many 
Chinese organisations were too close to the Chinese embassy in Indonesia and some of 
them even invited officers from the embassy to interfere in the internal disputes among 
their members (Yu, 2012).
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 ChanCT (2012), a member of a Chinese Indonesian online 
Yahoo discussion group known as Budaya Tionghoa (Chinese Culture) argued that the 
freedom to organise was a basic human right and Chinese Indonesians should not be 
barred from setting up organisations based on ethnicity. This individual opined that 
instead of making a provocative statement by calling for the disbandment of all ethnic 
Chinese organisations in Indonesia, the writer of the letter should urge the organisations 
to organise more meaningful social activities that could benefit the wider society. 
ChanCT‘s suggestion is relevant because activities and events organised by ethnic 
Chinese organisations are mostly catered for the interests and needs of ethnic Chinese 
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and rarely include non-Chinese, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter. Most ethnic 
Chinese organisations in the post-Suharto era have merely established limited interaction 
with the wider local society. The letter that calls for the disbandment of all ethnic Chinese 
organisations shows that some indigenous Indonesians are uncomfortable with the 
existence of organisations that are exclusively Chinese in terms of their membership and 
activities, as well as their close relationships with China. This is mainly due to the 
negative perceptions of Chinese Indonesians as clannish, exclusive, opportunistic and 
oriented toward China instead of Indonesia that still exist among indigenous people.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The emergence of a more open and liberal socio-political environment in post-
1998 Indonesia has opened up opportunities for Chinese Indonesians to establish and 
participate in various ethnic-based and non-ethnic-based organisations. In addition, the 
rise of China as an economic power has played a part in prompting the revival of ethnic 
identity among Chinese Indonesians.
 
This resulted in the mushrooming of ethnic 
Chinese-based organisations in post-1998 Indonesia. Most of these organisations are 
established by Chinese Indonesians with a strong ethnic identity. These Chinese are keen 
to revive and bolster Chinese ethnic and cultural identities, which were suppressed and 
hidden during the New Order period. They utilise their intra-ethnic linkages to safeguard 
Chinese ethnic and cultural identities by promoting Chinese cultural and socialisation 
activities among the Chinese, and consequently contribute to multiculturalism in post-
Suharto Indonesia. Hence, using Giddens‘s concept of structure and agency, I argue that 
the more open and liberal socio-political environment in post-Suharto Indonesia is both 
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the medium and the outcome of Chinese Indonesians‘ actions in opening up the Chinese 
socio-cultural sphere. However, activities and events organised by these organisations are 
mostly focused on the interests and needs of ethnic Chinese and rarely include non-
Chinese. Hence, most ethnic Chinese organisations in the post-Suharto era have merely 
established limited interaction with the wider local society. This often contributes to the 
view that the Chinese are very insular and exclusive. Moreover, several Chinese 
organisations are well-connected with China, where Chinese Indonesians have their 
ancestral roots. In addition, some Chinese organisations often hold their events in an 
excessively extravagant way. All these have the tendency to reproduce and perpetuate the 
stereotypes of the Chinese as exclusive, clannish, loving showing off their wealth, 
opportunistic and oriented toward China instead of Indonesia.   
At the same time, there are also Chinese Indonesians who favour the integration 
of Chinese Indonesians into the wider Indonesian society form socio-cultural 
organisations that promote cross-ethnic understanding and solidarity. The integrated 
school founded by Sofyan Tan in Medan and Kalimas in Surabaya are such organisations. 
By introducing the programme of fosterage, Tan‘s school has to some extent reduced the 
negative stereotypes of the indigenous and Chinese Indonesian students and parents 
towards each other, as well as generated some good and strong relationships between 
patrons and protégés from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Students also have 
the opportunity to learn about ethnic and cultural differences in the country, and thus 
have better understanding of other ethnic groups. The initiatives of Kalimas resulted in 
changes in the constitution pertaining to the eligibility of presidential candidates and the 
passing of a bill that criminalised ethnic and racial discrimination. However, to date, 
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Chinese Indonesian community leaders and activists who actively engage in cross-ethnic 
initiatives are rare and therefore have only achieved limited success in altering the 
general negative perceptions of the Chinese within the wider society. The approaches of 
Tan‘s school and Kalimas are still not popular among Chinese organisations in Medan 
and Surabaya.  
Although Chinese Indonesians are free to openly express and celebrate their 
ethnic and cultural identities in the post-Suharto era, their position in Indonesian society, 
on the whole, remains ambivalent because they are generally still perceived by the 
indigenous Indonesians as an alien minority that is exclusive, extravagant, opportunistic 
and oriented toward China. Therefore, the increasing visibility of Chinese ethnic and 
cultural identities does sometimes result in threats and backlashes against the Chinese. It 
is therefore not surprising that some Chinese community leaders such as Wahidin think it 






















Susanto, a Chinese Indonesian, lives in Medan and is a stuffed toy distributor. He 
runs his business from a shophouse located in the central city area. He started his 
business in 2003 and in these past 10 years the business has remained small scale. He 
brings in the stuffed toys from Jakarta and sells them to customers in Medan. He has 15 
employees working for him, most of whom are indigenous Indonesians.   
Susanto revealed to me that since the end of the New Order regime, the central 
government has become stricter in collecting taxes from business enterprises. Business 
owners need to declare their revenues, calculate taxes they have to pay and make the 
payment accordingly. Tax officers later visit these companies to check their actual 
revenues. If tax officers find that the business owners have under-reported their revenues, 
instead of penalising the business owners, tax officers usually ask for bribes to cover up 
the tax defraud. Susanto emphasised, however, that even if a business owner has paid all 
the necessary taxes, tax officers usually create fictive taxes and charges and request the 
business owner to pay accordingly. Moreover, tax officers often demand higher bribes 
from businesspeople who are ethnic Chinese as they are deemed by others to be doing 
better in business. For this reason, Susanto and many local Chinese businesspeople have 
found it expedient not to declare their actual revenues, knowing that being honest does 
not pay. They will have to pay even more taxes and bribes. Instead, they wait for the 
officers to visit and negotiate with them the rates of the taxes and bribes requested and 
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only then pay their taxes. In my interview with him Susanto said, ―Although many 
businesspeople and I feel bad about it, we have no choice but to pay them [the bribes] 
since we have to survive‖ (Interview in Mandarin, August 4, 2010). Susanto also revealed 
that he and many Chinese businesspeople preferred not to fight against the extortion 
because they are ―afraid of running into troubles‖ (Mandarin: pa ma fan, 怕麻烦) by 
doing so. Therefore, they would rather pay the bribes to avoid any further problems. This 
also indicates that these Chinese businesspeople possess enough economic capital 
(money) to pay the bribes in order to protect their business.   
Susanto‘s story indicates the ambivalence of democratisation in post-Suharto 
Indonesia for the Chinese. Although democratisation has opened spaces for them to live 
their culture and express their ethnicity, it has not led to the emergence of good 
governance that promotes the rule of law, transparency and accountability, as corruption 
remains endemic in state institutions. This poorly developed democratisation creates, 
therefore, an even more ambivalent situation for Chinese Indonesian businesspeople. On 
the one hand, they remain the targets of extortion and corruption by power-holders; on 
the other hand, they also play a role in perpetuating the corrupt, predatory political-
business system. In this chapter, following Giddens‘s structure-agency theory, I look at 
how the corrupt and muddy business environment in the post-New Order era has 
influenced the ways Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan and Surabaya gain and 
safeguard their business interests, as well as deal with illegal practices by government 
officials, police and premans. I argue that due to the fear of the hassle of fighting back, as 
well as the economic and social capital they possess, Chinese Indonesian businesspeople 
on the whole tend to give in to the illegal requests of government officials, police and 
146 
 
premans, and resort to illegal or semi-legal means as well as opportunistic tactics to gain 
wealth and protect their business interests. Although there are Chinese businesspeople 
who fight against the illegal practices, such businesspeople are rare. Therefore this 
collusion with corrupt practices in turn reinforces the negative stereotypes against the 
Chinese, and consequently reproduces their ambivalent position.  
 
5.1 The Economic Role of the Ethnic Chinese in Post-New Order Medan 
and Surabaya 
 
Sofyan Wanandi (1999), Michael Backman (2001) and Charles A. Coppel (2008) 
have pointed out that it is commonly asserted that ethnic Chinese control 70 per cent of 
Indonesia‘s economy, although the official data of the economic domination of the 
Chinese in Indonesia is unavailable. These authors, however, emphasised that such a 
view is an exaggeration because a large portion of Indonesia‘s economy (such as the oil 
and gas industry) have always been under the control of the state, not the Chinese. In 
addition sociologist Mely G. Tan (陈玉兰) argues that it is impossible for the Chinese 
minority, who only constitute less than three per cent of the total population in Indonesia, 
to control 70 per cent of the national economy (Personal communication with Mely G. 
Tan, in English, June 8, 2010). Wanandi (1999, p. 132) suggests that Chinese Indonesian 
businesses only constitute 25 per cent of the national economy, while Backman (2001) 
estimates that Chinese Indonesians ―control 70 per cent of the private, corporate, 
domestic capital‖ (p. 88).     
In the post-Suharto era, Chinese Indonesians continue to play a crucial role in the 
economic development of Medan and Surabaya. Since there is no available official data 
specifically on the economic domination of Chinese Indonesians, I had to rely on 
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individual interviews to obtain the information in this aspect. According to a NGO 
activist in Medan, Chinese Indonesians in the city dominate businesses that are medium-
sized and above. At the same time, domination of businesses that are medium-sized and 
below is almost split evenly between the Chinese and the indigenous businesspeople. 
Businesses that are small and micro are dominated by indigenous businesspeople 
(Interview with Halim, in Indonesian, July 26, 2010). In addition, three other NGO 
activists disclosed that Chinese businesspeople engage in nearly all sectors of the 
economy in Medan except the construction industry which is dominated by indigenous 
businesspeople who are Batak and members of youth/crime organisations (Interview with 
Daniel, in Indonesian, September 17, 2010; interview with Surya, in Indonesian, 
September 17, 2010; interview with Halim, in Indonesian, July 26, 2010). A local 
economic analyst in Surabaya remarked that Chinese businesspeople dominate 100 per 
cent of manufacturing business and about 90 per cent of real estate business in the city. In 
addition, more than 60 per cent of bankers and about 70 per cent of advertisers in 
Surabaya are Chinese Indonesians (Interview with Wahyu, in Indonesian, May 18, 2011). 
In short, Chinese Indonesians continue to dominate the private economy of Medan and 
Surabaya in the post-New Order era. 
 
5.2 The Business Environment in Post-New Order Indonesia  
Since the advent of democratisation in Indonesia, international and domestic 
organisations such as the SMERU Research Institute, the World Bank and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been actively offering 
policy advice on decentralisation of state authority in the country. The SMERU Research 
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Institute sees regional decentralisation as a huge administrative operation that could 
improve the weaknesses in the administration of central and local governments (Usman, 
2002). The World Bank (n.d.) believes that decentralisation will break up stifling central 
government authority, reduce complex bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
bottlenecks, as well as ―increase government officials‘ sensitivity to local conditions and 
needs‖. A USAID publication argues that decentralisation will stimulate the development 
of democratic, accountable and effective local governance (USAID Office of Democracy 
and Governance, 2000, p. 7). In particular, The Asia Foundation assists local 
governments in addressing inefficiencies in the business licensing process and reducing 
the cost of doing business in Indonesia through developing the One Stop Shops (OSS) 
programme. The OSS are service centres that handle applications of various business 
permits (Steer, 2006). As stated in an article that introduces the programme, ―[The OSS] 
are new institutions that merge authority from disparate technical departments into one 
office where licenses and permits can be obtained quickly‖ (Steer, 2006, p. 7). 
However, during my fieldwork in Medan, the OSS, which was established with 
the aim of addressing the licensing process and reducing the burden on business, actually 
created more burdens for local businesspeople. According to a news report in Harian 
Orbit, a local Indonesian-language newspaper in Medan, officials at the centre often 
demanded bribes by asking for ‗service charges‘ from applicants. If the applicants 
refused to pay, they would need to wait for a long time before getting their permits 
(―Pungli Berdalih Uang Jasa‖, 2010, pp. 1-2). For instance, applicants for a business 
permit (SIUP- Surat Izin Usaha Perdagangan) needed to pay an extra Rp. 150,000 of 
unofficial ‗service charge‘ to the officials in order to get the permit on time (―Pungli 
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Berdalih Uang Jasa‖, 2010, p. 2). Such incidents have been highlighted in the press and 
the mayor, Rahudman Harahap, said he would summon the persons in charge of the OSS 
(―Kepala dan Sekretaris BPPT Medan Diduga Pungli‖, 2010, pp. 1-2). But as of 
December 2013, the local government has not yet investigated the problem and such 
corrupt practices were still rampant in the OSS of Medan (―Tak Mampu Stop Pungli di 
BPPT Medan‖, 2013).  
In addition, scholars have noted that the implementation of regional 
decentralisation in Indonesia has produced many regional heads who behave like ‗little 
kings‘ (raja-raja kecil) in the sense that they perceive decentralisation and autonomy as 
meaning more power given to them to control local resources and raise revenues rather 
than as more responsibilities for them to offer better public services to their local 
constituencies. These ‗little kings‘ are unaccountable to central authorities, local 
parliaments or local citizens (Hofman & Kaiser, 2004, p. 26; Hofman & Kaiser, 2006, p. 
97; Azis, 2003, p. 3; Firman, 2009, p. 148). Since the decentralisation law went into 
effect, local governments in Indonesia have more power to tax the local population in 
order to raise more revenues. According to my informants, the imposition of new taxes 
has increased the burdens of the business community (Interview with Johan Tjongiran, in 
Mandarin, August 3, 2010; interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010; 
interview with Harianto, in Mandarin, November 23, 2010). The local governments in 
Medan and Surabaya have been levying new taxes and charges on businesses as a means 
to increase direct revenues, as well as to extract indirect revenues in the form of bribes. 
Moreover, officials at all levels of governments, i.e. central, provincial and local, claim 
ultimate authority over many kinds of investment activity (Hadiz & Robison, 2005, pp. 
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235-236). This increases unpredictability in business, as well as the necessity to further 
the common practice of bribing officials for licenses and the like.  
At the end of 2010, the Committee of Monitoring for Regional Autonomy 
(KPPOD- Komite Pemantau Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah), a NGO in Indonesia that 
monitors the implementation of regional autonomy in the country, announced that North 
Sumatra and East Java, where Medan and Surabaya are located, had more problematic 
local regulations issued by the city and kabupaten governments than all the other 
provinces. The committee proposed that 315 local regulations in North Sumatra and 291 
local regulations in East Java should be abolished because they were deemed to hamper 
business activities in the provinces. Nevertheless, as of 2011, the city and kabupaten 
governments of North Sumatra and East Java had only repealed 98 and 91 of the 




Medan is also notorious for its gangsterism or premanism, which is prominent and 
influential in the city. It is therefore known as gangster city (kota preman) (Honna, 2011, 
p. 266). As ethnic Chinese are often deemed wealthier than others in Medan, they always 
become the target of extortion for premans (Hadiluwih, 1994, p. 159). It is also common 
for local Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in the city to rely on extra-legal resources 
such as premans for their security and protection (Purdey, 2006, p. 117). Premans in 
Medan are mostly members of major New Order-nurtured youth/crime organisations such 
as Pancasila Youth (PP- Pemuda Pancasila), Work Service Youth Association (IPK- 
Ikatan Pemuda Karya) and Armed Forces Sons‘ and Daughters‘ Communication Forum 
(FKPPI- Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia). When the 
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Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Perjuangan) became the ruling party after winning a majority of national parliamentary 
seats in the 1999 elections, they formed Satgas PDI-P as the paramilitary arm of the party 
to compete with the other more established youth/crime organisations in Medan in 
controlling local state and private resources (Hadiz, 2003, p. 128).
85
 Although the satgas 
was banned in 2004, it later revived in a less formal way (Wilson, 2010, pp. 204-205). In 
other words, there are more preman organisations in Medan now than before the fall of 
Suharto. 
Indeed, according to Hadiz (2004, p. 626), the collapse of the Suharto regime did 
not reduce the influence of local premans linked to youth/crime organisations in Medan, 
but instead brought new opportunities for them to exploit. These premans are able to 
provide muscle for candidates during election period and fund political bids since they 
dominate lucrative underworld businesses (Hadiz, 2003, p. 128). In addition, many 
leaders of such youth/crime organisations are given opportunities to run local branches of 
political parties. Some even hold local parliamentary seats and some top executive body 
positions in local government (Hadiz, 2003, pp. 125-126). For instance, for 1999-2004 
period, three members of the Medan city parliament – Bangkit Sitepu (Golkar), Moses 
Tambunan (Golkar) and Martius Latuperissa (Justice and Unity Party) - were leaders of 
the local branches of preman organisations. Sitepu, Tambunan and Latuperissa led the 
Medan branches of PP, IPK and FKPPI respectively (Hadiz, 2005a, p. 47; Ryter, 2000, 
pp. 19-21; Soed, 2002). Besides that, Ajib Shah, the former chairperson of PP‘s North 
Sumatra branch, is a member of the North Sumatra provincial parliament affiliated to 
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members with preman backgound. The party greatly appealed to premans through its populist approach and 
pro-‗little people‘ rhetoric.  
152 
 
Golkar for 2009-2014 period (Bangun, 2013; ―DPRDSU: Pemasok Narkoba‖, 2012; 
―Menuju Parpol Terbaik di Sumut‖, 2013). He was also one of the mayoral candidates in 
Medan‘s 2010 mayoral election (―H. Anif Shah dan Keluarga‖, 2010). Therefore, it can 
be said that members and leaders of local youth/crime organisations in Medan have 
captured the new local state institutions and political vehicles in the reformasi era. 
This is felt by some of my informants who are local Chinese businesspeople in 
Medan, who say they have encountered more harassment and extortion from premans in 
the post-Suharto era, especially during Megawati‘s presidency (2001-2004) (Interview 
with Susanto, in Mandarin, August 4, 2010; interview with Eddie, in Mandarin, 
November 10, 2010). A few of my informants disclosed that premans often ask for 
‗protection money‘ from businesspeople who own factories or shophouses or otherwise 
they vandalise these places (Interview with Hasyim, in Indonesian, August 11, 2010; 
interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010; interview with Halim, in 
Indonesian, July 26, 2010; interview with Joko, in Indonesian, November 11, 2010). To 
further squeeze money from these businesses, when an owner or their employees load or 
unload goods in front of their shophouse, premans again force their loading or unloading 
services on the business. Usually they charge Rp. 500 to Rp. 1,000 per item of the goods. 
Even if the business owner or their employees refuse such service, they still need to pay 
the premans who will otherwise vandalise their shophouses (Interview with Johan 
Tjongiran, in Mandarin, August 23, 2010; interview with Andi, in Indonesian, September 
20, 2010). In addition, premans ask for Rp. 300,000 to Rp. 500,000 when a 
businessperson opens a new company in their area, and if a shophouse is renovated, the 
owner also needs to pay a certain amount of money to premans (Interview with Johan 
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Tjongiran, in Mandarin, August 23).
 
Moreover, whenever preman organisations have 
installation events, they send an ‗invitation‘ with a proposal for expenses to be paid by 
businesspeople and ask for ‗donations‘. Normally businesspeople need to pay them at 
least Rp. 10,000 – Rp. 20,000 (Interview with Daniel, in Indonesian, September 17, 2010; 
interview with Johan Tjongiran, in Mandarin, August 23, 2010). Some Chinese 
businesspeople need to pay ‗uang keamanan‘ (protection money) to more than one 
preman if there is more than one youth/crime organisations that claim authority over that 
particular area (Interview with Andi, in Indonesian, September 20, 2010). As a ‗service‘ 
to industrialists, premans also help to break up strikes (Interview with Halim, in 
Indonesian, July 26, 2010). 
It is important to point out that preman also demand ‗uang keamanan‘ from 
indigenous businesspeople.
86
 But my informants disclosed that they often ask for more 
‗uang keamanan‘ from businesspeople who are ethnic Chinese as the latter are deemed 
by others as businesspeople who are doing better in business than their non-Chinese 
counterparts (Interview with Susanto, in Mandarin, August 4, 2010; interview with 
Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010).  
Why do premans ask for money from the business community? According to the 
chief of PP‘s North Sumatra branch, there are too many unemployed citizens in Indonesia. 
If they join ‗youth‘ organisations like PP, the organisations arrange for them to help in 
taking care of the safety of business areas, and let them collect money from the 
                                                 
86
 For instance, an indigenous businesswoman who owned a restaurant in Medan was beaten by two 
premans on November 4, 2010 as she refused to pay the ‗protection money‘ worth Rp. 500,000, which she 
deemed too high. See ―Tidak Beri Uang Keamanan, Preman Pukul Ibu Rumahtangga‖ (2010, p. 4). In 
addition, premans often extort money from small and medium businesspeople, including street vendors 




businesspeople (Interview with Anuar Shah, in Indonesian, October 30, 2010). 
Sociologist Usman Pelly and criminologist Mohammad Irvan Olii, as interviewed by 
Gatra and The Jakarta Globe respectively, made a similar argument that poverty and 
unemployment are the main causes of premanism (Sujatmoko, Hutasuhut, Siregar & 
Napitupulu, 1995, p. 27; Nirmala, 2012). According to another source, the unemployment 
rate in Indonesia reached 6.8 per cent in 2011 and more than half the population were 
living on less than US$2 per day in the same year. In addition, more than 65 per cent of 
workers in the country were employed informally (Brooks, 2011).
87
 Poverty and the 
failure of the Indonesian government to create sufficient employment opportunities for its 
citizens are seen by many as the main causes of the rampant nature of such extortion. 
Informants told me that premans have become less active since President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) came into power because the police have become 
more powerful and have started to arrest premans who extort money from the business 
community (Interview with Johan Tjongiran, in Mandarin, August 3, 2010; interview 
with Susanto, in Mandarin, August 4, 2010; interview with Dirk A. Buiskool, in English, 
July 14, 2010). This corresponds to findings by other scholars working on Indonesia 
(Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 2011, p. 33; Wilson, 2011, pp. 257-258). According to 
Wilson (2011, p. 257), high-profile ‗anti-preman‘ campaigns were initially run by the 
police in 2001 and were only limited to Jakarta, but they became national in scope by 
2004. Aspinall and his co-authors on the other hand remarked that the influence of the 
Work Service Youth Association (IPK), which was once a dominant youth/crime 
organisation in Medan, has declined since the death of its founder, Olo Panggabean, in 
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2009 (Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 2011, p. 33).
88
 The diminution of the power of 
IPK is also due to a police crackdown on illegal gambling run by the organisation. 
Although the power of preman organisations in the city has markedly declined, it is 
alleged that business enterprises at certain areas such as Jalan Asia and Jalan Gatot 
Subroto still encounter harassment and extortion from premans (Interview with Andi, in 
Indonesian, September 20, 2010). 
In Surabaya, on the other hand, youth/crime organisations are much less 
prominent and influential. The premans who often offer ‗protection‘ for Chinese business 
premises in Surabaya are unorganised Madurese premans. According to Dédé Oetomo, 
an ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya, there is a system of mutual dependence 
between Chinese businesspeople and Madurese premans in Surabaya. Chinese 
businesspeople usually pay about Rp. 500,000 each month to the Madurese preman in 
exchange for protection of their business (Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, 
December 24, 2010). Such a system of mutual dependence existed in the city even before 
the demise of the New Order regime. Although unorganised, the Madurese premans 
normally allocate their territories among themselves so that each area only has one 
preman in charge of the ―safety‖ of the areas. The preman will make sure that the 
business premises in their territories will be free of burglary, theft, robbery and vandalism 
(Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, December 24, 2010).  
In Surabaya, underworld activities are controlled by the military and police units. 
According to Hadiz (2010, p. 140), it is alleged that the military, instead of premans from 
youth/crime organisations, act as immediate protectors and bodyguards for illegal 
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gambling operations controlled by Chinese Indonesians in Surabaya. Furthermore, the 
navy and marines units in the city are said to have direct links with local prostitution.  
In is ironic, therefore, that in attempting to control preman activities, the police 
have started acting like preman. According to a NGO activist in Medan, local police 
officers often extort money from businesspeople in the city, especially those who own 
factories; such incidents have become more rampant especially throughout the ‗anti 
preman‘ campaigns (Interview with Joko, in Indonesian, November 11, 2010). The police 
officers will pay a visit to a factory and ask for money. If the business owner refuses to 
pay, the police coerce him or her to admit to offences, which he or she did not commit 
and threaten to close down the factory. Sometimes the police even confiscate some 
machines in a factory if the business owner refuses to pay them money (Interview with 
Joko, in Indonesian, November 11, 2010). Wilson (2011) suggests that such phenomena 
indicate that some police ―have used the campaigns as an opportunity to reclaim sources 
of illegal rent extraction taken from them by street level racketeers‖ (p. 257). A well-
established Chinese businessperson in Medan even remarked that 
 
During Suharto‘s reign, the military was the most powerful institution. 
Since the fall of Suharto, the military is not as powerful as before. Now 
the police are more powerful. They often ask for money from 
businesspeople and will give us a hard time if we refuse to pay them. So 
the police are no different from a select group of scoundrels.  
(Interview with Erik,
 




Similarly, in Surabaya, the police often ask for money from local businesspeople, 
who are mostly ethnic Chinese. According to an informant who used to work in a real 
estate company in Surabaya‘s Chinatown, whenever the police have an event, they will 
ask for ‗contributions‘ from businesspeople in their area. If the businesspeople refuse to 
pay, the police will give them a hard time if the former ask for police help (Personal 
communication with Yati,
 
in Indonesian, April 8, 2011). In addition, Junus, a university 
professor in Surabaya, told me that the police often visit nightclubs and discos (that are 
mostly run by Chinese businesspeople) and ask for a ‗protection fee‘. If the owners refuse 
to pay, the police will conduct a raid and threaten to close down their premises (Interview 
with Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 2011). 
In the face of this difficult business environment, some Chinese businesspeople 
resort to illegal or semi-legal business practices to gain wealth and safeguard their 
business interests. I will explore these business practices in the following sections.  
 
5.3 Dealing with Power-Holders, Police and Military Commanders 
 As mentioned earlier, according to some of my informants, most of the Chinese 
businesspeople in Medan and Surabaya usually just pay the amount of money or bribes 
requested by government officials in order to get their business permit or other related 
documents issued on time. Most of them give in to police officers‘ illegal requests as well 
in order to prevent any further problems. Sometimes they try to negotiate with the people 
who ask for money if the amount requested is too large (Interview with Daniel, in 
Indonesian, July 13, 2010; interview with Johan Tjongiran, in Mandarin, August 3, 2010; 
interview with Susanto, in Mandarin, August 4, 2010; interview with Atan, in Mandarin, 
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February 28, 2011). As I mentioned in the opening of this chapter, it is alleged that even 
if a businessperson pays all taxes and charges levied on his or her business accordingly, 
tax officers will still pay a visit to check his or her business, and ask for bribes; even 
when they do pay their taxes honestly, they will have to pay more. So, most Chinese 
businesspeople will only pay some of the taxes and charges. Then when tax officers pay a 
visit to their companies, they will usually just bribe the officers as requested (Interview 
with Johan Tjongiran, in Mandarin, August 3, 2010; interview with Susanto, in Mandarin, 
August 4, 2013). Johan Tjongiran, an ethnic Chinese social activist in Medan, explained 
such a practice by giving an example: 
 
For instance, if a businessperson needs to pay Rp. 500 million of taxes, the 
officers would normally ask him or her to pay only Rp. 250 million and 
they would keep Rp. 220 million for themselves, and submit only Rp. 30 
million to the government. 
(Interview with Johan Tjongiran, in Mandarin, August 3, 2010) 
 
Therefore, Susanto, the ethnic Chinese toy distributor in Medan whom I 
mentioned in the opening story of this chapter, argues that: 
 
The wealthiest people in Indonesia are in fact not ethnic Chinese 
businesspeople but indigenous bureaucrats in the central and local 
governments like Gayus Tambunan.
89
 They become extremely rich after 
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 Gayus Tambunan is a former tax official who was arrested by police on March 30, 2010 for alleged tax 
evasion of Rp. 25 billion. See Abdussalam (2010) and ―Gayus Tambunan arrested‖ (2010). Although 
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getting many bribes from businesspeople. Their children often spend time 
shopping in Singapore and bringing back many branded luxury goods to 
Indonesia. 
(Interview with Susanto, in Mandarin, August 4, 2010) 
 
Following Bourdieu‘s concept of habitus and field, I argue that most Chinese 
businesspeople choose to give in to the illegal requests of government officials, police 
and premans not only due to their reluctance of running into more troubles and the fear of 
the hassle of fighting back, but also because they have enough economic capital (money) 
to pay the bribes and extortion to protect their business and save them from further 
troubles. This is in line with Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus and field that social actors well 
endowed with capital tend to defend the status quo of the field (social structure) they are 
in, in order to safeguard their capital. 
Although there are also Chinese businesspeople who refuse to be extorted by the 
police and choose to get themselves organised and protest against the extortion, such 
businesspeople are rare. These businesspeople often do not have the necessary economic 
capital (money) to pay the bribes and extortion. They therefore decide to protest against 
the extortion in order to safeguard their business. This is in line with Bourdieu‘s notion of 
habitus and field that social actors least endowed with capital are inclined to challenge 
the status quo of the field (social structure) they are in. One well-known example is Yap 
Juk Lim (叶郁林), a local Chinese businessperson engaged in a snack production industry 
near Jalan Metal, Medan. Yap used to have to pay the police Rp. 300,000 to Rp. 400,000 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tambunan is of Batak origin, an ethnic minority group in Indonesia, his ethnicity is never problematised by 
the public because the Batak is one of the indigenous groups in the country. 
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every time they visited his factory. Eventually, he could not bear the extortion and 
refused to pay the police in 2007. As a result, the police alleged that his factory used 
expired ingredients in snack production and detained him for eight days (Interview with 
Yap Juk Lim, in Mandarin, November 16, 2010). As noted in a news report in Waspada, 
the Regional Forum of Small and Medium Enterprises (FORDA UKM- Forum Daerah 
Usaha Kecil dan Menengah)‘s Medan branch supported Yap and launched a public 
protest together with other small and medium businesspeople from different ethnic 
backgrounds in March 25, 2008 (―Hari Ini Ratusan Pelaku UKM Unjukrasa 
Keprihatinan‖, 2008). The protest took place in front of the North Sumatra Police 
Headquarters, governor‘s office, mayor‘s office, provincial parliament and Medan city 
parliament. There were about 2,000 people who joined the protest, and they demanded 
the police to stop extorting small and medium businesspeople (Interview with Yap Juk 
Lim, in Mandarin, November 16, 2010). According to Yap, after the protest, the police 
officers stopped harassing the factories around Jalan Metal for a long time. Since 2010, 
however, they began to visit again some factories in that area, asking for payments; Yap‘s 
factory, however, was free from the harassment (Interview with Yap Juk Lim, in 
Mandarin, November 16, 2010). This indicates that the police recognised that Yap would 
fight back if they tried to extort him.  
Sofyan Tan, the mayoral candidate in Medan‘s 2010 mayoral election, revealed 
that many local Chinese businesspeople viewed Yap‘s action positively although it was 
not a common practice among Chinese businesspeople (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in 
Indonesian, May 7, 2013). Yap related the reluctance of most Chinese businesspeople to 
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fight against extortion by government officials and police, and their reluctance to spend 
time getting themselves organised: 
 
We have to get ourselves organised if we want to fight against such illegal 
requests. Many Chinese businesspeople regard this as time-consuming and 
would rather give in to illegal requests of government officials and police 
to avoid any further problems. 
(Interview with Yap Juk Lim, in Mandarin, November 16, 2010) 
 
Another Chinese businessperson made a similar remark, ―The Chinese are generally 
afraid of getting trouble. If paying money to those extorting them can save them from 
further troubles, they will just pay the money instead of fighting back‖ (Interview with 
Ivan, in Hokkien, July 16, 2010). 
In short, most Chinese businesspeople prefer to give in to the illegal requests of 
government officials and police because they are afraid of the hassle of fighting back, and 
the trouble it is likely to cause them. Moreover, they have the necessary economic capital 
(money) to pay the bribes and extortion to protect their business and save them from 
further troubles. Very few of them choose to fight against the extortion because they 
consider getting themselves organised to fight back is time-consuming. By giving in to 
the illegal requests, Chinese businesspeople continue to make themselves the targets of 
extortion, and perpetuate a corrupt, predatory political-business system.  
Additionally, in order to obtain protection for their businesses, many well-
established Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan and Surabaya have utilised their 
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social capital to establish close relationships with heads of security forces. The following 
quotation from an interview and the excerpts from a Chinese-language newspaper report 
on a welcome and farewell dinner for the East Java Regional Military Command in 2010 
illustrate such political-business relationships between local Chinese Indonesian business 
elites and heads of security forces in both cities. 
 
The ceremony of North Sumatra police chief transfers was held recently 
[in March 2010]. I was there too. [Do you] want to know who most of the 
attendees were? About 90 per cent of them were big Chinese 
businesspeople!  
(Interview with Usman, in Indonesian, July 30, 2010) 
 
East Java Entrepreneur Charitable Foundation, Surabaya Chinese 
Association (PMTS- Paguyuban Masyarakat Tionghoa Surabaya) and 
Chinese community leaders jointly organised a welcome and farewell 
dinner for the East Java Regional Military Command on October 6 at 7pm. 
The event was held at the Grand Ballroom of Shangri-La Hotel, Surabaya. 
 
During the dinner, Alim Markus
 
[president of East Java Entrepreneur 
Charitable Foundation and PMTS] delivered his speech with enthusiasm, 
―Thanks to the mercy of the Lord, tonight we have the opportunity to get 
together with the former and new military commanders of East Java. On 
behalf of the Chinese community in Surabaya, I would like to wish our 
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former military commander [Suwarno] all the best in his future 
endeavours. I would also like to call upon the Chinese community to 
cooperate with the new military commander [Gatot].‖ 
(Chen, 2010, p. M4, my translation from Chinese original) 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Local Chinese business elites and community leaders in Surabaya with 
Suwarno (seventh from right), former regional military commander of East Java, and 
Gatot (fifth from right), the new regional military commander of East Java. (Photo from 





Figure 5.2 Alim Markus (left) and Chen Yi Tuan (second from left) presenting souvenir 
to Suwarno, former regional military commander of East Java. (Photo from Medan Zao 
Bao, October 9, 2010, p. M4.) 
 
As referred to in the excerpts from a Chinese-language newspaper report above, 
the local Chinese business community in Surabaya led by Alim Markus (林文光 ), 
organised a welcome and farewell dinner for the former and new regional military 
commander of East Java in 2010. Junus, one of my informants who is a university 
professor in Surabaya, revealed that Markus used to be well-connected to President 
Suharto during the New Order. After the collapse of the Suharto regime, Markus 
established close ties with Imam Utomo, the then governor of East Java (Interview with 
Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 2011). Markus is the owner of Maspion Group, a 
Surabaya-based conglomerate that manufactures household appliances. Besides its core 
business, the group is involved in trade, financial services, real estate, and the production 
of building construction material.
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Many well-established Chinese businesspeople in Surabaya also have established 
close relationships with the governor, the regional police chief (Kapolda- Kepala Polisi 
Daerah) and regional military commander (Pangdam- Panglima Daerah Militer), all of 
whom are paid money on a regular basis (Interview with Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 
2011). Bambang, a Chinese businessperson whom I interviewed, disclosed that he is a 
good friend of Soekarwo, the governor of East Java. Bambang owned a ceramic tile 
factory (Interview in Indonesian, March 3, 2011). Junus, who knows many local Chinese 
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 The Maspion Group was formerly known as UD Logam Jawa. It was established in 1962 by Markus‘s 
father, Alim Husin (林学善), and his business partner, Gunardi Go (―Brief History‖, n.d.). By 2010, the 
group had branched out to Singapore, Hong Kong, the People‘s Republic of China, Japan, France and 
Canada (Chen, 2010, p. 23). At the time of writing, Markus and two of his brothers, Alim Mulia Sastra and 
Alim Satria, are members of the group‘s board of directors. Alim Prakasa, another brother of Markus, is a 
member of the group‘s board of commissioners (―BOC & BOD‖, n.d.; ―Brief History‖, n.d.). 
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businesspeople, commented that Bambang is free from harassment and extortion by the 
police due to his good relationship with the governor (Interview with Junus, in 
Indonesian, January 11, 2011). Moreover, a few well-established Chinese businesspeople 
who run nightclubs in the city are well-connected to the mayor and local police. 
Therefore, their businesses are well-protected and their clubs are free from police raids 
(Interview with Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 2011).  
  It is alleged that some Chinese businesspeople who run big businesses in 
Surabaya are well-connected to Anton Prijatno (王炳金), a Golkar member who served 
in the East Java provincial legislature and the national legislature (DPR- Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat) during the Suharto era, and later, after the end of the New Order, 
became a prominent businessman and political patron for many Chinese businesses in 
Surabaya (Interview with Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 2011).
91
 In my interview with 
him, Prijatno revealed that he left Golkar in May 1998 because he was very disappointed 
with the rampant corruption within the Suharto regime (Interview with Anton Prijatno, in 
Indonesian, February 24, 2011). Unlike most local Chinese politicians with business 
backgrounds, Prijatno was only actively engaged in business activities after spending 
many years in politics. He became the chairperson of an asphalt distribution company in 
2003 (Interview with Anton Prijatno, in Indonesian, February 24, 2011). Since Prijatno is 
close to the governor, his business flourishes and is protected from harassment and 
extortion by the police. He is also a business partner of Sudomo Mergonoto (吴德辉) 
who owns Kapal Api Group, a coffee production company and Bambang (a ceramic tile 
factory owner) (Interview with Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 2011). In addition, 
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 Prijatno was a member of the East Java provincial legislature from 1977 to 1987 and a member of the 
national legislature from 1987 to 1997 (Interview with Anton Prijatno, in Indonesian, February 24, 2011). 
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Prijatno is a supplier of asphalt for many well-established Chinese real estate developers 
and contractors in the city (Interview with Anton Prijatno, in Indonesian, February 24, 
2011; interview with Atan, in Mandarin, February 28, 2011). Since he is a prominent 
politician and close to the governor, it is alleged that he also acts as a political patron for 
most well-established Chinese businesses in Surabaya, except Markus‘s Maspion Group, 
the largest conglomerate in Surabaya (Interview with Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 
2011).  
Similarly, in Medan, according to a local media activist who knew many local 
businesspeople of Chinese descent, in order to obtain protection and privileged access to 
permits and contracts from local power-holders, many well-established Chinese 
Indonesian businesspeople in the city established close relationships with local power-
holders and heads of security forces who hold the most power in North Sumatra, i.e. the 
governor, the regional police chief and the regional military commander. They often 
group together to ‗contribute‘ money to those power-holders and heads of security forces 
regularly in exchange for protection and permits (Interview with Daniel, in Indonesian, 
September 17, 2010). Another NGO activist disclosed that it is common for Chinese 
businesspeople that operate big businesses in the city to group together and form close 
ties with local police officers. They pay money to the police regularly in exchange for 
protection (Interview with Joko, in Indonesian, November 11, 2010).   
Benny Basri ( 张保 圆 ) is a good example of a well-connected Chinese 
businessman in Medan. Running a well-established real estate company in the city, Basri 
is said to be close to regional military officers and local police officers (Interview with 
Usman, in Indonesian, July 30, 2010; interview with Christopher, in Indonesian, August 
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18, 2010; interview with Joko, in Indonesian, November 11, 2010). He also holds the 
position of treasurer in the Democratic Party (PD- Partai Demokrat)‘s North Sumatra 
branch since 2003 (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010; interview 
with Joko, in Indonesian, November 11, 2010). It is alleged that because of his close 
relationship with local power-holders, he could purchase land previously owned by the 
Indonesian Air Force in Polonia, Medan, for a real estate development (Interview with 
Usman, in Indonesian, July 30, 2010).  
While Chinese businesspeople who run large-scale businesses often establish 
close ties with local power-holders and heads of security forces, because they have strong 
social network, those who owned small- and medium-scale businesses generally do not 
have the ability and opportunity to establish close ties with local power-holders or 
potential power-holders. 
 
5.4 Relations with Premans 
In Medan, some local Chinese businesspeople who run large-scale business have 
established close relationships with youth/crime organisations to get more protection for 
their business. Apart from paying ‗protection money‘ regularly to members of those 
organisations, some of them also have become their advisors. For instance, one of my 
informants disclosed that Vincent Wijaya, a local Chinese businessperson engaged in the 
frozen seafood industry, was an advisor of PP‘s North Sumatra branch, a major 
youth/crime organisation in the province, and hence his business was well-protected by 
PP (Interview with Joko, in Indonesian, November 11, 2010). In addition, according to 
the person in charge of Harian Promosi Indonesia (《印广日报》), a Chinese-language 
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press in Medan, the founder of the press, Hakim Honggandhi (关健康), used to be the 
treasurer of IPK, a youth/crime organisation based in Medan. Honggandhi was also 
connected to the North Sumatran military because he used to distribute consumer goods 
to them (Interview with Setiawan, in Mandarin, November 8, 2010).
92
  
Another good example is the support Indra Wahidin ( 黄印华 ), the then 
chairperson of Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI)‘s North Sumatra branch, and a 
group of Chinese community leaders (who were mostly businesspeople) gave to Ajib 
Shah-Binsar Situmorang, one of the candidate pairs in Medan‘s 2010 mayoral election, as 
mentioned in Chapter Four (Purnama, 2010; ―150 Tokoh Masyarakat Tionghoa Siap 
Menangkan Ajib-Binsar‖, 2010, p. 12; ―150 Tokoh Masyarakat Tionghoa‖, 2010, p. C7). 
Wahidin, as already mentioned, is an insurance agent and paint distributor (Interview 
with Christopher, in Indonesian, August 18, 2010), and openly supported Ajib-Binsar 
because of his connections with Ajib, the former chairperson of PP‘s North Sumatra 
branch. Wahidin and several other Chinese businesspeople, some said, believed Ajib 
would offer more protection to their business if he was elected (Interview with Farid, in 
Hokkien, July 15, 2010; interview with Ivan, in Hokkien, July 16, 2010), as opposed to 
Sofyan Tan, who as I mentioned in the opening of Chapter One, refused to promise any 
favours to those who supported his candidature.
93
 However, Wahidin‘s open support for 
Ajib-Binsar upset a few local Chinese community leaders who supported Sofyan Tan, the 
only ethnic Chinese mayoral candidate. He subsequently became less popular among his 
fellow Chinese community leaders after the mayoral election (Interview with Hasan, in 
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 As Harian Promosi Indonesia had been running at a loss due to low readership, Honggandhi eventually 
lost all of the capital he invested in the press. He later moved to Jakarta and worked in a hotel (Interview 
with Setiawan, in Mandarin, November 8, 2010).  
93
 As mentioned in Chapter Four, one informant however suggested that Wahidin supported Ajib as mayor 
in order to protect the Chinese community and not because of his hope for business favours. 
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Mandarin, August 19, 2010; interview with Rudy, in Mandarin, August 25, 2010; 
interview with Erik,
 
in Mandarin, August 25, 2010).
94
   
Besides that, according to some of my informants, the local governments of post-
New Order Medan/North Sumatra often allocates local state projects to indigenous 
contractors who are members of youth/crime organisations (Interview with Ivan, in 
Hokkien, July 16, 2010; interview with Halim, in Indonesian, July 26, 2010). But it is 
also not uncommon for them to subcontract some of their projects to Chinese contractors 
who are their friends. An indigenous contractor may subcontract his projects to his 
Chinese friends at 20 per cent less than his original tender cost. What this means is that 
the contractor would get the 20 per cent cut from the cost (Interview with Halim, in 
Indonesian, July 26, 2010). In other words, some local Chinese businesspeople who are 
well-connected with youth/crime organisations could also work on local state projects 
informally. 
 
5.5 Financial Coercion against the Media 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the advent of democratisation and the removal of 
restrictions on Chinese cultural expression have brought about press freedom and a new 
beginning for Chinese-language presses in Indonesia. Several Chinese-language presses 
have been established across the country since the end of the New Order. However, it is 
worth noting that press freedom appears to be a double-edged sword for Chinese 
businesspeople. On the one hand, Chinese businesspeople can establish Chinese-language 
presses to promote Chinese culture and discuss issues related to the ethnic Chinese in 
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 It appeared that the local Chinese community leaders‘ dislike of Wahidin did not affect their perception 
of INTI as I only heard of their complaints about Wahidin but not INTI during my fieldwork.  
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Indonesian society. They can also use the presses as a cultural space to showcase 
themselves and their business. But on the other hand, press freedom also allows the 
media to expose the corrupt practices of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to whom 
they are connected.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Chinese-language presses in Medan and 
Surabaya are generally making a loss due to the low readership. The presses need to 
depend on the financial support of local Chinese businesspeople in order to survive. 
Some well-established Chinese businesspeople support Chinese-language presses in 
Medan and Surabaya by becoming their shareholders or advertisers. In this way, they 
make sure that the presses report in favour of them and their business. Such patrimonial 
power relations between local Chinese-language presses and well-established Chinese 
businesspeople have deterred the presses from reporting negative news about local 
Chinese business. Therefore, news about corrupt business practices that involve Chinese 
businesspeople has rarely been reported in the local Chinese-language presses. For 
instance, in October 2010, while local Indonesian-language newspapers in Medan such as 
Waspada and Harian Orbit covered the alleged tax evasion by PT Indo Palapa, a real 
estate company owned by Benny Basri, an ethnic Chinese real estate tycoon in the city, 
most of local Chinese-language newspapers did not report about the case. PT Indo Palapa 
allegedly submitted false information to the tax offices in the city about the number of 
shophouses that were built by the company, so as to avoid paying taxes.
95
 When Xun Bao 
later published a news report on the case, they did not mention the name of Benny Basri 
(―Jian Zu Xing Jian Xu Ke Zheng Xing Pian‖, 2010, p. 11).  
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 See ―Bekukan Aset Bos PT Indo Palapa, ‗Tangkap Benny Basri‘‖ (2010, pp. 1-2) and Suwandi (2010). 
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Moreover, these Chinese businesspeople who fund these Chinese language 
presses are mostly well-connected to national and local level power-holders. In order to 
survive, these presses must refrain from being critical to these power-holders, otherwise, 
they might encounter withdrawal of their funders‘ sponsorship as a form of punishment. 
The fate of Rela Warta (《诚报》) in Surabaya vividly illustrates such carrot-and-stick 
methods used on a critical press. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Rela Warta was 
the only Chinese-language newspaper in Surabaya that did not cover many of the socio-
cultural activities held by local Chinese organisations. It was also the only Chinese-
language newspaper that often published in-depth and critical editorials and opinion 
pieces on current affairs and politics in Indonesia. The newspaper published a few 
editorials and opinion pieces on the general election and the role of Chinese Indonesians 
voters during the 2004 parliamentary election.
96
 It also published news on Dédé Oetomo 
(温忠孝), an ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya, who contested in the East Java 
regional representative council (DPD) election in 2004 (―Bu Yao Xuan Ceng Yan 
Zhong‖, 2004, p. 1).  
Shortly after the 2004 election, Rela Warta suddenly announced that it would turn 
into a weekly paper due to the low readership and the increase in printing price (―Gao 
Jing Ai De Du Zhe Shu‖, 2004, p. 1; Li, 2008, p. 360). But according to the former 
person in charge of the newspaper, the change was actually due to the main advertiser‘s 
decision to stop advertising in the newspaper after the editorial team refused to openly 
support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the soon-to-be presidential candidate at that time, 
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 For examples, see ―Yao Zheng Que Shi Yong Wo Men De Xuan Ju Quan (1)‖ (2004, p. 1); ―Yao Zheng 
Que Shi Yong Wo Men De Xuan Ju Quan (2)‖ (2004, p. 1); ―Xuan Min Yao Ji Zhu‖ (2004, p. 1); ―Hua Zu 
Xuan Min‖ (2004, p. 2). 
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as requested by the main advertiser. The main advertiser was a Chinese business elite 
who ran various types of business in East Java. He had been contributing Rp. 2 million 
towards the advertising fees to the newspaper every month. Prior to the polls, the main 
advertiser, who was close to Yudhoyono, urged Rela Warta to openly support 
Yudhoyono and call upon the local Chinese community to support Yudhoyono. But the 
newspaper‘s editorial team refused to do so because they maintained that the Chinese 
community had the right to support any electoral candidate they liked. In addition, the 
newspaper published a few news articles that were critical of Yudhoyono prior to the 
election. The main advertiser was upset and subsequently decided to withdraw his regular 
contribution of advertisements to the newspaper. Moreover, he urged other local Chinese 
business elites to boycott the newspaper. Consequently, Rela Warta lost many 
subscribers and a considerable amount of advertising revenue. Therefore, shortly after the 
parliamentary election, the founders decided to turn Rela Warta into a weekly paper 
(Interview with Samas H. Widjaja, in Mandarin, May 5, 2011). But after the weekly 
circulation of the paper was reduced to 2,000 copies it was still losing money. Later in 
June 2007, Rela Warta was taken over by PSMTI‘s East Java branch led by Jos Soetomo 
(江庆德) and became the bulletin of the organisation (Li, 2008, p. 360). In 2009, the 
paper ceased publication as it was no longer supported by PSMTI‘s East Java branch 
(Interview with Samas H. Widjaja, in Mandarin, May 5, 2011). 
The decline of Rela Warta clearly shows that some Chinese business elites would 
not hesitate to resort to financial coercion against a media outlet in order to safeguard 
their business interests. It also shows that it is extremely difficult to establish and 
maintain a Chinese-language press without financial support from the Chinese business 
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community. Without the money, it is impossible for a press to survive in the long term. 
This illustrates the ambivalence of press freedom for the Chinese in the post-Suharto era. 
 
5.6 Illegal Business Practices 
 There are several cases that I want to showcase here of how some ethnic Chinese 
based in Medan have willingly resorted to illegal practices to further their business 
interest. These cases have gotten fairly high profile coverage in the national press, and 
have kept alive the general national view of Chinese Indonesians as collusive and willing 
to engage in corruption to maintain their wealth.   
 
Asian Agri Group (AAG)‟s Tax Embezzlement Saga 
In 2007, Tempo magazine‘s January 15-21 edition extensively reported the 
alleged tax embezzlement committed by Asian Agri Group (AAG), a subsidiary company 
of Raja Garuda Mas Group (RGM) owned by Sukanto Tanoto a.k.a. Tan Kang Hoo (陈
江和), a Chinese Indonesian tycoon from Medan.97 Tempo featured on its cover a picture 
of Tanoto and the title ‗Akrobat Pajak‘ (Tax Acrobat) for the Indonesian edition and 
‗Fancy Footwork‘ for the English edition. The tax evasion was alleged to have cost the 
state around Rp. 1.1 trillion (around US$114 million) (Dharmasaputra, 2007b, p. 47; 
Steele, 2013, p. 347).  
Tanoto was a crony of Suharto during the New Order era. He was named by 
Forbes Asia magazine as the richest Indonesian in 2007. His personal wealth was 
estimated to be around US$2.8 billion (―Sukanto Tanoto‖, 2007). Tanoto‘s business 
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 Tempo is an Indonesian weekly news magazine published in both Indonesian and English. The report 
was also published in the English edition of the magazine for January 16-22. 
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empire expanded to Singapore, Hong Kong, Macau, Mauritius and the British Virgin 
Islands (Dharmasaputra, 2007b, p. 48). He and his family relocated to Singapore in the 
mid-1990s (Teo, 2007). AAG is a subsidiary company of Raja Garuda Mas Group 
(RGM)
98
 owned by Tanoto. The subsidiary company is one of Indonesia‘s largest 
agribusiness companies producing palm oil, cocoa and rubber. It was founded in 1979 
and owned 70,000 hectares of plantations in Sumatra as in January 2013 (Tampubolon, 
2013). AAG often uses fire to clear forest land for plantations, thus repeatedly causing 
haze problems for neighbouring countries such as Singapore and Malaysia (―Fires in 
Sumatra‖, 2013). RGM is a conglomerate that engages in pulp and paper production, agro 
industry, and energy resource development. RGM was founded in 1972 by Tanoto and 
his younger brother, Polar Yanto Tanoto (陈江海) (Arvian, 2007, pp. 56-57; Lu, 2010). 
Polar was also the president of PT Inti Indorayon Utama (IIU), a pulp, paper and rayon 
fiber production company under RGM. IIU was founded in 1989 at Porsea, a sub-district 
that is 215 kilometres away from Medan.
99
 The establishment of the plant was initially 
opposed by Emil Salim, the then state minister for environment, who considered the plant 
to be too close to residential areas and likely to cause pollution to the Asahan River and 
its environs. However, with the blessings of the then President Suharto, the construction 
of the plant went ahead (Arvian, 2007, p. 56). The story of this company (and the tax 
embezzlement of AAG) shows that Chinese Indonesian businesspeople can be above the 
law as long as they are wealthy. In other words, some Chinese Indonesian businesspeople 
took advantage of their wealth to get away with illegal business practices.  
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 The Group was renamed RGE (Royal Golden Eagle) on September 9, 2009 (―History‖, n.d.). 
99
 Polar however was later killed in an airplane crash that occurred in North Sumatra in 1997 (―234 Killed 
In Indonesias Worst Air Disaster‖, 1997).  
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The information on the alleged tax embezzlement was revealed to Tempo by 
Vincentius Amin Sutanto, AAG‘s former financial controller in Medan. In mid-
November 2006, Sutanto abused his position by embezzling company funds. He sent a 
fictitious transfer order to the Fortis Bank in Singapore that requested a transfer of 
US$3.1 million (about Rp. 28 billion at that time) from AAG Oil and Fats Ltd. at British 
Virgin Island to his former high schoolmate‘s account at the Panin Bank in Jakarta. 
Sutanto was of course the one at fault in this illegal practice. His embezzlement attempt 
was later discovered by AAG‘s management. Sutanto initially tried to reconcile the fraud 
internally but the company rejected his request and reported it to the police. Worried for 
his safety, Sutanto then ran away to Singapore with the data of tax manipulation 
committed by AAG since 2001 (Dharmasaputra, 2007b, pp. 46-47).  
Tempo‘s reporter flew to Singapore to meet Sutanto on November 28, 2006, after 
being contacted by the latter, and Sutanto then exposed the evidence on AAG‘s tax 
evasion. Sutanto eventually surrendered to the Singapore police on December 2, 2006, 
after finding out that Tanoto had hired private detectives to trace him to Singapore 
(Dharmasaputra, 2007a, pp. 54-55). He disclosed the company‘s tax irregularities to the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK- Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) with all the 
evidence he had on the company‘s fraudulent tax reports. After receiving the evidence of 
AAG‘s tax manipulation from Sutanto, KPK and tax officers started to examine the 
group‘s offices in Indonesia. Sutanto was later sentenced to 11 years in jail for money 
laundering (Sunariah & Sari, 2007, p. 21). 
According to Tempo, from at least 2001 to October 2006, AAG had committed 
tax evasion worth around Rp. 1.1 trillion, which amounted to nearly 30 per cent of the 
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company‘s profits (Sunariah & Sari, 2007, p. 21). Methods used included fictitious costs, 
fictitious hedging transactions
100
 and pricing transfers. These methods reduced recorded 
profits to minimise tax payments (Dharmasaputra, 2007b, p. 47). In the first method, 
Tanoto faked various targets of costs (e.g. road construction, weed clearing and 
contractors) supported with fictitious receipts for auditing purposes. In reality, the costs 
were never paid out but were transferred to the private accounts of people whom Tanoto 
trusted. The money was later transferred to one of Tanoto‘s offshore companies. The 
second method involved fictitious crude palm oil hedging transactions that were made 
between companies under AAG in Indonesia and its affiliated overseas companies. The 
transactions were made based on backdating. They were made in such a way that 
Indonesian companies always sold products at low prices but purchased ones at high 
prices while overseas companies always sold products at high prices and purchased ones 
at low prices. Therefore, the Indonesian companies always incurred a loss and had to 
transfer funds overseas. In the third method, AAG set up fictitious affiliated companies in 
Hong Kong, British Virgin Island and Macao. The Indonesian companies under AAG 
sold crude palm oil to these fictitious companies at a low price and these companies then 
sold the commodity to a real purchaser at the genuine market price. This prevented a high 
tax burden of the AAG in Indonesia (Dharmasaputra, 2007b, pp. 47-49; ―The Tycoon‘s 
‗Economic Package‘‖, 2007, pp. 50-51). 
In January 2008, Tanoto sent a letter to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
requesting the president to give his company a chance to settle the case with the Director 
General of Taxation (Kustiani, Wijaya & Aprianto, 2008, p. 34). In other words, he tried 
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 Hedging transaction is ―a sale and purchase forward contract between two parties at a jointly agreed 
price‖ (Dharmasaputra, 2007, p. 49). 
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to resort to opportunistic means to save himself from legal action. Nevertheless, the 
president was not keen to ‗help‘ the tycoon; a presidential spokesperson revealed that 
President Yudhoyono ―will not take sides‖ (―Sukanto‘s Mixed Message‖, 2008, p. 13). 
According to Tempo, the Director General of Taxation had sent three summonses to 
Tanoto, requesting him to testify as a witness against board members of AAG who were 
named suspects by the Tax Office. But Tanoto never honoured the summonses 
(―Sukanto‘s Mixed Message‖, 2008). 
 AAG was later sentenced by the Supreme Court on December 18, 2012, to Rp. 
2.5 trillion in fines for tax embezzlement and another Rp. 1.8 trillion in the form of back 
taxes. The Court also sentenced the company‘s former tax manager, Suwir Laut, to two 
years in prison for misstating the annual tax obligations of AAG‘s 14 subsidiaries 
between 2002 and 2005 (Yasin, Aprianto & Febriyan, 2012; Sihombing, 2013). By July 
2013, the Attorney General‘s Office had frozen some of the group‘s assets as part of the 
fine ordered by the Supreme Court (Sihombing, 2013). 
AAG was not happy with the ruling. Muhamad Assegaf, the group‘s lawyer, 
argued that the former tax manager‘s submission of false tax information was his own 
individual action and it had nothing to do with the group. Freddy Wijaya, who 
represented the company‘s management, claimed that AAG never avoided paying tax 
(Sihombing, 2013). He said the company therefore would file an objection to the court 
ruling (Cahyafitri, 2013). At the time of writing, there is still no further news on the case. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that AAG was innocent in the tax embezzlement. Without the 
management‘s instruction and approval, the tax manager would not have dared to 
misstate the company‘s tax information.  
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This tax embezzlement saga was an interesting one for what it shows us about the 
illegal and semi-legal business practices some Chinese Indonesian businesspeople utilise 
to safeguard their business and personal interests. Such business practices contribute to 
the reproduction of the corrupt and muddy business environment in post-Suharto 
Indonesia as well as perpetuate the negative perceptions of Chinese businesspeople as 
corrupt, opportunistic, arrogant and heartless.   
 
The Murder of a Chinese Indonesian Couple in Medan 
In late March 2011, the Chinese Indonesian community in Medan was shocked at 
the brutal murder of a Chinese Indonesian couple at their home. The couple were shot 25 
times, while parking their car in the garage of their home, by a groups of unidentified 
youths. According to the police, there was no evidence of robbery as a motive for the 
murder. The couple were Kho Wie a.k.a. Awi (杜致纬), 34, and Dora Halim (林绮琦), 
30. Awi was a fish merchant and salt trader (―Polisi Tangkap Pembunuh Awi‖, 2011). He 
and his wife had two young children orphaned by the murder (Gunawan, 2011a; ―Mian 
Lan Hua Ren Fu Fu‖, 2011).  
Indra Wahidin, the chairperson of Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI)‘s North 
Sumatra branch, and Brilian Moktar (莫粧量), member of North Sumatra provincial 
parliament, were very concerned about the incident. They thought the killing was a 
violent act that targeted the ethnic Chinese, and were afraid the incident would cause 
unrest within the Chinese community in Medan (Gunawan, 2011a). Wahidin also opined 
that the murder could have been triggered by the perception that many local Chinese 
Indonesians were wealthy. He therefore urged the local Chinese community to mingle 
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with the local community and refrain from showing an extravagant lifestyle, ―Get along 
with the surrounding communities and don‘t raise your profile with extravagant 
behavior‖ (Cited in Gunawan, 2011a). Moktar, as cited in The Jakarta Post, called upon 
the police to pay serious attention to the incident, ―The Police have to be quick in 
uncovering the motive behind the killing. Capture the killers. Don‘t allow Chinese-
Indonesian residents to feel unsafe living in Medan‖ (Gunawan, 2011a). 
But it later turned out the murder was actually caused by business competition 
between Kho Wie and his fellow businesspeople who were also ethnic Chinese 
(Gunawan, 2011b, 2011c; ―Kasus Penembakan Pengusaha‖, 2011). This means the 
killing did not target the ethnic Chinese. According to the North Sumatra Police, the 
murder was related to the auction of 15 fishing boats at Belawan Port near Medan. Some 
of the boats belonged to local fish merchants and some belonged to Malaysians. The 
boats that belonged to the Malaysians were earlier confiscated by the marine police for 
illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. Awi and his wife had won bids on some of the boats. 
The previous owners of the boats planned to buy back the boats from the couple but their 
offers were rejected. The couple even scuttled the boats and this angered the owners who 
later took revenge by murdering the couple (Gunawan, 2011b, 2011c).
101
  
The murder was planned by Acui a.k.a. Halim Winata a.k.a. Jackson (a fish 
merchant), Toni (Acui‘s son), Sun An (a fishing boat trader), Ang Ho (Sun An‘s nephew, 
also an antique business dealer) and Acuang (information on this person is not available) 
(―Kasus Penembakan Pengusaha‖, 2011; Ridin, 2011; ―25 Saksi Ungkap Pembunuh 
Awie dan Dora‖, 2011; Asril, 2012). They hired four Malaysian professional killers from 
an international syndicate. The killers were paid Rp. 200 million (which was about 
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US$23,000 at that time) (Gunawan, 2011c). Not long after the murder, Sun An and Ang 
Ho were arrested by the police while Acui, Toni and Acuang were alleged to have fled to 
Malaysia. It was also alleged that the four killers had fled to other places in Indonesia 
(Ridin, 2011). Although the Indonesian police have been working with the police in 
Malaysia to look for Acui and other suspects (Gunawan, 2011d), they still have not found 
out the whereabouts of the suspects at the time of writing. Sun An and Ang Ho were 
eventually sentenced to lifetime imprisonment on January 31, 2012, for murdering Awi 
and Dora Halim (―Divonis Penjara Seumur Hidup‖, 2012).   
This incident clearly shows that some Chinese Indonesian businesspeople are 
willing to resort to criminal acts such as murdering their business competitors in order to 
protect their business interests or take revenge. The incident also reflects the ambivalent 
perception about the position of Chinese Indonesians among some Chinese Indonesians. 
Whenever a murder incident that involves ethnic Chinese victims happens, some Chinese 
Indonesians tend to see it as a violent act that targeted the ethnic Chinese although it 
might actually not have anything to do with anti-Chinese sentiments.    
 
The Land Mafia in Medan 
In November and December 2011, Indonesian-language newspapers in Medan, 
reported that three ethnic Chinese tycoons were implicated in illegal seizure of state and 
residential land in the city. The tycoons involved were Benny Basri (张保圆), Tamin 
Sukardi and Mujianto (郑祥南). All of them were real estate developers (―Warga Sari 
Rejo Iri dengan Benny Basri‖, 2011; ―Mafia Tanah Hilangkan Nurani‖, 2011; ―Tangkap 
Tamin Sukardi‖, 2011; ―‗Tangkap Tamin, Mujianto & Benny Basri‘, 2011; ―Mafia Tanah 
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Sengsarakan Rakyat‖, 2011; ―Mujianto Dituding Mafia Tanah‖, 2011). It was alleged that 
they managed to take over the land by bribing local government bureaucrats. Basri, the 
owner of PT Central Business District (CBD), was alleged to have obtained the land title 
for Sari Rejo Sub-district (Kelurahan Sari Rejo) through illegal means. The land was 
previously under the ownership of the Indonesian Air Force but it had later become a 
residential area. However, residents who had been living in Sari Rejo for decades did not 
get their land title while Basri managed to get it within a short period of time and planned 
to turn the land into a commercial property. In other words, the ownership of the land had 
been transferred from the air force to Basri‘s company. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Basri was a real estate tycoon well-
connected to local power-holders and local military as well as police officers He was also 
the treasurer of PD‘s North Sumatra branch since 2003. So, it was quite possible that 
Basri managed to take over the land in Sari Rejo within a short period of time because of 
his close association with local power-holders and officers at the local air force base.  
Both Sukardi and Mujianto were implicated in land seizures at Helvetia, 
Deliserdang Regency (Kabupaten Deliserdang), North Sumatra. Sukardi, owner of PT 
Erniputra Terari, had taken over former state land in Helvetia for commercial purposes. 
The land was earlier given by the state to the residents of Helvetia. Sukardi was allegedly 
involved in the hiring of gangsters to kidnap and assault a NGO activist who led residents 
of Helvetia to defend their land rights. The activist was later released after being 
assaulted by gangsters repeatedly for several hours. Mujianto, the owner of Agung 
Cemara Realty, was implicated in the seizure of another piece of former state land in 
Helvetia. The land had been given to residents of Helvetia in 1968, and they later turned 
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it into a football field. According to a local social activist, as cited in Harian Orbit, 
Mujianto suddenly claimed the ownership of the land in 2011 with a title deed. Although 
the title deed did not show the correct address of the land, Mujianto still fenced the land 
with the help of the police to prevent residents from entering. Therefore, the activist 
believed the incident was ―a game of land mafia‖ with the collusion of government 
officials (―Mujianto Dituding Mafia Tanah‖, 2011, my translation from Indonesian 
original). As a result, the residents could no longer use the field for leisure and exercise. 
This angered the residents and they subsequently demolished the fence, leading to a clash 
between the residents and gangsters hired by Mujianto. Police officers showed up during 
the clash but instead of protecting the residents, they joined the gangsters in attacking the 
residents as well. Several residents were injured in the confrontation. 
The land disputes in Helvetia drew the attention of a few North Sumatra 
provincial parliamentarians, who later paid a visit to the location of the land disputes on 
April 9, 2013. They promised to hold a meeting with the residents to discuss the issue, 
and how to look for solutions. In June 2013, the promise had not yet been fulfilled, so on 
June 7, 2013, the Islamic organisation Al Washliyah, which owned land in Helvetia that 
was taken over by Sukardi, officially lodged a complaint with the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) about Sukardi‘s seizure of land in Helvetia. Apart from protesting 
against Sukardi in front of his office, members of Al Washliyah also held demonstrations 
in front of North Sumatra chief attorney‘s office and North Sumatra High Court, urging 
the law-enforcers to take action towards Sukardi (―Penyerobotan Tanah Negara di 
Helvetia Menuai Kemarahan‖, 2013). The protesters carried a coffin when they protested 
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again outside Sukardi‘s office on June 24, 2013 (―Lagi, Al-Washliyah Beri Tamin 
Keranda Mayat‖, 2013). 
Harian Orbit referred to the three developers as ―slanted-eye businesspeople‖ 
(pengusaha mata cipit), clearly indicating their Chinese ethnicity, since it was common 
for non-Chinese in Indonesia to refer to the Chinese as ―slanted-eye‖- mata cipit 
(―‗Tangkap Tamin, Mujianto & Benny Basri‘, 2011). To some extent, the alleged 
involvement of the three Chinese developers in land disputes reinforced the stereotypes 
of Chinese businesspeople as being heartless, corrupt and opportunistic. 
On another occasion, PT Jatimasindo, a real estate company owned by Arsyad Lis, 
another ethnic Chinese tycoon in Medan, was involved in the demolition of the Raudhatul 
Islam Mosque in Medan on April 11, 2011 (―Terkait Perubuhan Masjid Raudhatul Islam‖, 
2013). The mosque was situated behind Emerald Garden Hotel, which was also owned by 
Lis. According to the chairperson of the Muslim People‘s Forum (FUI- Forum Umat 
Islam),
102
 Indra Suheri, as interviewed by The Jakarta Post, the demolition of the mosque 
was to make way for the establishment of a shopping mall and a housing complex 
(―Protest against mosque relocation turns wild‖, 2012). The company carried out the 
demolition after getting the approval from Medan‘s Council of Indonesian Islamic 
Scholars (MUI- Majelis Ulama Indonesia). Suheri accused Medan‘s MUI of gaining 
material benefits at the expense of a mosque (―Perubuhan Masjid Raudhatul Islam‖, 
2012). Since then, FUI and several local Islamic activists have staged demonstrations in 
front of Emerald Garden Hotel from time to time. In early February 2012, banners with 
provocative words ―[Kalau] 1 mesjid lagi digusurr.1000 rumah cina kami bakarr.!‖ (If 
one more mosque is demolished, we will burn 1,000 Chinese houses!) were even 
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displayed during the demonstrations. It was also rumoured that the protesters carried out 
sweeping raids on every car passing the area and asked the drivers to lower the car 
window. Although the sweeping never really happened, the rumour, which was circulated 
via mobile phone text messages in Medan, caused panic among local Chinese in the city 
(―Sweeping di [Em]erald Garden tidak Benar‖, 2012).  
Later in February 2013, PT Jatimasindo promised to rebuild the mosque at the 
same location. But, as of March 2013, the company had not yet provided the rebuilding 
funds and this was perceived by local Islamic activists as breaking the promise. So, they 
continued to stage open demonstrations in front of Emerald Garden Hotel (―Massa 
Ancam Bakar Hotel Emerald Garden‖, 2013).   
At the time of writing, there is still no further news on land disputes involving the 
above Chinese tycoons. 
The Chinese businesspeople‘s involvement in the above land disputes have not 
only violated the land rights of local communities, but also perpetuated the corrupt, 
predatory political-business system in Medan. In addition, their alleged corrupt business 
practices have reinforced the negative perceptions of ethnic Chinese among indigenous 




The democratisation that is not followed by the emergence of good governance in 
post-Suharto Indonesia reinforces the ambivalent position of Chinese Indonesian 
businesspeople. On the whole, they are both victims and perpetuators of the muddy and 
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corrupt business environment. On the one hand, they remain the targets of extortion and 
corruption by power-holders, police and premans. On the other hand, in the process of 
utilising their economic and social capital to gain and safeguard their business and 
personal interests, most Chinese businesspeople actually play an active role in 
perpetuating and reproducing the corrupt, predatory political-business system. By giving 
in to the illegal requests of power-holders, police and premans, the Chinese 
businesspeople have connived at and indirectly perpetuated such corrupt practices, as 
well as reinforced the stereotypes that the Chinese can pay, will pay and should pay for 
everything, including a peaceful business environment. By establishing collusion with 
local power-holders, heads of security forces and youth/crime organisations to get 
protection and access to permits and contracts, the Chinese businesspeople have directly 
become an integral part of the problematic political-business relationships. Although 
there are a few Chinese businesspeople who refuse to become victims of extortion and 
choose to fight back, these appear to be rare.  
By resorting to various illegal and semi-legal means such as bribing bureaucratic 
officers, hiring premans to intimidate local residents during land disputes, committing tax 
embezzlement, and even murdering business competitors, the Chinese businesspeople 
have not only perpetuated organised crime and corruption in both cities but have also 
reinforced the negative perceptions of the Chinese as corrupt, opportunistic, arrogant and 
heartless. This has therefore worsened the ethnic relations between Chinese and non-
Chinese, and strengthened the ambivalent position of the Chinese in Indonesian society. 
By intimidating critical media through financial coercion, the Chinese businesspeople 
have seriously threatened the press freedom in post-Suharto Indonesia. Such a 
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problematic political-business system is a vicious circle: Following Giddens‘s structure-
agency theory, the corrupt and muddy business environment in post-Suharto Indonesia 
prompts Chinese businesspeople to resort to various illegal and semi-legal business 
practices to gain and protect their business and personal interests. Such business practices 
in turn perpetuate and reproduce this business environment, as well as reinforce and 
reproduce the ambivalent position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society. I therefore 
argue that the corrupt, predatory political-business system continues to exist in the 
reformasi era not only because of the capture of the new political vehicles and institutions 
by the New Order-nurtured predatory interests, but also due to the active role of many 
Chinese businesspeople in perpetuating the system. Many, if not most, Chinese 
businesspeople in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya are agents who maintain the status 
quo (of the problematic political-business system and the ambivalent position of the 



















Since the end of the New Order, there has been more participation of Chinese 
Indonesians in electoral politics. However, as suggested in earlier chapters, the Chinese 
have been considered economically strong, and a move into politics is believed by some 
Chinese to risk the anger of pribumi Indonesians. Moreover, although the more 
democratic and liberal political environment in post-Suharto Indonesia, on the one hand, 
allows Chinese Indonesians to become actively involved in politics, on the other hand, 
the consequential explosion of costs for election campaigning has constrained the 
political achievements of Chinese Indonesians with high political ideals but are least 
endowed with money. I would now like to look more closely at the tensions between the 
high political ideals of some Chinese Indonesian politicians, such as Sofyan Tan, and the 
more personal oriented agendas of some other Chinese Indonesians, and the way they 
have a differing view of the democratisation process in Indonesia and the changing 
landscape of electoral politics. I suggest that these different political behaviours and 
political views are due to the different habitus of Chinese Indonesian politicians. I will 
first examine some of the political-institutional changes at the national level in post-
Suharto Indonesia in order to set the context for understanding the local level in Medan 
and Surabaya. Understanding Indonesian politics means taking a look at the spread of 
money politics in post-Suharto Indonesia, and I suggest that Chinese businesspeople have 
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had an important instigating role in this regards. Well-established Chinese businesspeople 
often back electoral candidates who can promise them political favours and refuse to 
support those with anti-corruption political ideals. Candidates who promise political 
favours to anyone who back them are usually not committed to push for positive changes 
in Indonesia by fighting against all forms of corruption and bureaucratic abuse. This is in 
line with Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus and field that social actors who control 
considerable capital are inclined to defend the status quo of their field, in in order to 
safeguard their interests. However, there are also a few wealthy Chinese Indonesian 
businesspeople who support genuine reform-minded Chinese Indonesian electoral 
candidates without expecting any political favours in return. I argue that these 
businesspeople choose to use their free will to challenge the status quo of Indonesian 
political environment because they perceive the promotion of good governance as more 
important than their personal interests. This is in line with the concept of free will in 
Giddens‘s structure-agency theory. There has been increasing political participation of 
the Chinese in post-Suharto Indonesia, and looking at the participation and achievements 
of the Chinese politically in Medan and Surabaya will help us to focus on the tensions 
between high political ideals and personal agendas. Following Giddens‘s structure-
agency theory, I argue that the active agency that Chinese Indonesians in Medan and 
Surabaya have demonstrated in engaging electoral politics and their political participation 
has helped to shape the political environment and has also contributed to increasing their 





6.1 Politics at the National Level 
The fall of Suharto in May 1998 led to the opening up of a more democratic and 
liberal political space in Indonesia. As noted earlier in Chapter One, post-Suharto 
governments allowed the formation of political parties based on any principle and 
aspiration that did not conflict with the Pancasila. Responding to this newly found 
political freedom, people began to organise themselves and establish political parties. It 
was reported that more than 200 political parties were registered in 1999 but only 48 of 
them were qualified to contest in the 1999 election (King, 2000, p. 92). According to the 
new election law, in order to qualify to contest in the election, a political party must have 
established management (pengurus) in more than half of the provinces and in more than 
half of the districts and special regions in Indonesia (Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 91). Parties 
that were qualified to contest in the 1999 election ranged from major Pancasila-based 
secular parties such as Golkar (the New Order dominant party), the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan), the 
National Awakening Party (PKB- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), the National Mandate 
Party (PAN- Partai Amanat Nasional) to Islamic parties such as the United Development 
Party (PPP- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK).  
The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) was led by Sukarno‘s 
daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri. The party was formed out of the internal conflict 
within the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) in the 
closing years of the New Order regime. As Stephen Sherlock (2004) notes, ―[PDI] was 
split between those supporting the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri and a leadership 
imposed on the party by the government‖ (p. 25). Megawati‘s faction formed PDI-P in 
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early 1999. The party identifies itself as a secular party that focuses on defending the 
unity and integrity of Indonesia as well as safeguarding the interests of the common 
people (Suryadinata, 2002a, pp. 79, 84; Sherlock, 2004, pp. 25-26).  
The National Awakening Party (PKB) was established after the fall of Suharto in 
1998 by Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest mass-
based Muslim organisation in Indonesia.
104
 Although the party is strongly identified as an 
―Islamic party‖, its ideological basis is Pancasila, the official philosophical foundation of 
the Indonesian state, and not Islam (Sherlock, 2004, p. 31). During Wahid‘s presidency, 
PKB put in considerable efforts in improving inter-religious relations and safeguarding 
minority rights. Therefore, PKB is seen as a tolerant and inclusive political party by non-
Muslim and minority groups (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 49). The party had strong bases in 
East Java, a province that is dominated by members of NU (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 48).     
The National Mandate Party (PAN) was formed after the fall of Suharto in 1998 
by Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah, the second largest mass-based Muslim 
organisation in Indonesia (Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 85). Leaders and members of the party 
are mostly modernist Muslims. However, in order to establish a wider basis of support, 
the party adopts Pancasila, instead of Islam, as its ideological basis (Sherlock, 2004, p. 
34). 
The United Development Party (PPP) was a forced amalgam of Islamic parties 
created by the New Order regime in 1973. It was also one of the three legal political 
parties during the New Order era (Sherlock, 2004, p. 32). PPP declares Islam as its 
ideology and restricts its membership to Muslims only (Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 76). After 
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the fall of Suharto in 1998, PPP was led by Hamzah Haz, a member of Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) (Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 77).    
The Justice Party (PK) was formed in July 1998 as an Islamic Party which 
adopted Islam as its ideological basis. The party was led by Nur Mahmud Ismail, an 
intellectual (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 13). PK is active on university campuses in the post-
New Order years and therefore is influential among Muslim students and intellectuals 
(Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 75; Ananta et al., 2005, p. 13).  
The 1999 election also saw the participation of the People‘s Democratic Party 
(PRD- Partai Rakyat Demokratik), the only participating political party that adopted 
socialism as its ideology (Suryadinata, 2002a, pp. 78-84, 205). According to Edward 
Aspinall (2005, p. 130), the party was originally established as a NGO known as the 
People‘s Democratic Union (PRD- Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik) in 1994. The founders 
of PRD were a group of university student activists influenced by Marxist ideology and 
by leftist student movements in the Philippines and South Korea. The objective of the 
organisation was to fight against the New Order regime and to push for democratisation 
in the political, economic and cultural aspects (Aspinall, 2005, p. 131). According to Leo 
Suryadinata (2002a), PRD ―has a large following among university students and urban 
youths‖ (p. 70). In addition, PRD activists mobilised workers to join numerous labour 
protests and strikes during the New Order period (Aspinall, 2005, p. 131). As Aspinall 
(2005) notes, ―[PRD activists‘] capacity to organize large mass actions, plus their 
discipline and programmatic boldness, gave them a dramatic visibility in the developing 
democratic movement‖ (p. 131). Despite the prohibition of additional political parties by 
the New Order regime, PRD publicly launched itself as a political party and renamed the 
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People‘s Democratic Party (PRD- Partai Rakyat Demokratik) in 1996 (Aspinall, 2005, p. 
189). PRD‘s political activity ultimately marked it out for repression by the New Order 
regime. Senior military officers denounced PRD ―as a reincarnation of the PKI 
[Indonesian Communist Party]‖ (Aspinall, 2005, p. 192) and many PRD members were 
later hunted down. Budiman Sudjatmiko, the leader of PRD, was tried for subversion and 
was sentenced to 13 years in prison. But he was later released in December 1999 after 
Abdurrahman Wahid became president (Amri & Hasits, 2008). PRD played a major role 
in the reformasi movement. Its members actively organised students‘ demonstration that 
played an important role in pressuring Suharto to step down in May 1998 (Suryadinata, 
2002a, p. 70). Therefore, it can be said that the party is genuinely reformist with high 
political ideals and favours rapid change. After the fall of Suharto, PRD contested in the 
1999 election but only received 0.07 per cent of the total votes, failing to pass the 2 per 
cent electoral threshold that was required to secure a seat in the parliament (Suryadinata, 
2002a, p. 223). It is believable that many voters did not vote for PRD because it was a 
socialist party and was deemed by many Indonesians as pro-communist. It is also 
possible that PRD did not get much support from the business community because the 
party opposes the capitalist system, which it believes exploits workers (See ―Sekilas 
Tentang PRD‖ [2010] for more details on the ideology of PRD). After failing to get a 
parliamentary seat in the 1999 election, PRD has not contested in subsequent elections.  
Another radical political change that was undertaken after the end of the New 
Order was the move to decentralise some of the power to make decisions and the duties 
of government away from the central government to the regions. The laws put in place 
also changed the process of electing regional heads, which during the New Order had 
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always been appointed by the central government. It was expected that with the removal 
of intervention from the central government, local governments would freely elect the 
best and most suitable leaders to lead them (Choi, 2004, p. 282; Rasyid, 2003, p. 65). 
Although both laws included a clause that postponed their implementation until early 
2001, in the wake of the general election held in June 1999, newly elected members of 
local legislative assemblies immediately began to implement the law‘s provisions on the 
election of local government heads. Such initiative did not face many obstacles from the 
national government ―under the lame-duck presidency of B. J. Habibie, and subsequently 
the weak leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid‖ (Malley, 2003, p. 110). Consequently, local 
government leaders have been elected by local assembly members since late 1999. 
However, it was later alleged that local government leaders could win elections by 
bribing local assembly members (Rasyid, 2003, p. 66). In response to such allegations, 
international and domestic civil society organisations called for a direct election system 
in which local government heads are elected directly by the people. In late 2002, the 
national assembly eventually agreed to adopt direct elections for government heads at all 
levels of governance, including at the local level (Choi, 2005, p. 7). The first direct 
election of local government heads, or better known as ‗pilkada‘,105 was held in June 
2005 (Sulistiyanto & Erb, 2009, p. 17). 
Initially, only political parties or party coalitions that gained 15 per cent of the 
vote or parliamentary seats in their respective electoral areas could nominate candidates 
for the direct elections. Independent candidates were not allowed to contest (Mietzner, 
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2009, p. 127). Later in 2008, under Law No. 12/2008 on regional government, 
independent candidates were allowed to contest in local executive government elections 
without the nomination of a political party or a coalition of political parties by posting an 
election bond and by garnering a certain number of signatures from the residents in their 
territory as a proof of the support they enjoyed (Buehler, 2010, pp. 271, 273). They have 
to get signatures from at least ―between 3 and 6.5 per cent of the residents in their 
territory, with the exact figure depending on population size‖ (Buehler, 2010, p. 273).  
In addition, a new institution known as the regional representative council (DPD- 
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) was established in 2001 (Crouch, 2010, p. 61). The DPD and 
the national parliament (DPR- Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) constitute the new national 
assembly (MPR- Majelis Mermusyawaratan Rakyat). The DPD has the right to draft bills 
and offer advice on bills proposed by the DPR. However, it cannot pass, reject or amend 
legislation (Sherlock, 2010, p. 161). DPD members were elected by the voters, for the 
first time, in 2004.  
Besides that, a closed party list ranking system was initially adopted in the 1999 
parliamentary elections whereby voters were only given the opportunity to elect the party 
of their choice as the names of the candidates were unavailable on the ballot paper. The 
political party would later decide who would be the actual candidate occupying the seat 
(Sherlock, 2004, p. 7). Later in the 2004 election, the closed party list ranking system was 
replaced by an open party list ranking system in which the parliamentary candidates were 
named on the ballot paper. Voters could, for the first time, vote for a candidate of their 
choice as well as the party that nominated the chosen candidate (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 5). 
The party list ranking system was later abolished in late December 2008. From the 2009 
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election onwards, an electoral candidate can gain a seat in parliament as long as he or she 
obtains the most votes in the constituency being contested (Buehler, 2010, p. 272). 
In short, from the 2004 election onwards, voters could directly elect the president 
and vice-president, members of parliaments at national (DPR- Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat), provincial (DPRD 1- Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 1) and local (DPRD 2- 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 2) levels as well as their DPD representatives. They 
could also directly elect local government heads from 2005 onwards. 
The political landscape in Indonesia, therefore, since the advent of 
democratisation is entirely different from during the New Order period when Golkar had 
always been the dominant party in electoral politics. The 1999 parliamentary election saw 
the rise of PDI-P that obtained the most votes and seats at the national level, defeating 
Golkar, the long-time ruling party. Other major parties that gained seats in the national 
parliament included PKB, PAN and PPP (Suryadinata, 2002a). 
In the 2004 election, however, the dominance of PDI-P declined significantly at 
the national level and they lost to Golkar, the New Order dominant party, which again 
emerged as the strongest and largest party in Indonesia (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 18).
106
 The 
election also saw the emergence of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS- Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera) and two new major parties, i.e. the Democratic Party (PD- Partai Demokrat) 
and the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS- Partai Damai Sejahtera). PKS is actually the 
reconstitution of the Justice Party (PK). PK contested in the 1999 election but only 
gained 1.8 per cent of the votes, failing to pass the 2 per cent electoral threshold that was 
required to contest in the 2004 parliamentary election (Hellmann, 2011, pp. 125-126). In 
order to appeal to broader constituencies, PK, as Olli Hellmann (2011) puts it, ―was thus 
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not only reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party but […] downplayed its Islamic 
goals and, instead, campaigned mainly on bersih (clean, meaning non-corrupt, 
government) and peduli (caring, meaning concern for social welfare)‖ (p. 126). This 
strategy proved to be successful. According to Aris Ananta and colleagues (2005), PKS‘s 
campaign that focused upon the eradication of corruption and poverty appealed to many 
urban voters. They supported PKS ―not because they wanted an Islamic state but because 
they supported the anti-corruption and anti-poverty promises that PKS highlighted‖ (p. 
24). PKS gained 7.34 per cent of the votes in 2004 (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 22, Table 1.3). 
The Democratic Party (PD) is the political vehicle of retired General Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. Within a short period of time, the party was able to create 
branches within all major provinces. PD is a secular party that promotes democracy and 
advocates popular political participation, multiculturalism as well as a professional armed 
forces (Ananta et al., 2005, pp. 23-24). Due to the attraction of these various principles, 
although Yudhoyono‘s party was not so successful in the parliamentary elections, he 
himself, as a fairly charismatic leader, was later elected as president in Indonesia‘s first 
direct presidential election in 2004. 
The Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) was formed in 2001 by Ruyandi Hutasoit, a 
Christian pastor and a doctor in Jakarta. The party is based on Pancasila and Christians 
are its main constituents, making it a primarily Christian party (Ananta et al., 2005, pp. 
17, 25). PDS gained 2.13 per cent of the votes in the 2004 election and were allotted 12 
seats in the national parliament (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 22, Table 1.3). 
In the parliamentary election of 2009, the Democratic Party (PD) gained the most 
votes and seats at the national level and became the largest party in parliament (Sukma, 
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2010, pp. 56-57) due to the influence and charisma of President Yudhoyono. As Dirk 
Tomsa (2010) points out, the huge gains of PD in 2009 ―were much more a reflection of 
the president‘s popularity than the performance of the party as such‖ (pp. 149-150). The 
2009 election also saw the emergence of two new secular parties founded and led by 
controversial former generals, i.e. the Great Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra-  
Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya) founded and led by ex-General Prabowo Subianto, and 
the People‘s Conscience Party (Hanura- Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat) founded and led by 
ex-General Wiranto.
 
Both ex-generals have been respectively accused of human rights 
violations in East Timor and of fomenting anti-Chinese violence in May 1998 (―Profile: 
General Wiranto‖, 2004; Tomsa, 2009). Their parties were formed shortly after the 2004 
election. Their formation was inspired by PD‘s successes in the election due to the 
influence and charisma of President Yudhoyono. Tomsa (2010) has noted that ―[t]he only 
function of these parties was to provide a political vehicle for their ambitious leaders‖ (p. 
150). Both Gerindra and Hanura passed the electoral threshold and gained seats in the 
national parliament (Tomsa, 2010, p. 144, Table 7.1). However, Tomsa (2010) also 
points out that Gerindra and Hanura did not emulate the achievements of PD. Both 
parties only obtained less than 5 per cent of the votes while PD gained more than 20 per 
cent (p. 150).  
No doubt the Indonesian political system since the end of the New Order is much 
more democratic than in the past. The opening up of political space has created 
opportunities for Indonesians, including the Chinese minority, to get involved in politics 
by joining political parties other than Golkar, the New Order dominant party. Voters also 
have more choices to elect their political representatives during elections. However, as 
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pointed out by Suryadinata (2002a), most of the new major parties that emerged since the 
fall of Suharto ―are conservative and do not favour rapid change‖ (p. 214). The People‘s 
Democratic Party (PRD) that favours rapid reformation could not become an effective, 
strong reformist force because it got little support from voters in the 1999 election. 
Moreover, as I will discuss later in this chapter, the opening up of political space is 
followed by the explosion of costs for election campaigning that led to the rise of money 
politics. This implies a paradox of democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia: On the one 
hand, the advent of democratisation brings more opportunities and choices for 
Indonesians to get involved in politics. On the other hand, genuine reformist forces such 
as PRD are marginalised. Moreover, the rise of money politics excludes those lacking 
financial resources from political contests. Therefore, as I mentioned earlier in Chapter 
Three, the end of the New Order has not been followed by greater popular participation in 
political contests.  
 
6.2 The Political Landscape in Post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya 
In the post-New Order era, the election results for city parliaments of both Medan 
and Surabaya (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kota Medan and Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah Kota Surabaya) have not always been the same as those for the national 
and provincial parliaments.
107
 In the 1999 parliamentary election, the North Sumatra 
provincial parliament and the Medan city parliament were both dominated by PDI-P led 
                                                 
107
 The politics in Medan and Surabaya is best reflected in the election results for city parliaments of both 
cities because all members of the city parliaments are elected by voters in both cities and they represent the 
people in both cities. Members of North Sumatra and East Java provincial parliaments are respectively 
elected by not only voters in Medan and Surabaya but also voters in other places of North Sumatra and East 
Java. Therefore, I suggest that one has to refer to the election results for city parliaments of Medan and 
Surabaya instead of North Sumatra and East Java provincial parliaments to get a better understanding of the 
politics in Medan and Surabaya. 
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by Megawati (Perhitungan Perolehan Kursi DPRD I, 1999). But five years later, the 
dominance of PDI-P had declined significantly at both the provincial and local levels in 
North Sumatra.
 
Most of the electoral candidates elected into the North Sumatra provincial 
parliament were from Golkar but interestingly, the Medan city parliament was dominated 
by representatives from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), an Islamic party that sought 
to solve the problems of people‘s life via Islam (Apriyanto, 2007, pp. 36, 39). This was 
due to the party‘s anti-corruption and anti-poverty promises that had impressed many 
Medanese voters. In East Java, although the provincial parliament was dominated by 
PKB in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections, the Surabaya city parliament was 
dominated by PDI-P in the same period (―Perbandingan Kursi DPRD Jatim Antara 
Pemilu 1999 dan 2004‖, 2004, p. 30; ―PPP, PBB, PBI, PKP Dapat 1 Kursi‖, 1999, p. 9; 
Apriyanto, 2007, pp. 334, 336). PKB was closely associated with the NU and since East 
Java was the birthplace and stronghold of NU, it was not surprising to see the domination 
of PKB in the provincial parliament. However the secular nationalist party, PDI-P had a 
strong base in Surabaya, the capital city of the province (Wibowo, 2001, p. 141) and thus 
the city parliament was dominated by PDI-P representatives.   
Nevertheless, the 2009 parliamentary election saw the rise of PD led by President 
Yudhoyono at both national and local levels. The party won most of the seats in 
provincial parliaments of North Sumatra and East Java, as well as city parliaments of 
Medan and Surabaya (Central Statistics Agency of North Sumatra, n.d.; East Java 
Provincial Parliament, n.d.; ―50 Calon Anggota DPRD Medan Terpilih Periode 2009-
2014‖, 2009; ―Anggota DPRD Surabaya 2009-2014‖, 2009, p. 29). The outstanding 
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performance of the PD was closely related to the influence and charisma of President 
Yudhoyono (Harahap, 2010). 
 
6.3 The Rise of Money Politics and the Role of Chinese Businesspeople 
The opening up of political space in post-1998 Indonesia and consequential 
explosion of costs for election campaigning have led to the rise of what has been called 
―money politics‖. There are two different types of money politics, one which involves the 
electoral candidates and the party ―vehicles‖, which candidates hope will support them, 
and the other involves direct payment to voters. I will discuss these different types in this 
section, and the role that Chinese businesspeople have come to play in this evolving post-
New Order political landscape.  
 Changes in the election procedures discussed above, have not eradicated the use 
of money and bribes in election, but have only changed the way and to whom money is 
given. When a closed party list ranking system was adopted in the 1999 parliamentary 
elections, in order to be placed on the top of the list and selected by party leaders to fill 
the seats after the elections, some electoral candidates resorted to bribing their party 
leaders (Choi, 2009, p. 125). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the party list ranking 
system was later abolished in 2008.  
At the local level, according to Sukardi Rinakit (2005), candidates who contested 
in local elections needed to pay for campaign expenses determined by the local election 
commission and the political vehicles, i.e. the political parties which nominated them. 
Each candidate must pay an average of up to 20 per cent of their campaign funds for the 
usage of the political vehicles (p. 2). Moreover, the cut in state subsidies for political 
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parties in 2005 brought severe financial difficulties to most parties in the country 
(Mietzner, 2007, pp. 238-263). According to Marcus Mietzner (2009), in order to 
consolidate their finances, local party branches tended to overlook their own cadres in the 
nomination and offer nominations to external candidates with vast financial resources (pp. 
128-129). In most nominations across the country, parties were more concerned about the 
financial resources of the nominees and their preparedness to contribute parts of their 
wealth to the party rather than their loyalty to the party and ideological affinity (Mietzner, 
2009, p. 128). In other words, they were more interested in the nominees‘ money rather 
than their political platforms. Therefore, the process of being elected to regional office 
has become increasingly expensive in the reformasi era. The country‘s anti-corruption 
watchdog, the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), as reported in Jawa Pos, revealed that 
the total amount of expenditure spent on all 244 direct elections for local government 
heads (pilkada) in 2010 alone had exceeded Rp. 14 trillion (about US$1.55 billion). This 
included Rp. 3.5 trillion (US$387.1 million) spent by local elections commissions on the 
operation of elections and Rp. 10.9 trillion (US$1.21 billion) spent by all candidates on 
campaign activities (―Pilkada 2010 Telan Rp14 Triliun Lebih‖, 2011, p. 2).     
Another type of money politics involves vote-buying. Syarif Hidayat (2009, pp. 
128, 142) points out that during pilkada, most voters tend to base their political decision 
more on pragmatic considerations; for instance, what material benefits can be obtained 
directly from the candidates for local government head, and who and what were the 
societal figures the candidates are affiliated with. It is therefore not surprising that the 
practice of vote-buying (in the form of cash or goods) marked the process of pilkada. 
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As elections in post-Suharto Indonesia involve a huge expenditure, aspiring 
politicians need to seek harder for the support of rich businesspeople, who can make 
considerable financial contributions to their political activities and campaign funds. As 
noted by Syarif Hidayat and Gerry van Klinken (2009), the democracy that emerged in 
post-Suharto Indonesia needs money (p. 149). Chinese Indonesian businesspeople are 
therefore important sources of income for electoral candidates who need significant 
electoral campaign funds to get elected in elections. In return, they often expect to get 
political protection, ‗kick-backs‘, state projects or other benefits should the candidate get 
elected. In this way, Chinese businesspeople continue to establish corrupt and patrimonial 
relationships with aspiring politicians in exchange for political favours for their business. 
By using Bourdieu‘s concept of habitus and field, I argue that these well-established 
Chinese businesspeople have played a part in maintaining the existing corrupt political 
environment in order to protect their business interests. The advent of competitive 
electoral politics has also created new incentives for Chinese businesspeople to sponsor 
politicians from parties other than Golkar during elections. Some hedge their bets by 
sponsoring more than one candidate, thus creating a higher chance that they will have 
supported someone who will be elected into office, whom they can seek favours from. 
For example, according to Christian Chua (2008, p. 126), during the 2004 presidential 
elections, it was alleged that Tomy Winata, the owner of the Artha Graha Group, 
financed the campaigns of both Megawati and Yudhoyono.
108
 Chua (2008) also reveals 
that certain Chinese business family members ―carefully split their political loyalties‖ (p. 
                                                 
108
 There were five pairs of candidates contesting in the 2004 presidential election: Wiranto-Solahuddin 
Wahid (nominated by Golkar), Megawati Sukarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi (nominated by PDI-P), Amien 
Rais-Siswono Yudo Husodo (nominated by PAN), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla (nominated by 
PD) and Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar (nominated by the United Development Party, PPP) (Ananta et al., 
2005, pp. 71-74). The Yudhoyono-Kalla pair was elected in the election. 
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126). For instance, Sofjan Wanandi, the owner of the Gemala Group,
109
 backed 
Yudhoyono while his brother, Jusuf Wanandi, who was a board member of The Jakarta 
Post, used the daily to secure support for Megawati. Mochtar Riady, the founder and 
owner of the Lippo Group,
110
 backed opposition leaders while his son, James Riady, 
supported the actual power-holders. A news report in Gatra discloses that Djoko Tjandra 
a.k.a. Tjan Kok Hui, the owner of the Mulia Group, and Prajogo Pangestu a.k.a. Phang 
Djun Phin, the owner of the PT Musi Hutan Persada, sponsored the campaign of 
Megawati in the 2004 presidential elections (Pamuji, Arifin & Febriana, 2004).
111
 
The split of political loyalties within the Poo family who owns the Cipta Cakra 
Murdaya (CCM) Group is another good example of bets-hedging among Chinese 
businesspeople. The CCM Group was founded and owned by Murdaya Widyawimatra 
Poo a.k.a. Poo Tjie Goan (傅志宽) and his wife Siti Hartati Cakra Murdaya a.k.a. Chow 
Li Ing (邹丽英) (Setyautama, 2008, pp. 38, 312).112 Poo joined PDI-P led by Megawati 
and became the treasurer and financial backer of the party. He also ran for the 2004 and 
2009 elections and was elected into the national parliament in both elections, thanks to 
his financial status as a wealthy businessman and the support from well-established 
Chinese businesspeople in Surabaya (Yunianto, 2004a; Li, 2007, p. 195; Li, 2010, p. 122; 
Sutrisno, 2009).
113
 Siti, on the other hand, joined PD led by Yudhoyono and became his 
benefactor (Prakoso, 2012). In other words, the Poo family members split their political 
                                                 
109
 The Gemala Group is a conglomerate engages in automotive and property development businesses. 
110
 The Lippo Group is a conglomerate engages in retailing, media, real estate, health care and financial 
businesses.  
111
 The Mulia Group is a commercial property developer while the PT Musi Hutan Persada is a forestry 
company. 
112
 The CCM Group is a conglomerate engages in electric utility, footwear, plantation, furniture and 
plywood industry. 
113
 In fact, to date, Poo is the only Chinese Indonesian conglomerate owner who has been elected into 
public office since the end of the Suharto regime.  
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loyalties and financial support between PDI-P and PD. But after the presidential election 
in 2009, where Yudhoyono was re-elected as president, Poo was dismissed from his party 
membership and his office in the parliament by PDI-P as he allegedly channelled his 




In Surabaya, Yahya, a university professor, disclosed that Alim Markus, owner of 
the Maspion Group in the city, funded three out of five pairs of candidates during the first 
direct gubernatorial election in 2008, although he was well-connected to only one 
candidate pair, i.e. Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf. The other two candidate pairs were 
Soenarjo-Ali Maschan Moesa and Kholifah Indar-Mudjiono (Interview with Yahya, in 
Indonesian, December 31, 2010). The gubernatorial election was eventually won by the 
Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf pair.  
These examples show that some Chinese businesspeople played a crucial role in 
perpetuating the corrupt and predatory characteristics of Indonesian politics. They 
supported certain politicians and expected to be paid back after the politicians got elected. 
This led to the corrupt practices. Therefore, these businesspeople were key players in the 
use of money politics and the perpetuation of corruption, and ultimately they were part of 
the problem.  
 
6.4 Political Achievements of Chinese Indonesians  
After the end of the New Order, Chinese Indonesians themselves have become 
increasingly involved in politics. This has been the case both in terms of appointed 
                                                 
114
 There were three pairs of candidates contesting in the 2009 presidential election: Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto 
(nominated by Golkar), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono (nominated by PD) and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri-Prabowo (nominated by PDI-P) (Sukma, 2010, p. 61). 
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positions, as well as elected ones. At the time of writing, Chinese Indonesians who have 
been appointed into high offices since the reformasi era include Kwik Kian Gie (郭建义), 
coordinating minister for the economy, finance and industry from October 1999 to 
August 2000 under President Abdurrahman Wahid, and state minister/head of the 
national planning board from July 2001 to October 2004 under President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri; and Mari Elka Pangestu (冯惠兰), minister of trade from October 2004 to 
2011 and minister of tourism and creative economy since 2011 (Coppel, 2008, p. 120; 
Primanita & Daslani, 2012; ―Minister Mari Elka‖, 2011). Kwik was a member of PDI-P 
while Pangestu is not affiliated to any political party (Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 128; 
Setyautama, 2008, p. 302).  
There have been many Chinese who have run for elected positions, mostly in 
various local level constituencies, and not at the national level. Those who have been 
elected into public offices include Hasan Karman a.k.a. Bong Sau Fan (黄少凡), mayor 
of Singkawang, West Kalimantan, from November 2007 to September 2012; Christiandy 
Sanjaya (黄汉山), deputy governor of West Kalimantan since November 2007; Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama, known by his Hakka affectionate nickname, Ahok (钟万学), chief of 
East Belitung regency from 2005 to 2006 and deputy governor of Jakarta since October 
2012;
115
 Basuri Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok‘s younger brother), chief of East Belitung 
regency since 2010; Eliezer Yance Sunur a.k.a. Eliezer Yantje Sunur, chief of Lembata 
                                                 
115
 Ahok resigned from the position of chief of East Belitung regency in December 2006 to run for 
governorship of Bangka Belitung in 2007. However, he was not elected in the gubernatorial election 
(―Basuki Tjahaja Purnama‖, n.d.). He later contested for national parliamentary seat in the 2009 
parliamentary election and was elected (Kuwado, 2014). 
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regency, East Nusa Tenggara from 2011 to 2014;
116
 Alvin Lie Ling Piao (李宁彪), 
national parliamentarian for Semarang from 1999 to 2004 and Central Java I from 2004 
to 2009; and Murdaya Widyawimatra Poo a.k.a. Poo Tjie Goan, national parliamentarian 
for East Java I from 2004 to 2009 and Banten II in 2009 (Hui, 2011, p. 299; Tambun, 
2012; ―Pasangan Awang-Abdul Pemenang Pilkada Singkawang‖, 2012; Primanita & 
Daslani, 2012; Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 241; Li, 2007, pp. 195-196; 2010, p. 122; ―Kepala 
Daerah‖, n.d.; ―Bupati Lembata Dilantik Kamis‖, 2011; Seo, 2014; Setyautama, 2008, pp. 
312-313). Several ethnic Chinese electoral candidates who are popular among Chinese 
and non-Chinese Indonesians, including Sofyan Tan mentioned in the opening story of 
this thesis, and Dédé Oetomo a.k.a. Oen Tiong Hauw (温忠孝), a well-known social 
activist in Surabaya, were not elected in past parliamentary and local elections. Karman 
and Ahok were previously members of the New Indonesia Party of Struggle (PPIB- 
Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru) but they later switched to other parties.
117
 Having 
lost in the mayoral election of Singkawang in 2012, Karman joined Gerindra in 2013 and 
will run for the national parliament in the 2014 election under Gerindra (―Gerindra Usung 
Hasan Karman‖, 2013). Ahok switched to Golkar in 2009 but left the party and joined 
Gerindra in 2012 (Li, 2010, p. 185; ―Pengurus Baru Gerindra‖, 2012). His brother, Basuri, 
is affiliated to Golkar (Widianto, 2010). Sanjaya was previously affiliated to PDS but 
later switched to PD in 2011 (Xun, 2010; Handoko, 2011). Sunur, Poo and Tan were 
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 Sunur was suspended by the Lembata regency parliament in February 2014 for his alleged involvement 
in extortion and fraud against a local state project contractor (Seo, 2014). 
117
 The PPIB was formed as the New Indonesia Alliance Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru) in 
2002. It is a secular party with its ideologies oriented towards justice, democracy and welfare (Ananta et 
al., 2005, p. 16, Table 1.2). The party only gained 0.59 per cent of popular votes in 2004 and failed to pass 
the 2 per cent electoral threshold that was required to contest in the 2009 election (Ananta et al., 2005, p. 
16, Table 1.3). It was later renamed the New Indonesia Party of Struggle and ran in the 2009 election. For 
the background of the PPIB, see Santoso (2008). 
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members of PDI-P while Lie was affiliated to PAN (―Bupati Lembata Dilantik Kamis‖, 
2011; Li, 2007, pp. 195-196; Anto, 2009, p. 261). Oetomo ran for a seat in the national 
parliament under the flagship of PRD in 1999 (Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, 
December 24, 2010). 
It is ironic that some ethnic Chinese politicians chose to cooperate with former 
generals such as Wiranto and Prabowo, who were respectively accused of human rights 
violations in East Timor and of fomenting anti-Chinese violence in May 1998. For 
example, Hary Tanoesoedibjo (陈明立), an ethnic Chinese media tycoon, joined Hanura, 
a political party founded by Wiranto, and decided that he will become Wiranto‘s running 
mate in the 2014 presidential elections (―Past history forgotten‖, 2013; Fang, 2013). 
Tanoesoedibjo decided to pair with Wiranto because he found both of them shared the 
same vision and mission, i.e. to improve the life of the people. In addition, Tanoesoedibjo 
thought that their different backgrounds complemented one another. Wiranto was 
experienced and firm due to his military background while Tanoesoedibjo had experience 
in economics and business (Gatra, 2013). Rudy Chua a.k.a. Rudi Chua (蔡健源), an 
ethnic Chinese member of Riau Archipelago (Kepulauan Riau) provincial parliament for 
the period of 2009-2014, left PPIB and joined Hanura in 2013 as PPIB was not qualified 
to contest in the 2014 election due to its low popular vote percentage in the 2009 election 
(―Bobby Jayanto Nasdem‖, 2013). Chua was also the only ethnic Chinese deputy mayoral 
candidate in the mayoral election of Tanjungpinang in 2012. But he and his running mate 
were not elected (Mohari, 2012; Limahekin, 2012). Ahok, an ethnic Chinese deputy 
gubernatorial candidate for Jakarta in 2012, as mentioned earlier, left Golkar and joined 
Gerindra founded by Prabowo in the same year (―Pengurus Baru Gerindra‖, 2012). He 
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and his running mate, Joko Widodo, were nominated and supported by Prabowo. 
Prabowo even funded their nomination and electoral campaigns (Septian, Pramono & 
Rafiq, 2012). According to a blog set up by a group of Chinese Indonesians to share news 
and stories on Chinese Indonesians, Ahok‘s decision to joined Gerindra and accept 
Prabowo‘s support had upset many Chinese Indonesians who still could not forget the 
May 1998 riots (―Didukung Prabowo‖, 2012). After Ahok was elected, he openly 
supported Prabowo to run for the presidency in 2014. He believed Prabowo ―could 
change the fate of the people‖ (Anggriawan, 2012). These examples indicate that in 
pursuing their political ambitions, some ethnic Chinese politicians chose to cooperate 
with certain political elites who were powerful and influential despite their involvement 
in a number of human rights abuses. The actions of these ethnic Chinese politicians have 
knowingly or unknowingly continued perpetuating the predatory political system in 
Indonesia.   
 
6.5 The Political Participation of Chinese Indonesians in Post-Suharto 
Medan and Surabaya: High Political Ideals vs. Personal Agendas 
 
Although the numbers of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in Medan and Surabaya who 
contested in 1999, 2004 and 2009 parliamentary elections are unavailable, according to 
my interviews with a few ethnic Chinese politicians and social activists in both cities, as 
well as news reports and advertisements in some local presses, in 1999, there were at 
least one candidate in Medan and five candidates in Surabaya who contested in 
parliamentary elections. Five years later, there were at least 17 candidates in Medan and 
seven candidates in Surabaya who ran for public office in parliamentary elections. In 
2009, there were at least 16 candidates in Medan and 17 candidates in Surabaya who 
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contested in parliamentary elections (See Appendix Seven for a compiled list of ethnic 
Chinese candidates in Medan and Surabaya). In 2009 the first Chinese Indonesian 
parliamentary candidates were elected into parliaments in Medan. In the 2009 
parliamentary election, there were four ethnic Chinese elected into the 50-member Medan 
city parliament and another two Chinese from Medan elected into the 100-member North 
Sumatra provincial parliament. Surabaya, on the other hand, already had two Chinese 
Indonesian candidates elected as parliamentarians in 1999. One was elected into the 40-
member Surabaya city parliament and another one was elected into the 100-member East 
Java provincial parliament. Five years later, Surabaya had another two Chinese 
candidates elected as parliamentarians, one into the national parliament and another one 
into the city parliament. In 2009, there were three ethnic Chinese candidates in Surabaya 
elected in the parliamentary election. One was elected into the national parliament and 
another two were elected into the city parliament.  
As I will illustrate below with several case studies, I believe that the participation 
of Chinese Indonesians in electoral politics in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya reflects 
the tensions between admirable political ideals of certain politicians and personal agendas 
of businesspeople who supported them or who became themselves involved in electoral 
politics. On the one hand, some Chinese Indonesian politicians who put themselves 
forward as electoral candidates, as I will show, were reform-minded and often had 
admirable political ideals, committed to bringing positive changes to the society by 
fighting against corruption, collusion and nepotism in state institutions as well as all 
forms of discrimination. On the other hand, Chinese Indonesian businesspeople who 
supported them often wanted to further their own agendas, expecting political favours 
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from the candidates they backed should they get elected in the election. They therefore 
preferred to establish corrupt and patrimonial relationships with politicians in exchange 
for patronage and protection for their business. This type of misfit of expectations and 
ideas is the best example of the tense roles that both Chinese businesspeople and Chinese 
politicians have in Indonesia. Politicians with anti-corruption political ideals reject 
financial offers from those who expect political favours from them, but then, very few of 
them get elected. This is because they cannot fund the massive electoral campaigns 
needed to win, nor hire reliable election witnesses to prevent fraud and irregularities 
during the polling process. Some Chinese businesspeople, such as Murdaya 
Widyawimatra Poo mentioned earlier, and Simon Lekatompessy also in Surabaya, which 
I will focus on later, become actively involved in politics and run for public office with 
the aim of gaining political protection for their business. Because they have the money to 
launch extensive campaign activities to influence voters, they can get elected. 
I will now explore the experiences of a few Chinese Indonesian politicians who 
ran for public office in the post-Suharto parliamentary and local direct elections. Their 
stories vividly illustrate the tensions between the high political ideals of certain Chinese 
Indonesian politicians and the personal agendas of Chinese businesspeople who 
supported them or who became involved in electoral politics as well. I include their 
stories in this chapter because I had the opportunity to interview them and they were 
willing to share with me many details of their experience in political participation. I was 
also able to obtain more information about them from other informants and the media, as 
well as other printed sources.
118
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 These politicians are all men. Although there were also Chinese women politicians in Medan and 




Hasyim a.k.a. Oei Kien Lim (黄建霖) 
Hasyim a.k.a. Oei Kien Lim (黄建霖), an ethnic Chinese who was elected into the 
Medan city parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kota Medan) in 2009, came 
from a family involved in politics, which has been rare among Chinese families. In the 
pre-New Order era, his granduncle, who was his grandfather‘s younger brother, used to 
be an active member of the Indonesian National Party (PNI- Partai Nasional Indonesia) 
which was founded and led by President Sukarno in the pre-New Order era. After 
Suharto came into power, his uncle, who was his father‘s younger brother, joined the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), a party that was created out of PNI and a few non-
Islamic parties. From his participation in the party, he became well-connected with 
Megawati, Rachmawati and Sukamawati Sukarnoputri, who were daughters of Sukarno 
and leaders of PDI. However, he did not play an active role in the party since PDI was the 
major opposition party during the New Order era and those who were well-connected to 
its leaders were subjected to close supervision by the New Order regime, and various 
forms of subtle harassment. Hasyim revealed that his interest in politics was mainly due 
to the influence of his uncle‘s political participation: 
 
When I was in my upper secondary years, I was always with my uncle. 
We were very close. He liked to talk to me about politics. Perhaps because 
of that, my interest in politics gradually grew. When I enrolled in the UDA 
[University of Darma Agung, Medan], I joined the Indonesian National 
Students‘ Movement [GMNI- Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia], a 
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student organisation that had historical connections with PNI.
119
  From 
then on, I participated in the activities of that organisation. Besides that, I 
often accompanied my uncle to meet his friends who also participated in 
politics. From them I heard and learnt a lot about politics […]. 
(Interview with Hasyim, in Indonesian, August 11, 2010) 
 
Hasyim graduated with a bachelor‘s degree in economics (accounting) in 1991. 
However, he did not immediately enter formal politics. Instead, he worked as a chief 
financial officer at a tapioca flour mill in Pematangsiantar, North Sumatra. After two 
years, he resigned and started a business with his wife distributing office stationery 
(Wahyudi, 2009). At the same time, he was also active in social activities and held 
important positions in local branches of the Chinese Indonesian Social Association 
(PSMTI) and Lions Club (Wahyudi, 2009). Therefore, he was well-known within the 
local community in Medan. Later, Hasyim was encouraged by his uncle to run for the 
parliamentary election in 2009. He then contested for the Medan city parliamentary seat 
under the flagship of PDI-P. His campaign team consisted of both Chinese and non-
Chinese Indonesians. He was financially supported by a few local Chinese 
businesspeople in Medan (Interview with Hasyim, in Indonesian, August 11, 2010). 
Hasyim received 2,937 votes and was elected in the election (―50 Calon Anggota DPRD 
Medan Terpilih Periode 2009-2014‖, 2009). He was happy that those who voted for him 
comprised both Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians. He revealed that about 30 per cent 
of the votes he gained were from non-Chinese voters (Interview with Hasyim, in 
Indonesian, August 11, 2010). In comparison with Sofyan Tan‘s defeat in the 2010 
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 GMNI was affiliated with PNI in the 1960s (Aspinall, 2005, p. 120). 
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mayoral election, it is possible that Hasyim was elected as a city parliamentarian in the 
2009 parliamentary election because a city parliamentarian represented a smaller number 
of voters compared to a mayor. Moreover, parliamentarians at the national, provincial 
and local levels only have legislative power and are not as powerful as mayors who hold 
executive power. Hence, it is relatively more difficult to be elected as a mayor than as a 
parliamentarian.   
After getting elected as a city parliamentarian, Hasyim always spent time visiting 
and helping victims of misfortunes, such as fires, approaching a few social organisations 
and requesting them to help the victims. Therefore, a news report in Harian Mandiri, a 
local Indonesian-language newspaper in North Sumatra, described Hasyim as a dedicated 
political leader and complimented him as the ―Ahok120 of Medan‖ (―Hasyim Sosok Ahok 
Medan‖, 2013). Hasyim, who was also the treasurer of PDI-P‘s Medan branch at the time 
of writing, has planned to run for the Medan city parliament again in the 2014 
parliamentary election (―PDIP Targetkan 11 Kursi di DPRD Kota Medan‖, 2013).  
 
Simon Lekatompessy 
Simon Lekatompessy was an ethnic Chinese member of the Surabaya city 
parliament for the period 2009-2014. He ran for the parliamentary election for the first 
time in 2009 under PDS and was elected. He was born and raised in Maluku but later 
moved to Surabaya to study accounting at the Surabaya Academy of Accounting 
(Akademi Akuntansi Surabaya), a private institute of higher learning in the city. He was 
active in a few student organisations during his college years. After graduation, 
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 Ahok, or Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, is the current ethnic Chinese deputy governor of Jakarta. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, he was elected to the office in the 2012 gubernatorial election. 
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Lekatompessy stayed in Surabaya and started his billboard business (Interview with 
Simon Lekatompessy, in Indonesian, May 5, 2011).  
Although Lekatompessy did not know Mandarin and Chinese dialects, he 
identified himself as an ethnic Chinese. After the end of the New Order regime, he joined 
the Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party (PBI- Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), a political 
party founded by Nurdin Purnomo a.k.a. Wu Nengbin (吴能彬), a Chinese Indonesian 
businessperson who ran a travel company in Jakarta. Although PBI was a multi-ethnic 
political party, about 85 per cent of its committee members were Chinese. Lekatompessy 
in an interview mentioned that he decided to be involved in politics in order to fight for 
the abolishment of discriminatory policies against Chinese Indonesians (Interview with 
Simon Lekatompessy, in Indonesian, May 5, 2011). Nevertheless, if one examines the 
circumstances revolving around his motives for entering into politics (which I will 
recount below), one can speculate that he may have been more concerned with the 
interests of his own business and the local big business community, rather than the 
interests of the general public. 
PBI was later disbanded in 2004 due to the lack of interest and support of the 
public. As a Chinese Indonesian Christian, Lekatompessy decided to join PDS that was 
led and dominated by Christians, and became the head of the party‘s Surabaya branch. In 
2009, he contested in the parliamentary election for the first time. He ran for the 
Surabaya city parliament and was elected (Interview with Simon Lekatompessy, in 
Indonesian, May 5, 2011). However, Lekatompessy was not generally well-known 
among Chinese Indonesians in Surabaya because he never joined any Chinese 
organisations. It was alleged that he was elected because he had spent a huge amount of 
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money (Rp. 500 million) on his campaign activities that focused on influencing voters 
(money politics) (Interview with Eddy Gunawan Santoso, in Indonesian, May 6, 2011). 
After getting elected into the city parliament, Lekatompessy was active in fighting 
for the interests of the local big business community, but not of the general public. In 
November 2010, Tri Rismaharini, the mayor of Surabaya, issued the Mayor Regulations 
No. 56 and No. 57 that increased the rates of large-size (8m
2 
and above) outdoor 
advertisement billboard taxes in the city by 100 to 400 per cent. The aim of increasing the 
rates of the taxes was to reduce the number of large-size billboards in the city, which 
were considered dangerous, and would put the public‘s safety at risk should they collapse. 
At the same time, the rates of small-size outdoor advertisement billboard taxes were to be 
reduced by 40 per cent according to the new regulations (―Tri Rismaharini‖, 2011). The 
regulations upset many large-size billboard producers because it affected their business 
since many people would stop installing large-size billboards to avoid paying more 
taxes.
121
 They wrote to Lekatompessy and other members of Surabaya City Parliament 
complaining about the regulations (Kusumadewi, 2012). Lekatompessy and a few other 
city parliamentarians opposed the regulations because this not only affected local 
businesspeople but also politicians who installed large-size billboards, because they 
would have to pay the taxes at higher rates.
122
 Lekatompessy and his fellow 
parliamentarians proposed to file an impeachment against Rismaharini during the city 
parliament session (Effendi, 2010, 2010b; ―Tri Rismaharini‖, 2011; Kusumadewi & 
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 The regulations also upset many businesspeople who installed large-size billboards because they would 
have to pay the taxes at higher rates. In an interview, my informant who is an ethnic Chinese ceramic tile 
factory owner in Surabaya complained about the regulations and criticised the mayor for not being 
considerate of businesspeople‘s interests (Interview with Bambang, in Indonesian, March 3, 2011). 
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 It was alleged that Lekatompessy opposed the increase of the rate because it also affected his own 
business. He had to pay for a higher advertisement billboard tax once the new regulation came into effect 
(Interview with Eddy Gunawan Santoso, in Indonesian, May 6, 2011). 
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Martudji, 2012). They accused the mayor of not following proper procedures in issuing 
the regulations because she did not involve the Local Government Working Unit (SKPD- 
Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah) in the debate over nor the proper procedures for the 
drawing up of the regulation (Hakim & Taufiq, 2011). But hundreds of locals backed 
Mayor Rismaharini by demonstrating in front of Surabaya city parliament on January 24, 
2011, urging the parliamentarians to stop bothering the mayor with the issue. The 
demonstrators argued that the increase in the rates of large-size billboard taxes only 
affected some businesspeople and did not affect the interests of the general public. 
Therefore, the parliamentarians should not waste time fighting with the mayor on this 
matter (―Wali Kota Disidang Pansus Angket‖, 2011). Despite the protest from the locals, 
the city parliament still launched an impeachment against the mayor and suspended her 
on January 31, 2011, (Taufiq & Abidien, 2011; ―Konflik Wali Kota dengan DPRD 
Surabaya‖, 2011). However, as reported in The Jakarta Globe, Home Affairs Minister 
Gamawan Fauzi later interfered in the matter and defended Rismaharini, saying that the 
reasons behind the impeachment of Rismaharini were not strong enough (―Surabaya 
deputy mayor tenders resignation‖, 2011). Eventually, the city parliament annulled the 
plan to oust Rismaharini (Hakim, 2011). 
In April 2013, not long after PDS was declared not qualified to run for the 2014 
election, Lekatompessy left PDS and joined Hanura led by former military officer 
Wiranto and was planning to run for the 2014 election under the Hanura‘s flagship 
(―Batal Maju DPD RI‖, 2013; ―DPRan PDS Pertanyakan Posisi Simon Lekatompessy‖, 
2013). His salary as a member of the Surabaya city parliament was suspended since May 
2013, because according to the city regulations parliamentarians are considered 
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withdrawn from their posts if they switch to other political parties (Hakim, 2013). 
However, for some unknown reasons, Lekatompessy later withdrew his plan to run for 
the election under Hanura and decided to return to PDS. PDS, however, has not accepted 
his return because according to the leader of PDS‘s Surabaya branch, as interviewed by 
D-onenews.com (an online Indonesian-language news site based in Surabaya), 
Lekatompessy never cared about the cadres of the party‘s Surabaya branch (―DPRan PDS 
Pertanyakan Posisi Simon Lekatompessy‖, 2013). In other words, leaders of PDS‘s 
Surabaya branch did not like Lekatompessy and therefore refused to let him return to the 
party (―DPRan PDS Pertanyakan Posisi Simon Lekatompessy‖, 2013). To date, there is 
still no news on Lekatompessy‘s next plan.  
Lekatompessy‘s experience shows that he was an ambitious and yet opportunistic 
politician. In order to continue pursuing his political ambition, he chose to leave PDS and 
join Hanura led by the notorious former military officer Wiranto who is still influential in 
the political arena. This has upset leaders of PDS‘s Surabaya branch. But he later 
changed his mind for some unknown reason and decided to return to PDS. No matter 
what reasons that prompted Lekatompessy to switch parties, his action has given the 
impression that he was an opportunistic politician and had no loyalty to any political 
party. In addition, he was not concerned for the safety and good of the masses, nor the 
views of the public but only his own business. 
 
Eddy Gunawan Santoso (吴继平)  
In 2010, Eddy Gunawan Santoso (吴继平 ), an ethnic Chinese businessman 
engaged in the cargo industry and business consultation, was keen to contest in the 
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mayoral election of Surabaya. As a devoted Protestant Christian, Santoso was active in 
the Christian society of his university during his varsity years. Since his graduation, he 
had been active in inter-religious activities. He held important positions in the East Java 
Inter-Religious Harmony Association (Ikatan Kerukunan Umat Beragama Jawa Timur) 
and the Surabaya Inter-Religious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama 
Surabaya). However, according to Wahyu, an economic analyst, Santoso was only 
popular within the local Christian community and not well-known in the wider local 
community in Surabaya. He was also not popular among the local Chinese because he 
never joined any Chinese organisations (Interview with Wahyu, in Indonesia, May 18, 
2011). Suhaimi, a university lecturer, made a similar remark that although Santoso was a 
wealthy businessman, he was not a popular public figure in Surabaya (Interview with 
Suhaimi, in Indonesian, April 27, 2011).  
Santoso revealed that he wanted to contest in the mayoral election because he 
wanted to bring positive changes to the city and do away with all forms of discrimination 
against Indonesian citizens regardless of their ethnicity and class. He was also 
encouraged by some religious leaders in Surabaya to run for the election (Interview with 
Eddy Gunawan Santoso, in Indonesian, May 6, 2011). Santoso was not affiliated with 
any political party at that time and he intended to run as an independent candidate. 
According to Law No. 12/2008 on regional government, for districts or cities with more 
than one million residents, independent candidates keen to run for district head or mayor 
without the nomination of a political party or a coalition of political parties are obliged to 
garner signatures from at least 3 per cent of the residents in their territory. According to a 
news report in Surabaya Post, the population in Surabaya in 2010 was about 2.9 million, 
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which was more than one million. Therefore, each independent mayoral candidate had to 
get at least about 90,000 signatures (3 per cent from the total population) from the 
residents (Arfani, 2010). In my interview with him, Santoso revealed that he managed to 
get about 400,000 signatures from the residents in Surabaya (Interview with Eddy 
Gunawan Santoso, in Indonesian, May 6, 2011). But later he thought it would be difficult 
for him to get elected if he ran for the election as an independent candidate without the 
support of political parties. Thus, he changed his mind and announced that he was keen to 
get the support of political parties to run for the election (―Eddy Gunawan Tunggu 
Pinangan Parpol‖, 2010). Possibly due to his financial status as a wealthy businessman, 
the Surabaya branches of PDS and PD initially offered to nominate Santoso as the deputy 
mayoral candidate (―PDS Gandeng Eddy Gunawan‖, 2010, p. 33; ―PAC Demokrat 
Dukung Eddy Gunawan‖, 2010, p. 30). However, PDS and PD later decided not to 
nominate him because he did not have enough money to ‗pay‘ for the nominations. 
Santoso revealed that PD requested him to pay the party Rp. 50 billion as the ‗nomination 
fee‘ but he rejected the request (Interview in Indonesian, May 6, 2011). At the same time, 
PDS offered the nomination to Fandi Utomo, an indigenous Muslim entrepreneur who 
had allegedly contributed Rp. 5 billion to the party. Having been ‗abandoned‘ by PDS 
and PD, Santoso decided not to run for the mayoral election. (Interview with Eddy 
Gunawan Santoso, in Indonesian, May 6, 2011).  
Without giving up his political ambition, Santoso later joined the Gerindra party 
founded and led by Prabowo Subianto, a former military officer who was accused of 
perpetrating anti-Chinese riots in May 1998. He decided to join the party because he saw 
Prabowo as an influential and powerful leader (Interview with Eddy Gunawan Santoso, 
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in Indonesian, May 6, 2011). Santoso will be running for the Surabaya city parliament in 
2014 under the flagship of Gerindra (―Daftar Calon Sementara‖, n.d.). With regards to 
accusations against Prabowo, Santoso, who was well-connected to Prabowo, defended 
the former military officer by saying that Prabowo was not involved in the anti-Chinese 
riots. According to Santoso, the perpetrators were actually former president Habibie and 
Wiranto, another former military officer, who has been accused of crimes against 
humanity in East Timor. In reporting on a conversation he had with Prabowo, Santoso 
related that Prabowo had said, ―How could I possibly kill the Chinese? My mother is a 
Chinese-Manadonese and I was born from a Chinese‘s womb‖ (Interview with Eddy 
Gunawan Santoso, in Indonesian, May 6, 2011). According to Santoso, Prabowo had also 
told him that he would make the evidence of the involvement of Habibie and Wiranto in 
the anti-Chinese violence known to the public should Habibie and Wiranto ―push him too 
hard [in the political arena]‖ (Interview with Eddy Gunawan Santoso, in Indonesian, May 
6, 2011). Nevertheless, at the time of writing, there is still no concrete evidence that can 
prove the validity of Santoso‘s (and Prabowo‘s) statement regarding Habibie‘s and 
Wiranto‘s involvement in the anti-Chinese violence.  
By joining Prabowo‘s party, therefore, Santoso has chosen to collaborate with a 
controversial former military officer who is influential and powerful in the political arena. 
This indicates that he believes he will be able to achieve his political ambition with the 
help of Prabowo‘s influence and power. It does not matter if Prabowo is accused of 
perpetrating the violence against the Chinese in May 1998 because Santoso believes that 




Dédé Oetomo a.k.a. Oen Tiong Hauw (温忠孝) 
Dédé Oetomo a.k.a. Oen Tiong Hauw (温忠孝) is a pro-reformasi social activist 
and a university lecturer based in Surabaya. He is also a leading activist for LGBT 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) rights in Indonesia. He is popular among local 
Chinese who strongly identify with their ethnic background since he wrote positively 
about Chinese culture and China when he was a columnist of the Surabaya Post in the 
1980s and 1990s. After the end of the New Order regime, he decided to become involved 
in electoral politics in order to ―build a more democratic Indonesia where everyone 
regardless of any identity or status can reach an optimal level of well-being in work, 
education and health‖ (Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, August 12, 2012). 
Oetomo ran for public office for the first time under the banner of the People‘s 
Democratic Party (PRD), a socialist party, in the 1999 election but was not elected 
because as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the party only received 0.07 per cent of the 
total votes, failing to pass the 2 per cent electoral threshold that was required to secure a 
seat in the parliament (Suryadinata, 2002a, p. 223). 
In 2004, Oetomo ran for the East Java regional representative council (DPD), 
whereby members were elected on their individual merits and not based on their party 
affiliation. Oetomo‘s election platform in 2004 focused on the promotion of pluralism in 
the society (Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, August 10, 2012). Although 
candidates for DPD election do not need party backing and thus do not have to pay 
political parties for their nominations, it is by no means less expensive to run for the DPD. 
Members of the DPD represent voters in their province and therefore are elected by 
voters from not only their cities or districts, but also other places in the province. Hence, 
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candidates for DPD election need a great amount of money to campaign throughout their 
province and to hire reliable election witnesses to prevent fraud and irregularities during 
the polling process. According to Oetomo and Hendi Prayogo, a member of Oetomo‘s 
campaign team, a few local Chinese business elites offered to sponsor Oetomo and most 
of them had the motive of getting business favours from him should he get elected 
(Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, December 24, 2010; interview with Hendi 
Prayogo, in Indonesian, March 28, 2011). But Oetomo, like Sofyan Tan who ran for 
mayor of Medan in 2010, made no promises of political favours to anyone who backed 
him. He rejected the approaches of some Chinese businesspeople who he considered to 
be close to corrupt local power-holders and military. He even told a Chinese Indonesian 
tycoon who approached him outright that the latter should not collude with corrupt 
politicians and military to get business favours (Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, 
December 24, 2010). Oetomo spent nearly Rp. 65 million on his election campaign and 
most of the funds were contributed by a well-established local Chinese business elite who 
kept a significant distance from local power-holders and military (Interview with Dédé 
Oetomo, in English, December 24, 2010). 
Oetomo was openly supported by local branches of PSMTI - already mentioned 
as a prominent Chinese Indonesian social association, because he was the advisor of 
PSMTI‘s East Java branch. He was also popular among local Chinese who strongly 
identified with their ethnic background since he could speak and read Mandarin 
(Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, December 24, 2010). Oetomo was also openly 
supported by GAYa Nusantara, a LGBT rights organisation which was founded by him; 
Persatuan Waria Kota Surabaya (PERWAKOS), a waria (male-to-female transgender) 
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organisation in Surabaya; the People‘s Democratic Party (PRD) and the New Indonesia 
Alliance Party (PPIB) (Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, September 24, 2012).  
However, Oetomo was not elected in the election. It was alleged that he could not 
win a seat due to the intentional misrecording of votes he obtained by the parliamentary 
election commission officials (who were bribed by his rivals).
123
 This happened because 
Oetomo did not have enough money to hire enough reliable witnesses to prevent such 
fraud from taking place (Interview with Samas H. Widjaja, in Mandarin, May 5, 2011). 
After failing to get elected in the 2004 election, Oetomo continued to focus on 
fighting for LGBT rights in Indonesia and has not contested in subsequent elections. 
 
Anton Prijatno (王柄金) 
Apart from Dédé Oetomo, Anton Prijatno (王柄金) was another ethnic Chinese 
candidate who contested for the East Java regional representative council (DPD) seat in 
2004 (Li, 2004b, p. 104). He was one of the very few Chinese Indonesian former 
parliamentarians affiliated to Golkar during the Suharto era (Interview with Anton 
Prijatno, in Indonesian, February 24, 2011). As mentioned in Chapter Five, Prijatno left 
Golkar in May 1998 as he was very disappointed with the rampant corruption within the 
New Order regime. He then turned to the asphalt distribution business. According to 
Junus, a university lecturer, due to Prijatno‘s close connection with the governor, his 
business is protected from harassment and extortion by the police. He has also become a 
patron of many well-established Chinese businesses in Surabaya. Chinese businesses 
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 It is also possible that Oetomo was not elected because he is an openly gay man and a LGBT (lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender) rights activist. Many conservative voters might not support him due to his 
sexual orientation and his involvement in fighting for LGBT rights. 
224 
 
under his patronage are free from harassment and extortion by the police (Interview with 
Junus, in Indonesian, January 11, 2011). In addition, Prijatno served as the rector (till 
2003) and later the chairperson of the University of Surabaya (Interview with Anton 
Prijatno, in Indonesian, February 24, 2011). 
In my interview with him, Prijatno revealed that he decided to contest in the 2004 
election in order to serve the people (Interview with Anton Prijatno, in Indonesian, 
February 24, 2011).
124
 It was alleged that he was not popular among Chinese Indonesians 
with a strong ethnic identity because he did not understand Chinese at all and did not join 
any ethnic Chinese organisations (Interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, December 24, 
2010). However, due to his background in politics and business, he was supported by 
many well-established businesspeople. Prijatno was allegedly backed by many wealthy 
Chinese business elites who contributed altogether about Rp. 3.5 billion to his campaign 
fund (Interview with Hendi Prayogo, in Indonesian, March 28, 2011).  
However, Prijatno was not elected in the election. Wahyu, an economic analyst in 
Surabaya, revealed that this was due to Prijatno‘s lack of popularity among rural and 
grassroots communities in East Java (Interview with Wahyu, in Indonesian, May 18, 
2011). He has not contested in subsequent elections. 
 
Sofyan Tan (陈金扬) and Indra Wahidin (黄印华)  
I have already said much about these two interesting and important figures who 
have been very influential in the Chinese community in Medan. I would now like to 
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 It is also possible that he ran for the office in order to gain political protection for his business. 
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discuss more of the background of these two individuals as a way of highlighting the 
tension between different ideas and desires in the Chinese community in Indonesia. 
In the 2004 parliamentary election of Indonesia, two local Chinese Indonesians 
ran for the North Sumatra regional representatives council (DPD).
125
 These two 
candidates were Indra Wahidin (黄印华), the then-chairperson of the Chinese Indonesian 
Association (INTI)‘s North Sumatra branch, and Sofyan Tan (陈金扬), who served in the 
advisory board of the Chinese Indonesian Social Association (PSMTI)‘s North Sumatra 
branch. As discussed in Chapter Four, both INTI and PSMTI are major Chinese 
organisations in Indonesia. Both Tan and Wahidin were not affiliated to any political 
party at that time. Tan decided to contest in the election because he was keen to enter the 
political system without joining any political party and bring changes to the society (Anto, 
2009, pp. 238-239). He also wanted to ―break the political silence within Chinese 
community‖ and ―set an example to show that the Chinese have the right to be elected 
and they do not have to be afraid of politics‖ (Anto, 2009, p. 239, my translation from 
Indonesian original). Wahidin, on the other hand, ran for the office because he wanted to 
try ―something new‖ (mencoba “barang baru”) (Anto, 2009, p. 242, my translation from 
Indonesian original).
126
 It happened that both Wahidin and Tan possessed medical 
degrees but they no longer practised as physicians. Wahidin obtained his medical degree 
from the Islamic University of North Sumatra while Tan graduated from the medical 
school of the Methodist University of Indonesia, Medan (―Calon DPD Sumut No. 12 dr 
Indra Wahidin‖, 2004, p. 24; Anto, 2009, p. 61). As earlier mentioned, Wahidin was an 
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 There were 48 DPD candidates contested in North Sumatra (Pemilu.Asia, n.d.). 
126
 ―Something new‖ refers to the DPD, which was established in 2001 (Crouch, 2010, p. 61).  
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insurance agent while Tan was a social activist and the founder of the Sultan Iskandar 
Muda integrated school in Medan.  
As a well-known Chinese community leader in Medan, Wahidin has been actively 
assisting the provincial government to introduce and promote investment from Malaysia, 
South Korea, Thailand and China. In 2003, he was honoured by the Karo-Batak 
Protestant Church in Medan with a ‗Ginting‘ Karo-Batak surname in recognition of his 
contributions to North Sumatra (Li, 2004a, pp. 337-338). He is also well-connected to 
several political elites and high-ranking military officers, thanks to the six-month training 
he received at the Indonesian National Defense Institute (LEMHANNAS RI- Lembaga 
Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia) in Jakarta in 2001 (Wu, 2009, p. 224; ―Calon 
DPD Sumut No. 12 dr Indra Wahidin‖, 2004, p. 24). In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 
Five, it is alleged that Wahidin is well-connected to gangsters in Medan (Interview with 
Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010).  
Tan, on the other hand, is very popular among many local grassroots indigenous 
Indonesians because he actively promotes inter-ethnic harmony through education work 
and engages in fighting for and safeguarding the interests of SMEs (small and medium 
enterprises) that are dominated by indigenous Indonesians. Although PSMTI and INTI 
always claimed that they took a neutral stance on partisan politics, they openly supported 
and campaigned for their specific candidate, who held important position in their 
organisation. Wahidin was strongly supported by ethnic Chinese from INTI while Tan 
was openly supported by those from PSMTI. As a result, the local Chinese community 
was divided between support for these two Chinese electoral candidates (Interview with 
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According to Wu Yi Guang (2009), although Wahidin was popular among 
political elites and high-ranking military officers in North Sumatra, not many people 
from the grassroots community and working class knew him (p. 221). On the other hand, 
although Tan was an outstanding public speaker and gained strong support from the 
working class, he was not supported by many well-established Chinese business elites. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, running for the DPD is by no means less expensive 
although candidates do not need party backing. Candidates need to conduct massive 
electoral campaigns throughout the province in order to get elected. Since Tan did not get 
much financial support from the local Chinese business community, he could not conduct 
massive electoral campaigns needed to win. His campaign fund was only about Rp. 400 
million, which was much lower than of many other candidates that might reach billions 
of rupiah (Wu, 2009, p. 221; Anto, 2009, pp. 243-244). 
After failing to get elected in the 2004 election, Tan later joined the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan) led by 
former president Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2008. He chose PDI-P because in his view, 
the party ―is more accepting of ethnic Chinese members compared to other political 
parties‖ (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). He was the 
treasurer of PDI-P‘s North Sumatra branch from 2005 to 2010 (Anto, 2009, p. 465). Tan 
was enthusiastic to participate in politics as he was very keen to promote the well-being 
of the people in Medan regardless of their ethno-religious background and end all sorts of 
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 Even if there was only one ethnic Chinese contested for the seat, that alone would not have been 
sufficient to ensure the victory of the Chinese candidate in the race.  
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corruption and malpractice in the bureaucracy. Apart from focusing on his education 
work that promoted inter-ethnic harmony, as already mentioned in Chapter Five, he also 
actively engaged in fighting for and safeguarding the interests of SMEs (small and 
medium enterprises) in Indonesia, that are dominated by pribumis. He was the head of 
National Forum of Small and Medium Enterprises (FORNAS UKM- Forum Nasional 
Usaha Kecil dan Menengah) from 1998 to 2004. FORNAS UKM is a NGO that 
promotes the interests of SMEs in the country, by voicing out against the policies of the 
government and banks that unfairly discriminate against SMEs. Tan assists small and 
medium businesspeople to expand their business network through the programmes of 
FORNAS UKM.  As the head of FORNAS UKM, Tan was instrumental in introducing 
ethnic Chinese businesspeople to indigenous small and medium businesspeople. He also 
managed to get a few Chinese businesspeople to join the leadership of the organisation 
(―Pemilihan Wali Kota Medan Geliat Politik Etnis Tionghoa di Medan‖, 2010). Besides 
that, Tan was also very active in helping poor people from local grassroots community, 
most of whom were pribumis. In my interview with him, Tan felt that his work for the 
poor had made him popular among the pribumis in the city‘s grassroots community 
(Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). In fact, Tan, prior to the 
first round of the 2010 mayoral election, was also honoured by the local Karo-Batak 
community leaders with a ‗Ginting‘ surname. The honour was in recognition of his social 
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 Tan later drew on his ‗Ginting‘ surname when he campaigned in the first round of the 2010 mayoral 
election (Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 2011, p. 43). 
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Contesting against one another in the 2004 DPD elections appeared to have 
destroyed the friendship between Indra Wahidin and Sofyan Tan.
129
 Although neither got 
elected, as mentioned, the tension between the ideals of these two candidates started to 
surface, and their differences in opinions and ideologies drove a wedge in the relationship 
which became even more strained during the later mayoral election of 2010. Tan decided 
to join the election race in order to participate in the country‘s development with all his 
ideas (―Pemilihan Wali Kota Medan Geliat Politik Etnis Tionghoa di Medan‖, 2010). In 
addition, he wanted to ―test the response of the people regarding their acceptance for an 
ethnic Chinese in the nation and character building‖ (Gunawan, 2010). Tan initially was 
nominated as a deputy mayor candidate, pairing with Rahudman Harahap, the incumbent 
acting Medan mayor. At that time both of them agreed to work together in the race under 
the support of Golkar and PDI-P. But four days before the deadline of registration with 
the local election committee, Rahudman left Tan and paired with Dzulmi Eldin, the 
Medan regional secretary.
130
 Both Rahudman and Dzulmi were supported by Golkar and 
PD, the political party of President Yudhoyono. Tan disclosed that Rahudman and 
Dzulmi were paired up under the instruction of Syamsul Arifin, the governor of North 
Sumatra, who was also the chairperson of Golkar‘s North Sumatra branch. Syamsul and 
other leaders in Golkar intended to eliminate any contestant of Chinese origin in the 
mayoral election (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010).  
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 SofyanTan disclosed to me how Wahidin became hostile to him and they were no longer on good terms 
as before after the 2004 elections (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). Moreover, 
three informants confirmed with me that Wahidin did not like Tan (Interview with Farid, in Hokkien, July 
15, 2010; interview with Hasan, in Mandarin, August 19, 2010; interview with Rudy, in Mandarin, August 
25, 2010). In fact, during my fieldwork in Medan, I was advised by a few Chinese Medanese friends not to 
talk about Tan when I interviewed Wahidin. 
130
 According to Law No. 32/2004 on regional government, the regional secretary is in charge of assisting 
the regional head in drawing up policies as well as coordinating regional government offices (dinas daerah) 
and regional technical institutions (lembaga teknis daerah). 
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Subsequently, PDI-P split with Golkar and decided to nominate Tan as a mayoral 
candidate since they believed there was no other better candidate from the party. The 
party managed to get PDS, a party led by Christians, to form a coalition in nominating 
Tan as the mayoral candidate. As mentioned in Chapter One, Tan later decided to pair 
with Nelly Armayanti, a Muslim woman of Minangkabau ethnicity, as the deputy 
mayoral candidate. Armayanti was the former head of the General Elections Commission 
(KPU) of Medan (2003-2008) and also a woman activist. She was a lecturer at the State 
University of Medan (UNIMED) at the time she ran for the election. Tan recounted the 
reasons for choosing Armayanti as his running mate as follows: 
 
I was sure that I would be attacked by the rivals because of my religious 
background [as a non-Muslim]. So I picked a woman with a headscarf. I 
did not mention whether she was a Muslim but people surely would say, 
―Oh, she is a Muslim.‖ And I picked a woman because I thought women 
would probably vote for a woman candidate. 
(Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010) 
 
Armayanti, on the other hand, decided to join the contest together with Tan 
because of her interest in politics and the fact that they shared the same political ideology 
and vision: 
 
When I was still the head of the KPU in Medan, I found that power was 
something very important. […] When we have power, it becomes 
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something very significant for us. We can then come out with various 
policies in public decision-making. […] I have known Dr. Sofyan Tan for 
a long time. We first met and became friends in a NGO. He is also an 
idealist like me. So I know him well. Prior to the mayoral election, he 
asked me to be his running mate and I wondered why did he choose me. 
Then he explained that he was looking for a running mate who was 
different from him in terms of gender and religious background. But the 
most important factor for him in looking for a running mate at that time 
was gender. He said the gender of his running mate must be different from 
his. […] Then I thought both of us had met the person who shared the 
same vision [i.e. committed to bringing positive changes to the society]. 
Both of us had the same will. We joined the race to bring changes to 
Medan. 
(Interview with Nelly Armayanti, in Indonesian, August 12, 2010) 
 
 In short, Tan picked Armayanti in order to draw more votes from Muslim and 
women voters but clearly also because both of them were committed to bringing positive 
changes to the society.  
It should be noted that initially, Wahidin intended to run for the election as well. 
He sought PDS‘s nomination and registered with the party‘s Medan branch as a candidate 
for mayor or deputy mayor (―Daftarkan Diri ke DPC PDS‖, 2010). But later Wahidin 
decided to pull out from the race as he could not get enough support from the members of 
the party and there was ―a lack of basis for cooperation with PDS‖ (Huang, 2010, p. B1, 
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my translation from the original Chinese newspaper commentary article).
131
 In addition, 
some indigenous friends told him that it was still not a good time for an ethnic Chinese to 
run for the mayoral election, as he recounted: 
 
Yes, initially I was keen to participate in the election. But later many of 
my indigenous friends and Islamic religious leaders advised me to 
withdraw as it was still not a good time for me to run for the post. They 
said the indigenous population generally still could not accept an ethnic 
Chinese to be their mayor. Many indigenous Indonesians feel that since 
May 1998, the Chinese already have the freedom to openly express their 
ethnic and cultural identities, to run businesses, and to establish Chinese-
language presses. So, why should we fight for more political power? 
Therefore, I eventually decided to pull out from the contest. 
(Interview with Indra Wahidin, in Mandarin, October 19, 2010) 
 
It can be said that a feeling that there was suspicion and prejudice towards the ethnic 
Chinese from the indigenous Indonesians was one of the important factors behind 
Wahidin‘s pulling out of the race. 
Initially, when Tan became the mayoral candidate, he was concerned that he 
would not have enough money to fund a massive electoral campaign for himself. When 
he had been paired with Rahudman, many wealthy businesspeople offered to sponsor the 
pair since Rahudman as incumbent was deemed as having a higher chance of winning. 
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 My understanding of the phrase ―a lack of basis for cooperation with PDS‖ is that since most members 
of the PDS did not support the nomination of Wahidin as a candidate for the mayoral election, there was no 
basis for him to cooperate with the party. 
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But later when they found that he would not pair with Rahudman, those businesspeople 
withdrew their offers and channelled their support for Rahudman-Eldin. As Tan 
recounted: 
 
I did not want to be the number one candidate [mayoral candidate] 
because I knew I would need a large amount of money to campaign.
132
 
When I was nominated to be the number one candidate, I was not happy 
but sad because all the people [wealthy businesspeople] had left me. No 
[well-established] businesspeople supported me because they believed I 
would lose. […] I did not borrow money from other people. If I was paired 
with Rahudman, I am sure I would win and all people would give us their 
money. [Initially, when Golkar intended to pair Rahudman with me], one 
of them said, ―Wow, I will sponsor you with Rp. 15 billion!‖ But later 
when he knew that I would not pair with Rahudman […], he just 
disappeared! I tried to call him but could not get through. 
(Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010) 
 
According to a news report, Tan initially did consider pulling out from the race 
but later changed his mind after getting encouragement from his family, ―At that time, I 
really wanted to withdraw from the nomination. But my eldest daughter told me that the 
biggest mistake a person makes is that he or she never tries‖ (Cited in ―Tokoh Thionghoa 
Salut Kepada Sofyan Tan‖, 2010, my translation from Indonesian). 
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 Here, the number one candidate refers to mayoral candidate while deputy mayoral candidate is known as 




Tan recalled how he tried his very best to campaign for himself despite the lack of 
funds in the first round of the election:  
 
People ridiculed me by uttering words like ―Forget it, just withdraw from 
the race. You won‘t win‖. How did I respond? I woke up every morning 
and walked to traditional markets. I greeted women in shabby and stinking 
clothes. I greeted the hawkers, shoppers, trishaw drivers, people who lived 
beside railway tracks, people who lived at slums, trash areas and along 
rivers. I could stand it! I often appeared dirty with bad smell when I went 
home then. […] Wealthy Chinese organised campaign events for 
Rahudman, Maulana Pohan and Ajib Shah in hotels and restaurants 
because they were confident that these candidates would win. But they 
never held such events for me [in the first round]. [PSMTI] did help in 
campaigning for me but they did not have enough money. So we could 
only have simple and moderate campaigns.  
(Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian,August 23, 2010) 
 
The local Chinese in Medan were once again divided in their support to Tan. 
PSMTI actively campaigned for Tan and mobilised the Chinese voters while INTI‘s 
members led by Wahidin, his long-time rival, openly supported Ajib Shah. Shah was an 
indigenous Indonesian, and used to be the head of the North Sumatra branch of the 
Pancasila Youth (PP- Pemuda Pancasila), an influential youth/crime organisation in the 
province. Besides that, Tan also received financial support from the Tan (surname) Clan 
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Associations in Medan and Jakarta (Interview with Halim, in Indonesian, July 26, 2010). 
According to Halim, a NGO activist in Medan, Tan was also supported by many 
indigenous social activists and intellectuals with a progressive mindset because they saw 
him as the ―symbol of change‖. In contrast, Rahudman was generally perceived as a New 
Order bureaucrat and the symbol of the entrenchment of the old oligarchy-style 
bureaucrats. Thus, voters who wanted change did not support him (Interview with Halim, 
in Indonesian, July 26, 2010).  
During the electoral campaign, Tan promised to pay more attention to people 
from the lower class. He also promised to provide loans for local SMEs as well as 
simplify the application procedures for the loans if he was elected. He stated his 
commitment to improve the urban infrastructure such as electricity, water supply and 
roads in Medan so that the city would be as progressive as Penang in Malaysia (Xiao, 
2010, pp. M1-M2).  
In the first round of the mayoral election which was held on May 12, 2010, there 
were 10 pairs of candidates and Tan was the only Chinese contestant. Tan-Armayanti 
unexpectedly defeated eight other candidate pairs by gaining 140,676 votes (20.72 per 
cent). Rahudman-Eldin received the highest votes, i.e. 150,671 (22.20 per cent).
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Aspinall and colleagues, in an analysis of this election, point out that the result was 
probably due to the split of the Muslim community‘s vote because of the large number of 
candidates (Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 2011, p. 46). Since none of the pairs gained 
the 30 per cent minimum of the total valid votes, a second round of polls was needed and 
both Rahudman-Eldin and Tan-Armayanti were qualified to enter the second round 
(Edward, 2010). According to Aspinall et al. (2011, p. 45), Tan-Armayanti gained a 
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 I obtained this data from the General Elections Commission (KPU) of Medan. 
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majority vote in 11 kecamatans, i.e. Medan Area, Medan Kota, Medan Maimum, Medan 
Sunggal, Medan Petisah, Medan Barat, Medan Timur, Medan Perjuangan, Medan 
Polonia, Medan Baru and Medan Tuntungan.
134
 In most of these districts, the Chinese are 
the largest or second largest ethnic group. In fact, the pair managed to defeat Sigit 
Pramono Asrie who paired with Nuslisa Ginting, a Batak Karo candidate, in Medan 
Sunggal, which was a Batak Karo area (―Pemilihan Wali Kota Medan Geliat Politik Etnis 
Tionghoa di Medan‖, 2010). 
Tan disclosed that after entering the second round, many wealthy businesspeople 
began to offer sponsorship to him as they believed he had a chance to win: 
 
[Originally,] many people did not expect that I could contest against 
Rahudman in the second round. Therefore, I received very little funds 
[from businesspeople] in the first round. In the second round, I began to 
get more funds. Many people gave [me their money]. People began to see 
there was hope [for me to win] because all trishaw drivers and parking 
attendants said they would vote for Sofyan Tan to make change.  
(Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010) 
 
These businesspeople included a well-established real estate tycoon in the city. Tan 
disclosed that these businesspeople intended to fund him and his running mate in order to 
obtain business favours if the pair was elected in the second round (Interview with 
Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). But as I mentioned earlier in the opening 
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 I obtained this data from the General Elections Commission (KPU) of Medan. There were 21 
kecamatans in Medan. Rahudman-Eldin gained a majority vote in nine kecamatans while Ajib Shah-Binsar 
Situmorang won in one kecamatan. 
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story of Chapter One, Tan rejected financial offers from businesspeople who hoped to get 
business favours from him. Tan openly claimed that if he won and became the mayor, he 
would not be involved in corruption, collusion and nepotism. Therefore, he would not 
grant any business favours to businesspeople who sponsored him during the election. 
(Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). Furthermore, on one 
occasion, Tan even displayed a gallows to the audience and claimed that he was ready to 
be hanged if he was found guilty of corrupt practices (―Zao Shi Hui Ren Chao Ru Yong‖, 
2010, p. 1; ―Pendukung Pasangan No 10 ‗Menyemut‘ di Lapangan Merdeka‖, 2010, p. 6). 
According to Armayanti, the campaign fund for the candidate pair was Rp. 5 
billion in the first round and Rp. 8 billion in the second round (Interview with Nelly 
Armayanti, in Indonesian, August 12, 2010). There were some Chinese businesspeople 
who offered genuine support to Tan without expecting any business favours in return. For 
instance, two prominent wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs, Djuandi, who runs a food and 
beverage production company and is also the chairperson of PSMTI‘s North Sumatra 
branch, and Rudy, who is engaged in the metal-grinding industry, openly supported and 
campaigned for Tan (Interview with Eddy Djuandi, in Mandarin, August 25, 2010; 
interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). According to Djuandi, Tan 
used to be the advisor of PSMTI‘s North Sumatra branch. Djuandi had known Tan for a 
long time and found that the latter was knowledgeable and capable enough to be a 
political leader. Therefore, Djuandi decided to support and campaign for him together 
with other members of the organisation (Interview with Eddy Djuandi, in Mandarin, 
August 25, 2010). In addition, Tan-Armayanti were also supported by several local 
Chinese small and medium businesspeople who did not ask for ‗kick-backs‘ or other 
238 
 
business privileges in return (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010; 
interview with Nelly Armayanti, in Indonesian, August 12, 2010; interview with Halim, 
in Indonesian, July 26, 2010). In addition, my informant Erik, a local Chinese 
businessperson engaged in iron and plastics industry, claimed that he had made the 
highest financial contribution to Tan-Armayanti, but kept a low profile and remained in 
the background during the election (Interview with Erik, in Mandarin, August 25, 2010). 
Both Rudy and Erik decided to support Tan because they perceived Tan as an honest and 
clean politician. They believed he would be able to bring positive changes to Medan if he 
got elected (Interview with Rudy, in Mandarin, August 25, 2010; interview with Erik, in 
Mandarin, August 25, 2010). Both Djuandi, Rudy and Erik decided to support Tan who 
made no promise of political favours to his supporters because they saw the promotion of 
good governance as more important than their personal interests. They had therefore used 
their free will to challenge the existing muddy and corrupt political environment.   
Tan perceived Rudy as a good and honest Chinese big businessman. During his 
electoral campaign, Rudy told Tan not to allocate any state project to him if he got 
elected. He only demanded Tan not to commit corruption and bring disgrace to the 
Chinese community. He also requested Tan to create more employment opportunities to 
the grassroots community in Medan which comprised mainly pribumis in order to 
improve their living conditions. He believed that when the pribumis enjoy better living 
conditions, they will not be hostile to the ethnic Chinese who have often been seen as 
wealthier than the pribumis (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). 
Tan-Armayanti‘s second place in the first round and thus their entry into the 
second round had not been expected by most of their rivals. The second round saw the 
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contest between a Muslim candidate who was an incumbent and a non-Muslim Chinese 
candidate who was ―a relative political outsider‖ (Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 2011, 
p. 46). According to my interview with Armayanti (Interview in Indonesian, August 12, 
2010) as well as Aspinall et al. (2011, pp. 29-30, 46-51), the second round of the election 
saw the dramatic escalation of communal tension and increased emphasis on religious 
identity. Tan‘s non-Muslim background became the target of attack for his opponents. 
Rahudman‘s campaign teams and supporters, including leaders of the Council of 
Indonesian Islamic Scholars (MUI- Majelis Ulama Indonesia) and a few famous Muslim 
preachers, undermined Tan‘s legitimacy as a mayoral candidate by manipulating 
religious identity. They launched a concerted campaign urging Muslim voters to support 
Rahudman, claiming it was against the teachings of Islam to vote for a kafir (infidel) 
(Interview with Yopie, in Indonesian, July 27, 2010; interview with Halim, in Indonesian, 
July 26, 2010; interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). The 
Rahudman camp even used the city‘s mosques to spread such messages. According to 
Yopie, a lecturer at the University of North Sumatra, on every Friday prior to polling day, 
preachers at many of the city‘s mosques called upon Muslims to vote for a Muslim 
candidate (Interview with Yopie, in Indonesian, July 27, 2010). Many Muslim voters who 
were conservative were influenced by such propaganda and decided not to support Tan 
(Interview with Yopie, in Indonesian, July 27, 2010; interview with Halim, in Indonesian, 
July 26, 2010). It is also possible that conservative Muslims did not support Tan-
Armayanti because they were not happy with a woman running for public office. In 
addition, according to Tan, local Muslims were intimidated by rumours that if Tan was 
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elected, he would turn Medan into a ‗Chinatown‘ and build many Chinese temples 
instead of mosques (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). 
In response to Rahudman‘s campaign, Tan‘s campaign team came out with a 
campaign that aimed to portray Tan as a pluralist figure (Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 
2011, p. 49). Most controversially, they had photographs taken of Tan with Islamic 
preachers who wore peci (a cap widely worn by Muslim men in Indonesia) and long 
robes, and used them extensively in the campaign. Nevertheless, according to Usman, a 
NGO activist in Medan, as well as Aspinall et al., the use of these photographs backfired 
as many voters felt that Tan manipulated religious symbols for political motives 
(Interview with Usman, in Indonesian, July 30, 2010; Aspinall, Dettman & Warburton, 
2011, p. 49). Usman further commented: 
 
Then he [Sofyan Tan] took photographs with a few Islamic preachers, 
right? Some of the preachers were, excuse me, not known to the public in 
many places. These were ‗ustaz dadakan‘. 135  They suddenly became 
preachers. [They were] ‗ustaz tukang‘.136 Yes, for political ends, all of a 
sudden I wear a peci and a long robe. I can become [such a] preacher too. 
There are many of these people nowadays in Indonesia. […] For me, this 
is fatal. […] The Sofyan camp was trapped [with such religious issues]. 
They enlarged the photos and put them on billboards and around the city. 
[Tan was seen] [s]haking hands with those preachers [in the photos]. 
                                                 
135
 The expression refers to Islamic preachers who were previously not known to many people but appeared 
―all of a sudden‖. 
136
 In Indonesia, ‗uztaz tukang‘ refers to people who are paid to disguise themselves as preachers, usually 
for political reasons. There is no direct English equivalent for this term. It can be translated as ‗instant 
preachers‘, which has the nearest meaning. 
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Many people found these photos very strange. [The preachers] [j]ust 
appeared all of a sudden. As if they were forced to [take photos with Tan 
in that way]. It looked so unnatural.
137
 
(Interview with Usman, in Indonesian, July 30, 2010) 
 
Usman‘s comments indicate that the strategy of Sofyan Tan‘s camp to counter the attacks 
from the Rahudman camp was apparently ineffective, as it upset many voters who had no 
knowledge of the preachers in these photos. 
Moreover, Halim and Usman, two local NGO activists in Medan, disclosed that 
although Tan was popular among many pribumis in the grassroots community, most 
pribumi urban voters in the city did not support him due to his being ethnic Chinese. In 
their views, the ethnic Chinese had considerable domination of the economy and they 
were afraid that if Tan was elected, the Chinese would become more powerful both in the 
economy and politics, and this would subsequently threaten the position of the pribumis 
(Interview with Halim, in Indonesian, July 26, 2010; interview with Usman, in 
Indonesian, July 30, 2010). In fact, prior to the polling day, a Chinese Indonesian who 
worked in a local Chinese-language press heard some racist remarks against Tan on a 
public minivan in the city: 
 
I remember during the election period, one evening, as usual, I took a 
public minivan to go home after work. Then I suddenly heard an 
indigenous passenger angrily utter, ―The Chinese are indeed greedy. They 
have controlled the economy and now they want to control the political 
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 Unfortunately I did not have an opportunity to see the photos. The photos are also not included in 
Aspinall and colleagues‘ article (2011) on the mayoral election. 
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arena as well. This is terrible! We must not support the Chinese candidate 
in the coming mayoral election!‖   
(Personal communication with Janice, in Mandarin, November 12, 2010) 
 
According to Usman, the racial prejudice against the Chinese among the pribumis 
was so great that during the campaign activities, some pribumis were unhappy when they 
heard ethnic Chinese members of Tan‘s team speaking in Hokkien: 
 
In a few public events, such as visiting patients who were fire victims in 
hospitals […] they [members of Tan‘s team] spoke Hokkien and some 
non-Chinese heard it. I think they did not purposely speak the language [in 
public] but even if they only uttered a very few words in Hokkien, the 
consequences were serious. After that, I heard some non-Chinese 
commenting, ―These people have not come into power but they are 
already bold enough to speak Chinese wherever they like.‖  
(Interview with Usman, in Indonesian, July 30, 2010) 
 
 
In addition, although Tan was supported by many Chinese voters in the first round, 
data from my field study implied that he was actually not very popular among some local 
Chinese with a strong ethnic identity. In the views of these Chinese, Tan identified 
himself more with the indigenous population than with the Chinese community. As a 




Sofyan Tan‘s biggest mistake is that prior to his participation in the 
mayoral election, he never established a close relationship with the local 
Chinese community in Medan although he held an advisory position in 




in Hokkien, July 15, 2010). 
 
It was also alleged that Tan was ideologically an assimilationist and this made 
him unfavourable in the eyes of some Chinese in Medan. Another informant pointed out, 
―Sofyan Tan advocated for the assimilation of the Chinese population into the indigenous 
communities. He shared the same ideology with Junus Jahja. Therefore, many Chinese 
did not like him and did not support him in the mayoral election‖ (Interview with The Lie 
Hok, in Mandarin, October 31, 2010).
138
 As already mentioned in Chapter Two, Junus 
Jahja is one of the key figures of the assimilation movement in the 1960s. His open 
advocation for the assimilation of the Chinese had upset some Chinese Indonesians, 
especially those with a strong ethnic identity. 
Moreover, according to a journalist of Yazhou Zhoukan (《亚洲周刊》 ), a 
Chinese-language international affairs magazine, when anti-Chinese riots broke out in 
Indonesia in May 1998, Tan openly expressed his disapproval of China‘s intervention as 
he deemed it as a domestic matter. This upset many Chinese Indonesians who considered 
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 But it should be noted that Tan‘s advocacy for Chinese assimilation was probably made prior to his 
candidacy in the mayoral election and not during the mayoral election as the presses did not report any such 
remarks during the election period. After all, it would be unwise for Tan to promote such an ideology 
during the election as he needed the support from the local Chinese community. Anyway, given that 
Chinese assimilation is a sensitive issue among Chinese with a strong ethnic identity, many Chinese could 
not forget Tan‘s advocacy for the idea although it took place earlier prior to the election. 
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China as their cultural motherland and thought China should express her concern for the 
Chinese victims in Indonesia. They still could not forgive Tan on this matter (Lin, 2010, 
p. 30).  
A commentary article in Guo Ji Ri Bao even stated that  
 
[Sofyan Tan] is a controversial figure in the Chinese community. 
Therefore, local Chinese who did not vote at all on the day of the election 
were actually also making their choice [as there were no suitable 
candidates whom they wanted to support]. It does not necessarily mean 
that they were politically apathetic. 
(Ming, 2010, p. B1, my translation from Chinese original) 
 
The ambivalent feelings toward Tan within the Chinese community reflect, 
therefore, the diversity of ideas of the Chinese in Medan. Although Tan was the only 
ethnic Chinese mayoral candidate, some Chinese refused to support him because he was 
very close to the indigenous population, but not to the Chinese community. In addition, 
some Chinese with a strong ethnic identity considered Tan as culturally ‗not Chinese 
enough‘ because he spoke Indonesian instead of Hokkien with his family members and 
did not identify China as his cultural motherland. Moreover, he allegedly advocated for 
the assimilation of the Chinese population into the indigenous population years ago and 
this had upset many Chinese in Medan. But at the same time, there were also Chinese, 
including leaders and members of PSMTI, who strongly supported and campaigned for 
Tan because he was the advisor of the North Sumatra branch of that organisation. 
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Moreover, they saw Tan as an honest and clean politician. To them, the relatively ‗weak‘ 
ethnic identity of Tan was not an issue. 
Many local wealthy Chinese businesspeople did not support Tan because of two 
reasons. First, Tan came from a poor family and was not part of the Chinese business 
elite community in Medan. Therefore, he was not very popular among local Chinese 
business elites in the city (Interview with Halim, in Indonesian, July 26, 2010). Second, 
Tan refused to grant business favours to businesspeople who funded him should he get 
elected in the election. As a result, many Chinese businesspeople who intended to get 
business favours and patronage from local power-holders decided not to support Tan who 
would not help and protect them in their business (Interview with Daniel, in Indonesian, 
July 13, 2010). 
In addition, some Chinese did not support Tan because they were not confident 
that Tan, as an ethnic Chinese, would be able to work with local government officials, 
who were mostly indigenous Indonesians, effectively (Interview with Daniel, in 
Indonesian, July 13, 2010). A reader of a local Chinese-language press in an opinion 
piece disclosed the remarks related to such concerns that he or she encountered, 
―Baseless rumours in coffee shops [that I heard]: ‗If the Chinese [Sofyan Tan] was 
elected, if anything goes wrong, all Chinese will be in trouble. A Chinese mayor is unable 
to lead non-Chinese government officials‘ (―Jing Xuan Zhong De Feng Yu‖, 2010, p. M1, 
my translation from Chinese original). It seems that the rumours that the author of this 
opinion piece heard led him or her to believe that if a Chinese mayor made a mistake, all 
Chinese in the city would be blamed. In other words, if something happens that people do 
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not like about one Chinese, then all Chinese become victims, an idea held also by Indra 
Wahidin as mentioned in Chapter Four. 
In short, not all Chinese in Medan found favour with Tan. Indeed, during my 
interview with Christianto Wibisono (黄建国), a noted Chinese Indonesian economist in 
Jakarta, prior to the polling day of the second round, he frankly told me that he was not 
confident Tan would be elected as not all Chinese in Medan supported him (Interview 
with Christianto Wibisono, in English, June 18, 2010). 
Prior to the polling day, many Chinese voters were also intimidated by rumours 
and mobile phone text messages that warned if Tan won the election, there would be riots 
in the city against the Chinese (Interview with Brilian Moktar, in Mandarin, July 16, 
2010; interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010; interview with Ivan, in 
Hokkien, July 16, 2010; interview with Rudy, in Mandarin, August 25, 2010; interview 
with Hasan, in Mandarin, August 19, 2010). The rumours and text messages were mostly 
spread by Tan‘s competitors but it was alleged that some of them were also sent out by 
local Chinese who disliked Tan (Interview with Rudy, in Mandarin, August 25, 2010; 
interview with Hasan, in Mandarin, August 19, 2010). Many Chinese were frightened and 
did not vote for Tan on polling day, or did not vote at all. According to Eddy Djuandi, the 
chairperson of PSMTI‘s North Sumatra branch, who observed the polling process with 
other leaders and activists of the organisation, there were probably only 30 to 40 per cent 
of the Chinese who came out to cast their votes in the second round (Interview with Eddy 
Djuandi, in Mandarin, August 25, 2010). Aspinall et al. (2011) also note that there was ―a 
lower turnout in booths in Chinese districts that had voted strongly for Sofyan in round 
one‖ (p. 52). 
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It was also alleged that there were a lot of violations and irregularities committed 
by the Rahudman camp, who were mainly bureaucrats of the local government in Medan. 
They bribed all kecamatan and kelurahan heads and instructed them to ensure that 
Rahudman-Eldin won in their kecamatans and kelurahans. Otherwise they would be 
removed from their position. According to a newspaper report and also mentioned in an 
interview with Sofyan Tan, many voters in the kecamatans where Tan-Armayanti gained 
most votes in the first round were consequently de-listed and could not vote in the second 
round of the election (Hutabarat, 2010, p. 2; interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, 
August 23, 2010). In addition, according to Budiman P. Nadapdap, the head of Tan‘s 
campaign team, all kecamatan and kelurahan heads in the city received a mobile phone 
text message from H. M. Fitryus, the regional secretary of Medan, which sounded, ―Demi 
menjaga nama besar Partai Demokrat-Golkar, demi menjaga nama baik Presiden SBY 
dan Gubernur Syamsul Arifin, maka kami meminta agar memenangkan Rahudman-Eldin 
pada Pilkada 19 Juni 2010‖ (For the sake of the reputation of Democratic Party-Golkar, 
President SBY [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] and Governor Syamsul Arifin, we request 
you to ensure the victory of Rahudman-Eldin in the mayoral election on June 19, 2010) 
(―KPU Medan dan Panwas Dituding Berpihak ke Pasangan Rahudman-Eldin‖, 2010, p. 6, 
my translation from Indonesian original). Tan disclosed that in fact, two witnesses from 
PDI-P who were supposed to inspect the polling process were bribed by his rival‘s camp. 
Tan had paid each of them Rp. 100,000 to inspect the polling process but later they were 
bribed Rp. 300,000 respectively by the rival‘s camp to ―disappear‖ from the polling 
station and thus did not prevent fraud from taking place (Interview with Sofyan Tan, in 
Indonesian, August 23, 2010).  
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Eventually, Tan-Armayanti lost in the second round of the race. They only 
received 251,435 votes (34.12 per cent) while Rahudman-Eldin gained 485,446 votes 
(65.88 per cent). The former only managed to win in four kecamatans, i.e. Medan 
Tuntungan, Medan Baru, Medan Sunggal and Medan Petisah.
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PDI-P and Tan‘s campaign team later filed a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court 
on June 24, 2010, citing rampant violations and irregularities during the campaign period 
and on polling day. But three of their key witnesses, i.e. the heads of Medan Tuntungan 
and Medan Baru as well as an officer at the mayor office, did not turn up to testify 
(Hutabarat, 2010, p. 2). According to Tan, the witnesses were ‗kidnapped‘ (meaning to 
say they were bribed) by people who did not want them to testify in court (Interview with 
Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010). Eventually, the court turned down the 
lawsuit on July 20, 2010 (―MK Tolak Gugatan Sofyan Tan‖, 2010, p. 7). It is worth 
noting that Rahudman later removed a few kecamatan and kelurahan heads who were 
deemed to have failed to ensure his victory in their districts. They were the heads of 
Medan Baru, Medan Tuntungan, Medan Polonia, Medan Barat, and Aur (a kelurahan 
under Medan Maimun) (―Dinilai Tidak Dukung Saat Pilkada‖, 2010, p. 6). Tan-
Armayanti gained a majority vote in these kecamatans and kelurahans during the first or 
second round of the election. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Tan lost in the second round because of the 
multiple factors associated with the position of the Chinese in Indonesia: low turnout 
among ethnic Chinese voters (and also the fact that not all Chinese supported him), the 
lack of support from the Muslim indigenous community, and massive electoral fraud. Tan, 
however, was not disappointed with the result, since he had managed to enter into the 
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second round of the race, because he had initially defeated the other eight pairs. Despite 
the defeat, he was happy that to a certain extent, his participation in the race, especially in 
the first round, had indicated a reduction of anti-Chinese antagonism among pribumis: 
 
I felt that I had won when I was able to enter the second round. I was 
satisfied as I had partially achieved the objective of reducing the hostility 
toward the Chinese. [After entering into the second round,] I began to 
campaign in villages and poor areas, where the residents tended to hate 
and kill the Chinese when riots broke out.
140
 [The circumstances had] 
[c]hanged. I won in strongholds of PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, which 
was the Islamic party. I think this was amazing because it clearly showed 
that the Chinese had become more acceptable to indigenous communities. 
What happens today should become an example and model for Chinese in 
Indonesia. [They should] [d]o the same as me so that they will be free 
from being killed or hated. That is my advice. 
(Interview with Sofyan Tan, in Indonesian, August 23, 2010)  
 
Indeed his idealism has not disappeared, nor his political ambition; Tan has 
registered to run for the national parliament in the 2014 election under PDI-P (―Daftar 
Calon Tetap 2014-2019: Sumatera Utara I‖, 2013). 
The process of the 2010 Medan‘s mayoral election clearly shows that due to the 
relatively lack of democratic behaviour among state and societal actors, Indonesia‘s 
formal democratic institutions remain vulnerable to patrimonial manipulation by 
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250 
 
entrenched and well-financed elites. In the opinion of a university lecturer, the election 
also shows that identity politics that focused upon race, ethnicity and religion are still 
very influential among Indonesians (Interview with Yopie, in Indonesian, July 27, 2010). 
Although Tan was popular among many pribumis from the grassroots community, most 
of pribumis from other social classes in Medan, especially those who were conservative 
Muslims, still could not accept a non-indigenous Indonesian to be their leader. This factor 
also prompted Wahidin to pull out of the race. Therefore, the mayoral election implies 
that despite the opening up of an open and liberal democratic environment in post-1998 
Indonesia, it is still not easy for ethnic Chinese Indonesians to make a significant 
breakthrough in electoral politics. 
The mayoral election also reflects the diversity of ideas of the Chinese community 
in Medan. Some Chinese with a strong ethnic identity did not support Tan because they 
considered him as not ‗Chinese‘ enough and not close to the Chinese community. They 
were also upset with Tan‘s alleged advocacy of assimilation of the Chinese into the 
indigenous society. However, at the same time, there were also Chinese who perceived 
Tan as an honest and clean politician despite his relatively ‗weak‘ ethnic identity. Thus, 
they fully supported and even campaigned for him. 
 
The stories of the above mentioned Chinese Indonesian politicians imply that 
Chinese Indonesians made use of the liberal and democratic political environment in the 
post-New Order era to become actively involved in electoral politics. Politicians with 
high political ideals such as Tan and Oetomo ran for elections in order to bring positive 
changes to Indonesian society. They also tried to do away with the corrupt and 
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opportunistic role the Chinese have in politics behind the scenes by rejecting financial 
offers from Chinese businesspeople who expected political favours in return. At the same 
time, however, the rise in electoral campaign costs means that without having a great 
amount of money, it is difficult for a Chinese Indonesian politician to have a chance to 
run for public office or get elected in elections. Santoso‘s failure in getting nominated by 
political parties to run for Surabaya‘s mayoral election clearly shows that without having 
enough money, a politician would not even have a chance to run for public office. 
Besides that, Chinese Indonesian electoral candidates who encountered smear campaigns 
attacking their ethnicity and religious backgrounds (such as Tan during the 2010 Medan‘s 
mayoral election) needed to conduct more campaign activities to counter those attacks. 
All these needed money. Chinese Indonesians who were keen to enter electoral politics 
had no choice but to abide by such new rules of Indonesia‘s political game. In order to 
achieve breakthroughs in electoral politics, some Chinese electoral candidates received 
financial support from Chinese businesspeople who expected political protection and 
other benefits in return. In this way, Chinese businesspeople established corrupt and 
patrimonial relationships with aspiring Chinese politicians in exchange for political 
favours for their business. Some Chinese businesspeople became directly involved in 
politics and contested in elections with the aim to gain political protection for their 
business. Some of them like Lekatompessy allegedly resorted to money politics during 
their campaigns. This has in turn reproduced the predatory characteristics of Indonesian 




It is also interesting to note that according to the stories of Chinese Indonesian 
politicians I discussed above, only Sofyan Tan experienced attacks for being Chinese 
from his opponents during the 2010 mayoral election in Medan. Indra Wahidin also 
encountered suspicion and prejudice from indigenous Indonesians when he intended to 
contest in the same mayoral election. The experience of Tan and Wahidin is similar with 
that of Christiandy Sanjaya, the ethnic Chinese deputy gubernatorial candidate who was 
paired with a Dayak during the gubernatorial election in November 2007. Sanjaya was 
elected and became the first ethnic Chinese deputy governor of West Kalimantan. As 
already mentioned in Chapter One, the Malays, the second largest indigenous group after 
the Dayaks in West Kalimantan, were upset that they had been denied representation in 
the highest office of the province. Later, riots broke out in Pontianak, the capital of West 
Kalimantan, in which Malay rioters attacked and vandalised properties owned by Chinese 
Indonesians. The riots were an externalisation of anger and disappointment of the Malays 
who had experienced electoral defeat due to the increasing political ascendancy of the 
Chinese. However, other Chinese Indonesian politicians running for legislative office that 
I mentioned above, i.e. Hasyim, Simon Lekatompessy, Dédé Oetomo and Anton Prijatno, 
did not encounter attacks for being ethnic Chinese from their opponents during the 
election period. This might be due to the fact that legislators only have legislative power 
and are not as powerful as mayors/deputy mayors and governors/deputy governors who 
hold executive power. Hence, the indigenous Indonesians did not feel so threatened if 
Chinese were to contest for legislative office. Thus, one can suggest that Chinese 
Indonesians running for legislative office face less racial hostility from the indigenous 
Indonesians compared to those running for regional or local government heads. Hence, it 
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is relatively easier for a Chinese Indonesian to be elected as a legislator than as a regional 
or local government head.  
On the other hand, the affiliation of Chinese Indonesian politicians to different 
political parties clearly demonstrates the heterogeneous political views of the Chinese as 
well as the presence of both pro-reform and pro-predatory forces within local Chinese 
communities in both cities. Chinese politicians who were reform-minded such as Tan and 
Hasyim chose to join PDI-P, a major political party that was relatively less connected to 
the predatory forces incubated under the New Order regime. However, at the same time, 
there were also Chinese politicians who were willing to be part of political parties that 
were led by former generals implicated in human rights violations (such as Gerindra and 
Hanura) in order to pursue their personal agendas and political ambitions. To them, those 
predatory forces were still very influential and powerful in Indonesia‘s political arena. 
Hence, they believed they would have the chance to achieve breakthroughs in politics if 
they cooperated with these predatory forces. By establishing close connections with 
predatory forces, these Chinese politicians have played a significant role in reproducing 
and perpetuating the negative perceptions of the Chinese as a corrupt and opportunistic 




This chapter has discussed the new democratic environment in post-Suharto 
Indonesia and the active agency of Chinese Indonesians in engaging in electoral politics 
in Medan and Surabaya. The advent of a democratic and liberal political environment has 
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led to the involvement of several Chinese Indonesians in both cities in electoral politics. 
Such political activism was unimaginable during the New Order era.  
In general, there are two kinds of Chinese Indonesian politicians. Some are 
reform-minded and have admirable political ideals. They get involved in politics in order 
to push for positive changes in Indonesia by fighting against corruption, collusion and 
nepotism in state institutions as well as all forms of discrimination. However others 
become actively involved in politics with the aim of gaining political protection for their 
business. Such politicians are not concerned about the interests of the general public. As I 
have mentioned earlier, these different political behaviours and political views are due to 
different habitus of Chinese Indonesian politicians. Those with anti-corruption political 
ideals are mostly social activists who are not well endowed with money, whereas those 
who get involved in politics for their personal agendas are mostly well-established 
businesspeople. In the face of the explosion of costs for election campaigning since the 
advent of democratisation, very few Chinese Indonesian politicians with high political 
ideals get elected in elections because they often reject financial offers from Chinese 
Indonesian businesspeople who expect political favours from them. As a result, they 
could not fund the massive electoral campaigns needed to get elected, nor hire reliable 
election witnesses to prevent fraud and irregularities during the polling process. In other 
words, their political ideals were undermined by economic clout. Conversely, those 
getting involved in politics for personal oriented agendas often have a higher chance to 
get elected into office because they have the money to launch extensive campaign 
activities to influence voters. In order to pursue their political ambitions, some of these 
politicians even join political parties that are associated with the predatory forces 
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incubated under the New Order regime. The marginalisation of genuine reform-minded 
Chinese Indonesian politicians and the rise of Chinese Indonesian politicians with 
personal oriented agendas is an enigma of electoral politics in post-Suharto Indonesia. 
The explosion of costs for election campaigning has also created opportunities for 
some Chinese Indonesian businesspeople to offer financial backing to electoral 
candidates who are deemed as having a higher chance to be elected into office with the 
motive of getting political favours in return. They prefer to establish corrupt and 
patrimonial relationships with politicians in exchange for patronage and other benefits for 
their business. Thus, they have been playing an instigating role in money politics. This 
has consequently perpetuated the corrupt and predatory characteristics of Indonesian 
politics, as well as reinforced the perceptions of the Chinese as corrupt and opportunistic. 
I argue that the tensions between the anti-corruption political ideals of certain Chinese 
Indonesian politicians and the more collusive personal agendas of some Chinese 
Indonesian businesspeople who supported them or who became themselves involved in 
electoral politics have made the democratisation process and the dynamics of electoral 
politics in Indonesia more complex. 
It is also worth noting that despite the opening up of a democratic political 
environment in post-Suharto Indonesia, it is still not easy for Chinese Indonesians to 
make a significant breakthrough in electoral politics, especially when they run for 
executive positions as regional or local government heads which have more power than 
members of legislative offices. Indigenous Indonesians often feel more threatened if 
Chinese contest for regional or local government heads. Therefore, Chinese candidates 
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running for these positions tend to face more backlash and racial hostility from 
indigenous Indonesians. 
Another interesting issue that electoral politics helps to highlight is how some 
Chinese in post-Suharto Indonesia have become very protective and assertive in terms of 
their cultural roots and ethnic identity. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the freedom for 
cultural expression opened up in the reform era has allowed these strong ethnic feelings 
to surface and become more visible.  Interestingly therefore, Chinese with a strong ethnic 
identity do not support Chinese politicians whom they consider as not ‗Chinese‘ enough 
and not close to the Chinese community. There are, however, other ideals apart from the 
expression of cultural identity that have emerged in the post-Suharto era. This has to do 
with the combating of corruption, and the attempt to foster good governance. 
Interestingly these different ideals do sometimes clash in the political choices of the 
Chinese Indonesians. Thus there are also Chinese who are more concerned with other 
qualities of a Chinese politician and do not consider his or her ethnic identity as the 
deciding issue. They are willing to support a Chinese politician with a relatively ‗weak‘ 
ethnic identity as long as he or she has good qualities such as being honest and clean, and 
therefore will further the goal of promoting good governance in Indonesia. This implies 
the tensions between two different Chinese ethnic and cultural identities due to different 
habitus of Chinese Indonesians that I have mentioned in Chapter Four. One emphasises 
the revival of Chinese culture and the bolstering of Chinese ethnic identity, another 
focuses on the integration of Chinese Indonesians into the wider Indonesian society. 
Those who strongly support Chinese ethnic and cultural identities often perceive those 
who focus on the integration of the Chinese into the wider Indonesian society as 
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identifying themselves more with the indigenous population than with the Chinese 
community. The ambivalent feelings toward Sofyan Tan within the Chinese community 
in the 2010 mayoral election in Medan clearly reflect such tensions. Tan‘s reformist 
political ideals did not appeal to some local Chinese with a strong ethnic identity because 
they considered him as not ‗Chinese‘ enough and not close to the Chinese community. 
Only the Chinese who considered the integrity of a politician as the most important 
criteria were willing to support him despite his relatively ‗weak‘ ethnic identity.  
Hence, it can be said that under the democratisation process in post-Suharto 
Indonesia, the situation of the Chinese has become more ambivalent and complex. In 
order to pursue their political ambitions, some Chinese politicians resort to money 
politics during their electoral campaigns. Some even cooperate with New Order-linked 
predatory forces. In order to obtain protection and other benefits for their business, some 
Chinese businesspeople prefer to back politicians who can promise them political favours. 
All these have reinforced the perceptions of the Chinese as corrupt and opportunistic. 
Although there are also genuine reform-minded Chinese Indonesian politicians and 
Chinese businesspeople who support them without expecting any political favours in 
return, these appear to be rare. In other words, they are ‗a minority within a minority‘. 
Furthermore, some Chinese with a strong ethnic identity are reluctant to support Chinese 
politicians whom they deem not ‗Chinese‘ enough regardless of their high political ideals. 
Therefore, genuine reform-minded Chinese politicians have only achieved limited 
success in doing away with the corrupt and opportunistic role of Chinese businesspeople 
in politics and bringing positive impact on Indonesian politics. I therefore suggest that in 
a society that experiences uneven democratisation, the resented economically dominant 
258 
 
minorities on the whole tend to resort to money politics and cooperate with predatory 
forces in order to pursue their political agendas. They also tend to prioritise the ethnic 
identity over the integrity or political ideals of a politician when they decide who to 
support during elections. This in return perpetuates the negative stereotypes against them, 

































My stories of different individuals who live and work in post-Suharto Medan and 
Surabaya, have attempted to illustrate the paradoxes of democratisation for ethnic 
minorities. As already mentioned in Chapter One, many scholars have reservations about 
considering democracy as a political system that will necessarily guarantee minority 
rights. Some argue that democratisation tends to bring a backlash against the minorities, 
especially those who play a dominant role in the economy. Some opined that 
democratisation may marginalise or even eliminate the culture of the minorities. However, 
this study shows that such views appeared to be too simplistic. As I have discussed in the 
previous chapters, in the case of Indonesia, the Chinese minority does enjoy certain 
positive outcomes of democratisation since the unravelling of the authoritarian regime. 
Most significantly, anti-Chinese violence has declined considerably and many 
discriminatory measures against the Chinese have been removed. The Chinese are 
allowed to openly express and celebrate their ethnic and cultural identities by establishing 
Chinese organisations and Chinese-language presses. They are also free to become 
involved in electoral politics and run for public office. On the other hand, however, the 
Chinese minority are still perceived by many indigenous Indonesians as a wealthy, selfish, 
exclusive, corrupt and opportunistic alien minority. They remain the perfect target of 
extortion and corruption by government officials, police and premans. The increasing 
visibility of the Chinese in socio-cultural sphere and politics has also resulted in 
suspicion and anger of indigenous Indonesians. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that 
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the situation of the Chinese minority has become increasingly ambivalent and more 
complex since the advent of democratisation in Indonesia.    
This study has shown that the situation of the minorities in a newly democratised 
society largely depends on how democratised the society has become, how well-
established the rule of law and how the minorities respond to and shape the 
democratisation process. According to typologies of Diamond (1999) and Haynes (2001), 
the minority rights are only fully guaranteed under a ―liberal‖ or ―full‖ democracy that 
promotes individual freedom, public participation in the political process, and the rule 
and accountability of public officials to ordinary people. This means if a society has not 
yet developed into a ―liberal‖ or ―full‖ democracy, the interests of the minorities are not 
necessarily guaranteed. To date, Indonesia has not become a ―liberal‖ or ―full‖ 
democracy that truly safeguards the interests of the minorities due to its uneven 
democratisation. On the one hand, a relatively democratic and liberal political 
environment has emerged; but on the other hand, the new political parties and institutions 
have generally been captured by old as well as some new predatory interests. Moreover, 
corruption and internal mismanagement have been plaguing state institutions. In the 
previous chapters, I have explored and shown, through a combination of Anthony 
Giddens‘s structure-agency theory as well as Pierre Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus and 
field, that Chinese Indonesians are by no means merely passive bystanders of the (uneven) 
democratisation process in Indonesia and powerless victims of their increasingly 
ambivalent and complex position. Although the Chinese are constrained by various 
conditions, they also have played an active and dynamic role in responding to and 
shaping the new political, business and socio-cultural environment in post-Suharto 
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Indonesia. In the aspects of business and politics, due to the fear of the hassle of fighting 
back and also the fact that they have enough economic capital (money) to pay the bribes 
and extortion, most Chinese prefer to give in to illegal requests of government officials, 
police and premans in order to prevent any further problems. Some Chinese 
businesspeople have willingly resorted to illegal practices to further their business 
interests. Some make use of their social capital to establish corrupt and patrimonial 
relationships with power-holders, heads of security forces, aspiring politicians and 
youth/crime organisations who can promise them protection and other benefits for their 
business. Some become involved in politics and run for public office with the aim of 
gaining political protection for their business instead of fighting for the interests of the 
general public. In the socio-cultural aspect, due to their strong ethnic identity and their 
well-established social networks in China, many Chinese Indonesian organisation leaders 
strongly support not only Chinese cultural identity, but also continuing ties to China. All 
these have kept alive the general perception of Chinese Indonesians as corrupt, collusive, 
opportunistic, insular and oriented toward China. At the same time, there are also Chinese 
Indonesians such as Sofyan Tan who focus on the integration of Chinese Indonesians into 
the wider Indonesian society. They have been relentlessly working to rectify the negative 
perceptions of Chinese among indigenous Indonesians. They play an active role in 
initiating and engaging in cross-ethnic endeavours that promote inter-ethnic solidarity 
and understanding. However, these Chinese are fewer than those who continue to 
reinforce such negative perceptions. Moreover, they are often perceived as culturally not 
‗Chinese‘ enough by some Chinese with a strong ethnic identity, and therefore become a 
target of dislike among those Chinese. In this way, Chinese Indonesians as a whole have 
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played a part in shaping the uneven democratisation process as well as their increasingly 
ambivalent and more complex position in post-Suharto Indonesia.   
It is hoped that the case studies in this thesis constitute a cutting-edge 
representation of Chinese Indonesian communities in urban centres of post-Suharto 
Indonesia, primarily Medan and Surabaya, since both cities are large and have a 
relatively high percentage of ethnic Chinese. The dynamics of Chinese Indonesian 
communities in post-Suharto urban Indonesia is therefore apparent in this study. 
In broader theoretical terms, this study argues that in order to have a better 
understanding of the relationship between democratisation and minority rights, one 
cannot ignore the agency of the minorities themselves. The situation of the minorities in a 
newly democratised society depends on not only the historical development of ethnic 
relations and various policies of governments, but also how the minorities themselves 
respond to the democratisation process. With regards to the position of the resented 
economically dominant minorities, such as the Chinese in Indonesia, this study suggests 
it is only possible to see a significant improvement in their position if the majority of 
them play an active role in fighting against corrupt practices in state institutions, initiating 
and engaging in cross-ethnic initiatives that seek to alter the negative perceptions against 
them, and supporting genuine reform-minded politicians regardless of their ethnic 
identity. Otherwise, their position will only become increasingly ambivalent and more 
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Mely G. Tan (陈玉兰) (Sociologist), June 8, 2010. 
Christianto Wibisono (黄建国) (Noted economist), June 18, 2010. 
 
Medan 
Dirk A. Buiskool (Historian), July 14, 2010. 
Brilian Moktar (莫粧量) (Member of North Sumatra provincial parliament, 2009-2014), 
July 16, 2010. 
Johan Tjongiran (章生荣) (Ethnic Chinese activist; electoral candidate in 2004 and 2009 
elections), August 3, 2010. 
Hasyim a.k.a. Oei Kien Lim (黄建霖) (Member of Medan city parliament, 2009-2014), 
August 11, 2010. 
Nelly Armayanti (Deputy mayoral candidate in 2010 Medan‘s mayoral election; woman 
activist), August 12, 2010. 
Sofyan Tan (陈金扬) (Mayoral candidate in 2010 Medan‘s mayoral election; electoral 
candidate in 2004 election; social activist; founder and chairperson, Sultan Iskandar 
Muda Educational Foundation [YPSIM]), August 23, 2010; October 13, 2010. 
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Eddy Djuandi (庄钦华) (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in food and beverage 
industry; chairperson, Chinese Indonesian Social Association [PSMTI]‘s North Sumatra 
branch), August 25, 2010. 
Indra Wahidin (黄印华) (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in insurance industry; 
chairperson, Chinese Indonesian Association [INTI]‘s North Sumatra branch; electoral 
candidate in 2004 election), October 19, 2010.  
Anuar Shah (Chairperson, Pancasila Youth [PP]‘s North Sumatra branch), October 30, 
2010. 
Ardjan Leo (廖章然) (Director, Medan Angsapura Social Foundation [Yasora Medan]; 
vice president, North Sumatra‘s Chinese Community Social and Education Association 
[MITSU-PSP]), November 12, 2010. 
Yap Juk Lim (叶郁林) (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in snack production 
industry; chairperson, Medan Deli Regional Forum of Small and Medium Enterprises 
[FORDA UKM Medan Deli]), November 16, 2010.  
 
Surabaya 
Dédé Oetomo (温忠孝) (Social activist; electoral candidate in 1999 and 2004 elections), 
December 24, 2010; August 12, 2012; September 24, 2012. 
Anton Prijatno (王炳金 ) (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in distribution of 
asphalt; chairperson, The University of Surabaya Foundation; former member of the East 
Java provincial legislature, 1977-1987; former member of the national legislature, 1987-
1997; electoral candidate in 2004 election), February 24, 2011. 
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William Rahardja (江国荣 ) (Chairperson, Chinese Indonesian Association [INTI]‘s 
Surabaya branch; travel agent; supplier of consumer goods), March 4, 2011. 
Henky Kurniadi (游经善) (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in real estate industry; 
electoral candidate in 2009 election), March 9, 2011. 
Liem Ou Yen (林武源) (Executive chairperson, Surabaya Chinese Association [PMTS]; 
vice president, Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Association [PERPIT]‘s East Java 
branch; ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in distribution of water pipes), March 23, 
2011. 
Alim Markus (林文光 ) (President director/chief executive officer, Maspion Group; 
chairperson, Surabaya Chinese Association [PMTS]; vice president 1 cum executive 
president, Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Association [PERPIT]), March 23, 2011. 
Hendi Prayogo (吴景贤 ) (Vice chairperson, Chinese Indonesian Social Association 
[PSMTI]‘s East Java branch; founder and chairperson, Committee of Social Concern of 
Surabaya [Kalimas]; social activist; founder of Rela Warta [《诚报》]), March 28, 2011. 
Harry Tanudjaja (陈国樑 ) (Chairperson, Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion 
[PKDI]‘s Surabaya branch; electoral candidate in 1999 and 2009 elections; lawyer), 
March 31, 2011; May 26, 2011. 
Lim Ping Tjien (林秉正) (Chairperson, Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Community 
[PERMIT]‘s East Java branch; ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in glass 
production and processing industry), April 13, 2011. 
Simon Lekatompessy (Member of Surabaya city parliament, 2009-2014), May 5, 2011. 
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Samas H. Widjaja (黄三槐) (Vice chairperson, Chinese Indonesian Social Association 
[PSMTI]‘s East Java branch; former chief editor, Rela Warta; former advisor, Harian 
Naga Surya [《龙阳日报》 ]; former chairperson, New Indonesia Alliance Party 
[PPIB]‘s East Java branch, 2002-2006), May 5, 2011; May 28, 2011. 
Eddy Gunawan Santoso (吴继平) (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in cargo 
industry; activist for inter-religious harmony), May 6, 2011. 
 
Other Informants (with Pseudonyms) 
Jakarta 
Timothy (University lecturer), January 31, 2011. 
Adam (Person in charge, Harian Nusantara [《千岛日报》]‘s Jakarta branch office), 
May 25, 2011.  
 
Medan 
Daniel (deceased) (Former media activist), July 13, 2010; September 17, 2010. 
Farid (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in garment production industry), July 15, 
2010. 
Ivan (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in real estate), July 16, 2010. 
Halim (NGO activist), July 26, 2010. 
Yopie (University lecturer), July 27, 2010. 
Syarfi (Person in charge, Medan Bisnis), July 29, 2010. 
Usman (NGO activist), July 30, 2010. 
Robertus (Journalist), August 2, 2010. 
313 
 
Susanto (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in distribution of toys), August 4, 2010. 
Christopher (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in frozen seafood industry), August 
18, 2010. 
Hasan (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in printing industry; writer), August 19, 
2010. 
Rudy (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in metal-grinding industry), August 25, 
2010. 
Erik (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in iron and plastics industry), August 25, 
2010.  
Surya (Media activist), September 17, 2010. 
Andi (Journalist), September 20, 2010. 
Melani (Person in charge, Medan Zao Bao [《棉兰早报》/Su Bei Ri Bao (《苏北日
报》]), October 22, 2010. 
Janice (Staff, Medan Zao Bao/Su Bei Ri Bao; former staff, Hua Shang Bao [《华商
报》]), November 12, 2010.  
The Lie Hok (Veteran writer), October 31, 2010. 
Amin (Committee member, Medan Angsapura Social Foundation [Yasora Medan]), 
November 2, 2010. 
Joe (Person in charge, Xun Bao [《讯报》]), November 5, 2010. 
Setiawan (Person in charge, Harian Promosi Indonesia [《印广日报》]), November 8, 
2010. 
Eddie (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in distribution of mechanical power-
transmission products), November 10, 2010. 
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Joko (NGO activist), November 11, 2010. 
Patrick (Person in charge, Hao Bao [《好报》]), November 15, 2010. 
 
Surabaya 
Harianto (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in beverage production industry), 
November 23, 2010. 
Yahya (University professor), December 31, 2010. 
Junus (University professor), January 11, 2011. 
Susana (University lecturer; committee member, Women‘s Division of Chinese 
Indonesian Association [INTI]‘s East Java branch; commit member, Hwie Tiauw Ka 
Chinese Clan Association in Surabaya [PHTKS]), January 14, 2011; February 13, 2012. 
Atan (Ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in real estate industry; developer cum 
contractor), February 28, 2011. 
Bambang (Ethnic Chinese ceramic tile factory owner), March 3, 2011. 
Vincent (Advisor, Si Shui Chen Bao [《泗水晨报》]), April 7, 2011. 
Yati (Former staff of a real estate company in Surabaya‘s Chinatown), April 8, 2011. 
Suhaimi (University lecturer), April 27, 2011. 
Wahyu (Economic analyst; university lecturer), May 18, 2011. 







APPENDIX TWO  
Major Chinese Organisations in Post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya 
 




Year of Establishment Remark 
Medan Angsapura Social 
Foundation (Yasora Medan- 
Yayasan Sosial Angsapura 
Medan) 
1895 Formerly known as Hui 
Chew Indonesia in the pre-
New Order period. 
Converted to a charitable 
foundation that provided 
burial service during the 
New Order era. Yasora 
Medan began to include 
again socio-cultural 
activities that promoted 
Chinese culture after the 
demise of the New Order 
regime.  
Indonesian Chinese Social 
Association (PSMTI- 
Paguyuban Sosial Marga 






Tionghoa)‘s local branches 
1999  
North Sumatra‘s Chinese 





Sumatera Utara - Peduli 
Sosial dan Pendidikan) 
2007 A coalition of Chinese 
organisations and Chinese 














Year of Establishment Remark 
Hwie Tiauw Ka Chinese 
Clan Association in 
Surabaya (PHTKS- 
Perkumpulan Hwie Tiauw 
Ka Surabaya) 
1820 Converted to a charitable 
foundation that provided 
burial service during the 
New Order era. PHTKS 
began to include again 
socio-cultural activities that 
promoted Chinese culture 






1985 A coalition of several 
Chinese organisations in 
Surabaya. It carried out its 
activities with a low profile 
during the New Order 
period but became more 
active after the demise of 
the Suharto regime.  
Committee of Social 
Concern of Surabaya 
(Kalimas- Komite Aliansi 
Kepedulian Masyarakat 
Surabaya) 
1998 A coalition of Chinese and 
non-Chinese Indonesian 
social activists and 
university students. Ceased 
operation in 2000. 
Chinese Indonesian Social 
Association (PSMTI- 
Paguyuban Sosial Marga 























APPENDIX THREE  
Chinese-Language Presses in Post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya 
 
Chinese-Language Presses in Post-Suharto Medan 
 
Chinese-Language Press Year of Establishment Remark 
Harian Promosi Indonesia 
(《印广日报》) 
1999  
Su Bei Ri Bao (《苏北日
报》) 
2002 Previously known as Hua 
Shang Bao (《华商报》 
and later Medan Zao Bao 
(《棉兰早报》). It is a 
subsidiary paper of Guo Ji 
Ri Bao (《国际日报》), 
the largest Chinese-
language daily in Jakarta. 
Xun Bao (《讯报》) 2007 A sister paper of Kwong 
Wah Yit Poh (《光华日
报》), a Chinese-language 
daily in Malaysia.  
Hao Bao (《好报》) 2008 A sister paper of Harian 
Analisa, one of the well-
established Indonesian-
language dailies in Medan. 
It was first published as a 
weekly paper in 2008 and 
was later converted to a 
daily paper in 2010. 
 
Chinese-Language Presses in Post-Suharto Surabaya 
 
Chinese-Language Press Year of Establishment Remark 
Harian Naga Surya (《龙
阳日报》) 





Rela Warta (《诚报》) 2001 It ceased publication in 
2009. 
Si Shui Chen Bao (《泗水
晨报》) 
2008 It is a subsidiary paper of 
Guo Ji Ri Bao (《国际日
报》), the largest Chinese-






Occupational Backgrounds of Local Major Chinese Organisations’ 
Leaders in Medan and Surabaya, 2010-2011 
 
Occupational Backgrounds of Local Major Chinese Organisations’ Leaders in 
Medan, 2010-2011 
 
Name of Chinese 
Organisation 
Name of Chairperson Occupation of 
Chairperson 
Indonesian Chinese Social 
Association (PSMTI)‘s 
North Sumatra branch 
Eddy Djuandi (庄钦华) 
 
Businessperson engaged in 
food and beverage industry 
Indonesian Chinese Social 
Association  (PSMTI)‘s 
Medan branch 
Joko Dharmanadi (杨果奋) Electrical products supplier 
Chinese Indonesian 
Association (INTI)‘s North 
Sumatra branch 






Medan Angsapura Social 
Foundation (Yasora Medan) 
Hakim Tanjung (曾来金) Businessperson engaged in 
wood making industry 
North Sumatra‘s Chinese 
Community Social and 
Education Association 
(MITSU-PSP) 
Fajar Suhendra (苏用发) Businessperson engaged in 
steel industry 
 
Sources: Interview with Hasyim, in Indonesian, August 11, 2010; interview with 
Christopher, in Indonesian, August 28, 2010; interview with Eddy Djuandi, in Mandarin, 
August 25, 2010; interview with Indra Wahidin, in Mandarin, October 19, 2010; 
interview with Ardjan Leo, in Mandarin, November 12, 2010; ―Hakim Tanjung Kembali 
Pimpin Yasora Medan‖ (2012); ―Surat Palsu Muluskan Illegal Logging di Tapsel‖ 
(2009). 
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 The names of informants in this appendix are pseudonyms except for the following public figures: 
Hasyim, Eddy Djuandi, Indra Wahidin, Ardjan Leo, William Rahardja, Liem Ou Yen, Alim Markus, Hendi 





Occupational Backgrounds of Local Major Chinese Organisations’ Leaders in 
Surabaya, 2010-2011 
 
  Name of Chinese 
Organisation 
Name of Chairperson Occupation of 
Chairperson 
Indonesian Chinese Social 
Association (PSMTI)‘s East 
Java branch 
Jos Soetomo (江庆德) Businessperson engaged in 
logging industry 
Indonesian Chinese Social 
Association (PSMTI)‘s 
Surabaya branch 
Tirto Wardono Pharmacy owner 
Chinese Indonesian 
Association (INTI)‘s East 
Java branch 
Aliptojo Wongsodihardjo  
(黄奋立) 
Traditional Chinese 




William Raharja (江国荣) Travel agent; supplier of 




Alim Markus (林文光) Maspion Group owner 
Hwie Tiauw Ka Chinese 
Clan Association in 
Surabaya (PHTKS) 
Benny Saiful (黄奋鹏) Owner of a pharmaceutical 




(PERPIT)‘s East Java 
branch 
Chen Yi Tuan (陈宜团) Businessperson engaged in 




(PERMIT)‘s East Java 
branch 
Lim Ping Tjien (林秉正) Businessperson engaged in 
glass production and 
processing industry. 
 
Sources: Interview with William Rahardja, in Indonesian, March 4, 2011; interview with 
Liem Ou Yen, in Mandarin, March 23, 2011; interview with Alim Markus, in Mandarin, 
March 23, 2011; interview with Hendi Prayogo, in Indonesian, March 28, 2011; 
interview with Lim Ping Tjien, in Mandarin, April 13, 2011; interview with Susana, in 





Numbers of Protégés of Sultan Iskandar Muda Educational Foundation, 
1990/1991-2011/2012 
 
No. Academic Year Number of Protégés   Category 
Non-Chinese Chinese 
1 1990/1991 17 9 8 
2 1991/1992 30 14 16 
3 1992/1993 60 34 26 
4 1993/1994 90 57 33 
5 1994/1995 86 54 32 
6 1995/1996 119 71 48 
7 1996/1997 131 90 41 
8 1997/1998 95 49 46 
9 1998/1999 98 52 36 
10 1999/2000 112 67 45 
11 2000/2001 98 64 34 
12 2001/2002 77 42 35 
13 2002/2003 78 54 24 
14 2003/2004 76 62 14 
15 2004/2005 89 Not available Not available 
16 2005/2006 91 Not available Not available 
17 2006/2007 86 Not available Not available 
18 2007/2008 113 Not available Not available 
19 2008/2009 107 Not available Not available 
20 2009/2010 115 Not available Not available 
21 2010/2011 183 Not available Not available 
22 2011/2012 204 Not available Not available 
 









APPENDIX SIX  
Original Text of Letter in Koran Tempo (May 15, 2012) 
 
Bubarkan Perkumpulan Tionghoa 
Pada 20 April lalu, delegasi rombongan Kantor Urusan Overseas Chinese dari 
Beijing berkunjung ke Jakarta, dan melakukan pertemuan dengan Perkumpulan Dagang 
Tionghoa Indonesia. Dalam sambutannya, Kepala Bidang Overseas Chinese Li In Zhe 
antara lain mengucapkan: orang Tionghoa yang tersebar di semua pelosok telah 
menciptakan untuk Tiongkok ―hubungan overseas‖ yang baik. Inilah kelebihan yang 
tidak dimiliki bangsa mana pun.  Saat ini ekonomi Tiongkok telah menjadi terbesar kedua 
di dunia.  Ini tidak terlepas dari sumbangsih besar yang dilakukan oleh orang 
Tionghoa/Chinese overseas. 
Dia juga mengatakan maksud kunjungan kali ini adalah membantu generasi muda 
Tionghoa/Chinese overseas dalam hal mempelajari bahasa Tionghoa. Belajar bahasa 
Tionghoa dan memahami budaya Tionghoa akan menjadi penting dalam meningkatkan 
kemasifan bangsa Tionghoa. Maka dia berharap kaum muda Tionghoa di luar negeri 
belajar bahasa Tionghoa dengan baik, memperkuat kontak hubungan dengan kaum muda 
di dalam negeri (Tiongkok), dan memperkuat pengakuan rasa kebangsaan bersama. 
Kunjungan-kunjungan seperti itu juga didapati di kota-kota di luar Jakarta. Untuk 
kepentingan nasional kita, bangsa Indonesia, terutama dalam pembangunan bangsa dan 
character building, juga untuk mencegah penggunaan ―perkumpulan-perkumpulan 
Tionghoa‖ sebagai alat kolone kelima. Sudah sepantasnya kita membubarkan dan 
melarang perkumpulan yang bersifat eksklusif ―Tionghoa‖. Peranan ormas-ormas 
menjadi sangat penting untuk menyikapi hal ini, karena pemerintah pasti akan melakukan 
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pembiaran, tanpa adanya tuntutan yang kuat dari masyarakat!  Jangan biarkan reformasi 
kita ditunggangi kepentingan asing, 
 
Sastrawinata 
Jalan Benda , Cilandak Timur 























List of Chinese Indonesian Candidates Running for Parliamentary 
Elections in Medan and Surabaya, 1999-2009 
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 The names of informants in this appendix are pseudonyms except for the following public figures: 
Sofyan Tan, Dédé Oemoto, Anton Prijatno, William Rahardja, Henky Kurniadi, Hendi Prayogo, Harry 
Tanudjaja, Simon Lekatompessy and Samas H. Widjaja. 
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 Data obtained from: ―10 Cara memilih Anggota DPRD Sumut‖ (2004, p. 5); Go (2004); ―Bakom PKB 
Medan Tempatkan Empat Kadernya Sebagai Calon Legislatif‖ (2004, p. 19); ―Karya Elly, SH‖ (2004, p. 
2); ―Ketua Pimpinan Cabang Partai PIB Kota Medan Sumandi Wijaya‖ (2004, p. 2); ―Mohon Doa Restu 
Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru‖ (2004, p. 9); ―Partai Pilihan Kami!‖ (2004, p. 3); ―Warga Tionghoa 
Harus Manfaatkan Peluang yang Dibuka Gubsu‖ (2004, p. 3); Indonesian Electoral Commission (2008b); 
―PDI Perjuangan Serahkan 2,8 Ton Kayu‖ (2008); ―Caleg DPRD Sumut dari PPRN Kie Hock Kwen[g]‖ 
(2009, p. 30); ―Daerah Pemilihan Sumut 1 DPRD Sumut‖ (2009, p. 12); ―Golput Bukan Solusi‖ (2009, p. 
11); ―Gunakan Akal Sehat, Pilih Partai PIB‖ (2009, p. 16); ―Kepedulian terhadap Masyarakat Harus 
Ditumbuhkan‖ (2009, p. 11); ―Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia‖ (2009, p. 5); ―Peluang Kursi Caleg 
DPRD Dapil 1 Medan‖ (2009, p. 4); ―Peluang Kursi Caleg DPRD Dapil 3 Medan‖ (2009, p. 4); ―Peluang 
Kursi Caleg DPRD Dapil 4 Medan‖ (2009, p. 4); ―Pilihlah kami!!!‖ (2009, p. M4); ―Rusmin Lawin dan 
Kepedulian terhadap Musik Tradisional‖ (2009, p. 10); ―Wong Cung Sen Tak Bayar Sate‖ (2009); ―Xuan 
Min Bu Shi Hua Yi Hou Xuan Ren‖ (2009); ―Ketua DPP Golkar‖ (2009); Harahap (2010); ―Sofyan Tan-
Nelly Dapat Dukuangan 19 Parpol‖ (2010, p. 6); interview with Ivan, in Hokkien, July 16, 2010; interview 
with Syarfi, in Indonesian, July 29, 2010; interview with Christopher, in Indonesian, August 18, 2010; 




































































Male PPIB Lawyer City/Not elected 
 Lily Tan 
(陈俐篥) 
Female PPIB Tax accountant City/Not elected 
 Ek Kiong 
(黄弈强) 
Male PPIB Not available City/Not elected 
 Suherman 
Gatot (吴







Male PPIB Lawyer City/Not elected 












Male PAN Businessperson City/Not elected 
2009 Rusmin 
Lawin 








Male Gerindra Not Available National/Not 
elected 






































 Kie Hock 
Kweng 
Male PPRN Not available Provincial/Not 
elected 
 Lily Tan 
(陈俐篥) 
Female PPIB Tax accountant City/Elected 
 Janlie (饶
洁莉) 













 A Hie (王
天喜) 












 Rudi Arif Male Golkar Physician City/Not elected 




Male PKPI Not available City/Not elected 
 
* For parliamentary elections at national, provincial and local levels, only constituencies 
that covered Medan are included, i.e. North Sumatra 1 (Medan, Deli Serdang, Serdang 
Bedagai and Tebing Tinggi) for national parliamentary elections, Medan City for 



















































Female PDI-P Not available City/Elected 
 Bambang 
Handoko 

















 Dédé Oetomo 
(温忠孝) 
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 Data obtained from: Li (2004, p. 104); introductory advertisement of PIB‘s East Java candidates 
contested in the 2004 parliamentary election (2004, p. 1); Surabaya City Government (n.d.); ―Yin Hua 
Guan Xin Pu Xuan Li Shi Hui‖ (2004, p. 16); Yunianto (2004a; 2004b; 2004c); ―Geng Shen Ceng Di Ren 
Shi Zheng Wen Ying (Johan Tedja Surya)‖ (2009, p. 16); ―M. SOKA, DRS., SH., MH‖ (2009, p. 17); 
Indonesian Electoral Commission (2008a); interview with Dédé Oetomo, in English, December 24, 2010; 
interview with Yahya, in Indonesian, December 31, 2010; interview with Anton Prijatno, in Indonesian, 
February 24, 2011; interview with William Rahardja, in Indonesian, March 4, 2011; interview with Henky 
Kurniadi, in Indonesian, March 9, 2010; interview with Hendi Prayogo, in Indonesian, March 28, 2011; 
interview with Harry Tanudjaja, in Indonesian, March 31, 2011; May 26, 2011; interview with Simon 


















 Soetanto Adi 
(陈纪雄) 


































 Johan Tedja 
Surya (郑文
英) 


















Male PDI-P Businessperson 






 M. Soka (胡
赐嘉) 












 Nyoto Wijaya 
(杨富盛) 
Male PKPI Not available National/Not 
elected 
 Abdul Chalim 
MZ. H. (李光
霖) 
























































Female PD Not available City/Elected 







* For parliamentary elections at national, provincial and local levels, only constituencies 
that covered Surabaya are included, i.e. East Java 1 (Surabaya and Sidoarjo) for national 
parliamentary elections, Surabaya City for provincial parliamentary elections, and all 
constituencies in Surabaya for city parliamentary elections. 
 
Notes: 
Gerindra: Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya) 
Golkar: Party of Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya) 
PAN: National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) 
PBI: Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia) 
PD: Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) 
PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Perjuangan) 
PDS: Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera) 
PKDI: Indonesian Democracy Devotion Party (Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia)  
PKPI: Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia) 
PKS: Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) 
PNBK: Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party (Partai Nasional Benteng 
Kemerdekaan) 
PPIB: New Indonesia Alliance Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru)/New 
Indonesia Party of Struggle (Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru) 
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PPRN: National People‘s Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional) 
PRD: People‘s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik) 
PRN: Republic of Indonesia Party (Partai Republika Nusantara) 
 
